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Chapter 1
Introduction
The creation of the single European currency in 1999 is an unprecedented experiment in
modern international nance. In 2004, the European Union admitted ten new member
states and is in negotiation with additional countries to join at a later stage. The
inclusion of these new and prospective members in the euro area will be one of the
greatest EU challenges ahead.
This dissertation addresses a number of resulting fundamental policy questions of
European monetary integration. Which of the new member states are ready to adopt
the euro, in the sense that their business cycles show su¢ cient synchronisation with the
euro area? What has been driving cycle synchronisation among the existing euro area
countries and what can we infer about potential endogenous e¤ects of the euro? What is
the role of risk-sharing and nancial integration in the context of monetary union, and
may benecial risk-sharing e¤ects make up for lacking cycle synchronisation of the euro
adopters?
In the following, we contextualises these questions by highlighting the political envi-
ronment of monetary integration in Europe. We then discuss the concepts and results
of the three major dissertation chapters, each presented in the light of the relevant
theoretical and empirical literature.
1
1.1 The political context
This section provides background information on the historical and present challenges
of European monetary integration. We briey review the landmarks on the road to the
euro and highlight the current political questions arising from EU enlargement and the
new member statestransition towards the euro.
1.1.1 A short history of European monetary integration
First attempts towards monetary unication were made in the late 1960s when the in-
ternational monetary environment started to show signs of instability. The 1970 Werner
Report proposed a stepwise procedure to create an economic and monetary union by
1980. This included narrowing uctuation margins of the European currencies which
became known as the "snake". During the 1970s, the break-down of the Bretton Woods
system of xed exchange rates as well as the oil crises created substantial tension in
the world economy. The divergent policy responses by the EU member states to these
economic shocks slowed down the process of monetary integration.1 It was only in 1979
that this process regained momentum with the establishment of the European Monetary
System with its parity grid and the European Currency Unit (ECU) which served as
basket currency. The idea of a single currency resurfaced after the Single European Act
was launched in 1987. The common market, it was argued, would remain incomplete
without a common currency. The Delors Report, published in 1989, became the blue-
print for the chapters on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty on the European Union. The road to the euro was to be taken in three stages,
the third of which involved the establishment of the European Central Bank and the
introduction of the euro as a unit of account in 1999. Three years later, the changeover
to the euro was completed when euro banknotes and coins were brought into circulation.
1The European Union emerged from the European Community of Coal and Steel, the European
Atomic Community and the European Economic Community which became the European Community.
For the sake of simplicity, we use the term "European Union" throughout.
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Eleven EU member states qualied initially for the single currency while Greece joined
the euro area in 2001.2 With the enlargement of the EU by ten countries in 2004, the
new member states entered the European System of Central Banks and are committed
to prepare for eventual adoption of the euro.
1.1.2 Euro area enlargement
Having fullled the acquis communautaire, the new members are formally part of EMU
already although being in the preparatory phase for the adoption of the euro. Since
no "opt-out clauses" as for Denmark and the UK were granted during the accession
talks, all new members are required to take the necessary steps towards full monetary
integration as specied by the Maastricht convergence criteria. Besides convergence
in ination rates, budget and debt positions, the criteria include a compulsory two-year
membership in the second generation of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) without
major disturbance. Subsequently, the nal stage of EMU involves introducing the euro
as the sole legal tender. To date, six out of the ten new member states have entered ERM
II already so that, provided that the remaining convergence criteria will be fullled, the
euro area may be enlarged as soon as 2006.3
1.2 Literature review and summary of results
Given this political framework, the question of optimal timing arises from an economic
point of view. What does economic theory say on currency union membership? What
are the answers that empirical analysis can provide on the question of the optimal
timing towards euro adoption? In the following, we highlight the major three strands in
2The eleven original euro area members were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal.
3Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia joined ERM II in June 2004, Cyprus, Latvia, and Malta followed in
April 2005. As a matter of fact, Slovenia will join the euro area in 2007 whereas Lithuanias application
was rejected by the European Commission, on the grounds of the excessive Lithuanian ination rate.
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currency union economics: classical optimum currency area theory, the endogeneity of
optimum currency areas, and the role of nancial markets and risk sharing in monetary
unions. These strands correspond to the three subsequent chapters of analysis. In each
of the following sub-sections we rst elucidate the theoretical background and review the
existing empirical research before we summarise the conceptual frameworks and the key
results of the economic contributions that constitute the remainder of this dissertation.
1.2.1 The initial optimum currency area approach
This section goes back to the roots of currency union research and reviews the original
ideas of the optimum currency area (OCA) approach from the 1960s. We then highlight
the empirical evidence which builds on this basic framework which, eventually, brings
us to the analysis of common trends and cycles of the new member states with the euro
area.
The theoretical framework of Mundell I
The theory of optimum currency areas has been at the heart of currency union research.
Although it is no fully-edged theory, the initial OCA framework provides helpful guide-
lines for the investigation whether or not certain countries would be good candidates for
a currency union.4 We rst describe the basic OCA ideas before we outline various at-
tempts to model OCA theory more formally. This early OCA approach has been known
as Mundell I, distinguishing it from Mundells later work to which we come below.
In his seminal contribution, Mundell (1961) highlights that regions with similar eco-
nomic characteristics may benet from a common currency even if they do not belong to
the same national federation, i.e. if "the national currency area does not coincide with
the optimum currency area" (Mundell 1961: 657). The e¢ ciency benets of a common
currency need, however, to be weighted against the costs of renouncing independent
4See Mongelli (2002) for a review on the extensive OCA literature.
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monetary policy and exchange rate adjustments.
Over the subsequent years, a number of criteria have evolved which typically charac-
terise an OCA. First, the exibility and mobility of production factors is regarded as a
key prerequisite, see Mundell (1961). If wages can adjust freely and capital or labour can
re-allocate without restrictions, the need for exchange rate adjustments in response to
economic disturbances is reduced. Second, the more open a country is to international
trade, the more is the domestic economy inuenced by international price changes. McK-
innon (1963) argues that, hence, the scope of national monetary policy and exchange
rate adjustments is naturally low. Third, Kenen (1969) suggests that a more diversied
economy is favourable because it is less threatened by idiosyncratic shocks and hence
not so much in need of domestic monetary or exchange rate response. Furthermore,
interregional compensation schemes and the political will for integration have been cited
as additional aspects of OCAs, see Krugman (1993) and Mongelli (2002).
Some attempts have been undertaken to formalise the Mundell I catalogue of verbal
arguments and translate them into mathematical models. Bayoumi (1994) presents
a micro-founded general equilibrium model of trade which integrates and compares the
criteria of the early OCA framework. The two-country model assumes full specialisation,
labour immobility and downward wage rigidity. In case of individual currencies, the
nominal exchange rate adjusts for relative price changes due to asymmetric shocks. In a
currency union, however, this adjustment mechanism is absent. Since prices and wages
cannot decrease, the adversely a¤ected country will su¤er unemployment. The costs of
the common currency depend on the size of the asymmetric shock and their correlation.
Benets arise in this model mainly from saved transaction costs. In consequence, the net
benet of a currency union with asymmetric shocks is greater the larger the transaction
costs, the higher the trade volume, the smaller the asymmetric shocks and the larger the
correlation of disturbances. Hence, the model integrates McKinnons openness criterion
as well as Kenens argument on diversication - via the size and correlation of shocks.
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Also, Mundells initial labour mobility criterion is included, in that it would provide an
alternative adjustment tool to alleviate regional unemployment in the rst place.
Other currency union models analyse a common currency as a commitment de-
vice. This literature builds on models of credibility in monetary policy of the Kydland-
Prescott/Barro-Gordon-type.5 Typically, a loss function describes the goals of monetary
policy, in that the central bank would minimise the deviations from output and ina-
tion targets, in the presence of supply shocks. Then discretionary monetary policy is
compared with various commitment designs under dynamic consistency aspects. By
adopting a credible anchor currency, a client country can benet by "importing" credi-
bility and a reputation of stability. However, if the supply shocks of the client country
deviate substantially from those of the anchor countrys economy, the client may incur
considerable costs. Alesina and Barro (2002) present a version of such a model and
demonstrate that countries with a high-ination record and closely correlated business
cycles benet most from currency union. In addition, they show that small countries
with a large trade share have the hightest potential for reduction in transaction costs in
a currency union.
Empirical evidence based on Mundell I
It has proved di¢ cult to test the OCA criteria empirically in a systematic and consis-
tent manner. For instance, labour market exibility is notoriously di¢ cult to quantify.
Also, similarity indices of diversication or capital mobility tend to involve a signicant
degree of subjectivity. Instead, it has become customary to analyse the symmetry in the
stochastic experience of countrieseconomic performance, i.e. the symmetry of shocks
or the synchronisation of business cycles. This approach has been known as the "meta
property" of OCA theory because most of the individual criteria translate into the prob-
ability of asymmetric shocks and the economys ability to respond to these shocks, see
5See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996) or Illing (1997).
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Masson and Taylor (1993) and Mongelli (2002). For example, the more diversied the
economic structure, the less likely is the occurance of idiosyncratic shocks in the rst
place. Moreover, if the countries are very trade-integrated, the probability of being hit
by symmetric shocks tends to be larger. In case of mobile production factors and scal
federalism, adjustments in these areas can cushion the adverse impacts of asymmetric
shocks. Thus, the more symmetric the shocks, or the more synchronised the business
cycle behaviour of two countries, the more likely it is that the major OCA criteria are
satised.
Two alternative ways of measuring the stochastic experience stand out. One part
of the literature attempts to measure the similarity of shocks directly. Based on the
structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) approach of Blanchard and Quah (1989) these
scholars distinguish demand and supply shocks by imposing the assumption that only
supply shocks exert a permanent e¤ect on output, while the long-term impact of demand
shocks is restricted to zero. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) apply this methodology
to Western Europe. They argue that the more similar the incidence of shocks across
countries, the better are the OCA criteria fullled and the more likely a country would
benet from currency union. Comparing European countries to US regions, they estab-
lish a core-periphery distinction and assert that only a few core EU countries would be
suited for EMU.
Another branch of the literature adopts a more general approach and explores the
observed comovement of short-run stochastic output behaviour, i.e. the synchronisation
of business cycles. Mostly, real output data have been de-trended using the Hodrick-
Prescott lter or the Baxter-King band-pass lter. The correlation coe¢ cients of the
resulting cyclical output components are then interpreted as synchronisation indicators
across countries. Also, Markov-switching VARs have been employed to identify a com-
mon European cycle, see Artis et al. (2004). Furthermore, Engle and Kozicki (1993) for-
mulate the common features approach which investigates business cycle synchronisation
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by identifying common serial correlation features on the basis of cointegration. Vahid
and Engle (1997) develop the advanced codependence technique. Rubin and Thygesen
(1996) apply an early version of the common features test and nd some evidence of
common cycles among Western European countries in the run-up to EMU.
A number of studies with a focus on various Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries (CEECs) and the euro area have been conducted recently. These papers typically
employ either SVAR approaches or determine simple correlations of cyclical output com-
ponents. Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006) provide a comprehensive literature overview and
perform a meta-analysis of business cycle correlation. They identify substantial di¤er-
ences between the studies reviewed and highlight the di¢ culties of empirical analysis in
the context of transition countries regarding data availability and methodological valid-
ity. On the whole, their survey concludes that the cycles of several CEECs are relatively
highly correlated with the euro area cycle, in particular those of Slovenia, Hungary,
Poland and, to a lesser extent, Estonia.
However, little attention has so far been paid to the combined analysis of long-
run trends and short-run cycles, as incorporated in the common features/codependence
technique. While most of the reviewed studies adopt the SVAR technique, only Buch
and Döpke (2000) apply the common features framework on the CEECs. They nd little
evidence of common cycles, which may, however, be due to the limited data period at
the time the study was conducted.
Common trends and cycles of Central and Eastern Europe and the euro area
Chapter 2 of this dissertation tests the meta-property of the OCA theory for selected
CEECs in relation to the euro area. We follow the approach of cycle synchronisation
and not the strategy of shock incidence. The SVAR methodology of imposing identify-
ing restrictions by labelling shocks "demand" and "supply" has not been undisputed.6
6Juselius (2004) and Rubin and Thygesen (1996) criticise the arbitrariness of imposing restrictions
that are based on theoretical grounds instead of allowing the data to determine the model.
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The strategy of applying zero restrictions for relatively short time series may lead to
uncertainties in the results. Moreover, observing output comovements instead of shocks
to catch the OCA "meta property" incorporates not only the external shocks themselves
but also the capability of the economies to respond to such shocks.
Based on this rationale, our study makes two contributions. First, we apply an inte-
grated cointegration/codependence approach to investigate long-run output comovement
and short-run synchronisation of business cycles between eight CEECs and the euro area.
The codependence technique does not only focus on the short-run properties of the time
series but considers the comovement of both long-run trends and short-run cycles. To
investigate the common cycle properties correctly, the results of the preceding cointe-
gration analysis feed into the calculation. Second, the approach takes seasonal e¤ects
explicitly into account. Instead of applying up-front seasonal adjustment procedures,
we resort to non-adjusted data and employ seasonal cointegration and codependence
techniques which incorporate the seasonality into the statistical model. This strategy
draws on the seasonal version of the codependence analysis based on Vahid and Engle
(1997) and Cubadda (1999).
We analyse trend and cycle comovement successively. The trend analysis is the
foundation of the subsequent cycle tests and estimates catching-up and steady-state
convergence. A simple cross-section regression conrms the catching-up convergence hy-
pothesis in that it indicates signicantly higher average growth rates for those countries
with lower initial income levels. Apparently, most CEECs under investigation are still
in the process of transition towards the steady-state equilibrium. This assertion is con-
rmed by the cointegration analysis. Using quarterly, not seasonally adjusted industrial
production data for the aggregate euro area plus the eight individual countries, we per-
form bivariate seasonal cointegration tests for each country vis-à-vis the euro area. We
nd no cointegration relations at standard frequency and conclude that the CEECs are
still largely in transition towards the steady-state equilibrium. The negative cointegra-
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tion result is consistent with the existence of catching-up convergence because the two
convergence concepts can be regarded as mutually exclusive.
The tests for common business cycles divide into the categories of synchronised and
non-synchronised common cycles. We nd only one case of synchronised common cycles
when testing for contemporaneous common serial correlation features, Slovenia. This
indicates that the remaining countries do not share common cycles with the euro area.
Regarding common but non-synchronised cycles, we test for codependence as we allow
for a delay in the response to shocks. Due to ine¢ ciencies in the propagation mechanism
of shocks, the CEECs may respond to shocks but not in the initial period. In fact, we
nd evidence of rst-order codependence for Hungary, Slovakia and, as a borderline case,
the Czech Republic. Estonia shows signs of second-order codependence. These countries
can, therefore, be considered as having an intermediate degree of cyclical comovement
with the euro area. For Poland, as well as for the candidate countries Croatia and
Turkey, we do not nd any codependence. Their cycles do not even align to that of the
euro area after a certain delay.
In sum, these results seem to suggest that real integration of the CEECs with the euro
area is still limited. In the framework of Mundell I, only Slovenia appears well-equipped
for joining the euro soon. For most of the other CEECs, however, giving up individual
monetary policies at a too early stage may entail the risk of incurring major costs. For
these countries, there is still some way to go to achieve business cycle synchronisation.
1.2.2 Endogeneity of optimum currency areas
This section examines the second major strand in currency union analysis dealing with
the potential endogenous e¤ects which a common currency may unfold. It was chiey the
seminal contribution of Frankel and Rose (1998) which enkindled a number of studies in
this area. This sub-section investigates the theoretical rationale, outlines the empirical
evidence and summarises the related study of Chapter 3.
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Theoretical models of OCA endogeneity
The endogeneity argument is as follows. While the traditional OCA criteria are formu-
lated as prerequisites for currency union, they may in fact evolve as a very consequence
of the introduction of a common currency. The currency union itself may increase trade
and synchronise business cycles so that, even if a country group would not have qualied
as an OCA ex ante, it may turn into an OCA ex post.
A major discussion has revolved around the question whether or not increased trade
would in fact lead to more closely synchronised business cycles. The European Commis-
sion (1990) expects more trade to have a positive inuence on cycle comovement. This
view would be substantiated if economic shocks were predominantly demand-driven and
hence spill over more easily across countries via the trade channel. Also, a large degree
of intra-industry trade would suggest the rising importance of common shocks, as op-
posed to idiosyncratic shocks. Krugman (1993), however, suggests that a rise in trade
would facilitate industry specialisation across countries and hence trade would become
increasingly inter-industry. In this case, we would expect the synchronisation of business
cycles to go down as a result of currency union.7
The endogeneity debate has produced a few formal models. Ricci (2006) develops a
monetary model with rm-location choice and nds that irrevocably xed exchange rates
can reduce shock asymmetry. This is mainly due to the rmsassumed preferences for
exchange rate stability, so that, in case of oating rates, rms of a certain industry would
agglomerate in the country where macro shocks coincide with the shocks faced by the
specic industry of the rm. In the presence of a currency area, variability-adverse rms
can therefore a¤ord to spread more evenly across countries. As a result, diversication
and intra-industry increases in a currency union, generating more synchronous cycles.
7While Krugman (1993) argues that the euro area may follow the U.S. example of increased speciali-
sation, Clark and van Wincoop (2001: 71) point out that U.S. census regions have actually become less
specialised during the post-war period and that, in 1986, the degree of specialisation in the U.S. and in
Europe were about the same.
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Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) present a model of "self-validating optimum currency
areas" which is independent of real integration and intra-industry trade e¤ects. Allowing
for imperfect pass-through of exchange rate onto export prices, they show that, in the
presence of a credible commitment to currency union, an equilibrium may emerge in
which rms preset prices not in domestic but in consumer currency. In this case of zero
pass-through, monetary policies are symmetric across countries, so there is no cost of
giving up monetary sovereignty and the currency union becomes self-validating. As a
result, output correlation is higher under currency union than under the alternative,
oating regime where monetary policy reacts to shocks.
Endogeneity empirics
The endogeneity debate started with a series of empirical papers by Andrew Rose and
co-authors in the late 1990s. Frankel and Rose (1998) refute Krugmans (1993) proposi-
tion and nd a positive e¤ect of trade on business cycle synchronisation. They interprete
their result as an indication of the endogeneity of optimum currency areas. Rose (2000)
conducts a gravity analysis, regressing bilateral trade on relative country size, geograph-
ical distance and numerous control variables. To isolate the e¤ect of a common currency
on trade, he introduces a currency union dummy. His results claim that the mere fact of
having a common currency is associated with trade volumes higher by a factor of up to
three, in relation to those countries that were not part of the same currency union. Engel
and Rose (2002) extend the analysis and nd a signicantly positive e¤ect of currency
unions on the correlation of business cycles. Frankel and Rose (2002) link the currency
union e¤ect on trade to an increase in output.
This approach has evoked much criticism. It has been noted, for example, that the
"Rose e¤ect" of currency unions could only be substantiated when using a vast dataset
of diverse countries which involves tiny island states and in which many currency unions
are in fact overseas dependencies. Only the East Carribean Currency Area stands out
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as a currency union of todays understanding wheras EMU is not considered.
Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004) and Imbs (2004) analyse large samples of both de-
veloping and industrialised countries and nd trade ows, specialisation and nancial
integration to be important factors for business cycle synchronisation. Their results are,
however, not unequivocal and seem to depend on the country samples and time periods
chosen.
In the wake of the studies pursued by Rose and co-authors, several scholars under-
took the attempt to extend the analysis on the euro area. For instance, Micco et al.
(2003) replicate the Rose-type regression approach, employing the most recent data and
incorporating various EU-specic variables to control for other aspects of European inte-
gration. They tend to nd moderate trade e¤fects of the euro but they have to conclude
that it may still be too early to detect a signicant and robust e¤ect.
Analysing the degree of business cycle synchronisation over time, various studies
indicate increasing synchronicity as monetary integration in Europe intensied, see for
example Artis and Zhang (1997, 1999) or Massmann and Mitchell (2004). Applying
Markov Switching VAR models, Artis and al. (2004) nd evidence of a distinct European
business cycle.
Determinants of business cycle synchronisation across euro area countries
The contribution of Chapter 3 of this dissertation deals with the underlying factors of
cycle synchronisation in the euro area and hence addresses the endogeneity argument
for those countries which have adopted the euro already. We do not try to calculate
the currency union e¤ect of EMU explicitly because we believe the results of previous
attempts have been rather tentative due to the short time period and problems in truely
isolating the e¤ect of the euro from other inuences. Rather, we ask which factors are
signicantly, and robustly, associated with business cycle synchronisation across euro
area countries.
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We investigate a number of potential determinants of cycle synchronisation in the
context of European monetary integration. Our intention is to nd out why, inside the
euro area, the business cycles of some country pairs are more synchronised than others
and whether the importance of these mechanisms have increased or declined over time.
We test some standard determinants and, in addition, consider a number of EMU-specic
policy and structural indicators which, to our knowledge, have not been tested in this
context. We check robustness by applying the extreme-bounds analysis framework as
suggested by Leamer (1983) and further developed by Levine and Renelt (1992) and
by Sala-i-Martin (1997). Also, we divide our 25-year sample period into sub-samples in
order to capture changing e¤ects throughout the di¤erent stages of European integration.
Our main results are as follows. We nd that bilateral trade have indeed been a
robust, positive determinant of business cycle synchronisation. Hence, we see the endo-
geneity hypothesis of Frankel and Rose (1998) conrmed for the euro area: countries
with larger trade volumes tend to have more closely synchronised business cycles. Al-
though we observe this phenomenon over the whole sample, its explanatory power seems
to be driven mainly by the earlier sub-sample, 1980-1996. During the period of prepa-
ration for EMU and actual currency union, since 1997, we nd that the di¤erences in
trade structure emerge as robust determinants of cycle synchronisation. In other words,
the degree of intra-industry trade plays an increasingly important role in binding euro
area business cycles together. In combination with our descriptive nding of rising intra-
industry trade among euro area countries, this result seems to point at the potential ex
post optimality of the euro area.
Regarding our policy and structural indicators, scal decit di¤erentials appear to
have driven di¤erences between business cycles until the preparation for EMU. With the
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, scal policy seems to have become less
pro-active and scal decit di¤erentials have lost some of their explanatory power. In
contrast, similarities in monetary policies, measured by interest rate di¤erentials, have
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emerged as a robust determinant of business cycle synchronisation. Also, di¤erences
in the size of industrial sectors, stock market comovement and similar competitiveness
situations appear to have good explanatory power. On the other hand, we could not
detect any robust impact of nominal exchange rate variability, bilateral bank capital
ows or di¤erences in labour market exibility on cycle synchronisation. The missing
e¤ect of mere exchange rate stabilisation on the synchronisation of business cycles is in
line with the endogeneity hypothesis which predicts that only irrevocably xed exchange
rates, i.e. currency union, would unleash synchronisation dynamics.
Taken together, these ndings seem to support Frankel and Roses prediction that
EMU would go hand in hand with trade expansion and the development of intra-industry
trade which in turn would result in more highly correlated business cycles. Although
more time is needed to make denite statements on the impact of the euro, we are
cautiously optimistic on the endongeneity of a European OCA.
1.2.3 Mundell II: Risk sharing, nancial integration and the insurance
mechanism of currency areas
Although the seminal Mundell (1961) paper and its follow-ups have been the starting
point for most currency union researchers, Mundell delivered a second inuential con-
tribution which has, however, received only recent attention. This 1973 article, called
"Uncommon arguments for common currencies", has been known as Mundell II. By
adding the role of nancial markets and risk sharing to the OCA debate, Mundell (1973)
species and revises some of his initial arguments on business cycle synchronisation,
generating interesting implications for the analysis of EMU.
The idea of Mundell II and theoretical contributions
It was McKinnon (2002) who drew attention to the seminal Mundell II paper, Mundell
(1973). The classical framework of Mundell I concentrates on the potential costs of cur-
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rency union incurred by the loss of independent monetary policy and nominal exchange
rate adjustments and asserts the importance of economic similarity, notably in terms
of business cycles, trade openness, diversication and labour mobility. Mundell II, in
contrast, revises this cost argument and turns the attention more towards the benets
of a common currency.
Regarding the cost of currency union, Mundell II argues that national monetary
policies may not be as e¤ective an adjustment tool to asymmetric shocks as the Keynesian
beliefs of the 1960s would have suggested. This period was shaped by the static Mundell-
Fleming framework of the open economy with its assumption of stationary expectations
regarding prices, interest rates and exchange rates. Also, the Brettow Woods system
of xed exchange rates was functioning reasonably well and most countries had captial
controls in place. These circumstances of what has been called the "ne-tuning fallacy"8
led Mundell I to emphasise the costs associated with the loss of renouncing inidividual
monetary policy - over-emphasise, in the eyes of Mundell II.
Moreover, Mundell II no longer considers exchange rates to be an adjustment mech-
anism only but, to a substantial degree, a source of shocks in itself. In a world with little
capital controls, McKinnon (2002) argues, exchange rate movements "are likely to be
erratic at best" so that the notion of smooth adjustment under exible exchange rates,
one of Mundell Is key assumptions, turns out to be an illusion. Both aspects, the re-
duced e¤ectiveness of national monetary policy and the ambiguous role of exchange rate,
downsize the role of the costs of currency union as they were pointed out by Mundell I.
The third and probably most interesting point of Mundell II, however, refers to the
benets of currency union due to enhanced risk sharing. In a currency union, nancial
market integration may develop into a powerful risk-sharing mechanism by providing
income insurance across the union. Due to portfolio diversication, adverse shocks to
one country can be shared across the union. Trade and nancial integration may act as
8Buiter (1999: 49).
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income insurance since individuals across countries hold claims on each others output.
As a result of this ownership diversication, consumption streams become smoother
and more highly correlated across countries, even and particularly in the presence of
idiosycratic shocks to production.
Alternatively, imagine a positive productivity shock in one country. Under separate
currencies, GDP and consumption rise by the same amount and falling prices lead to
increased real balances. With a common currency, however, the union-wide price level
goes down less than proportionally to the productivity shock in the respective country.
To increase real balance holdings, that country could run a balance of payments surplus,
for instance through trade in nominal bonds. The increase in consumption is less than
the rise in GDP so that the other countries of the union participate in the positive shock
by enjoying higher consumption as well.9
While nancially integrated countries make good candidates for currency union
against this background, Mundell II suggests that a common currency can be expected
to deliver risk sharing benets even for countries with hitherto little nancial integration.
Exchange rate uncertainty and interest rate risk premia inhibit international portfolio
diversication and constitute a major reason behind the home bias puzzle in interna-
tional nance. A common currency, it is argued, would convince nancial intermediaries
to diversify their portfolios so that the currency union in itself may develop into a boost
for nancial market integration.
Against this background, Mundell II challenges a central argument of Mundel I.
While the initial OCA framework warns countries with asynchronous business cycles
about joining a currency union due to the resulting loss of national monetary policy
and exchange rate adjustments, Mundell II suggests that it is exactly those countries
with asymmetric shocks which may benet most from adopting a common currency and
the resulting risk-sharing and income insurance mechanism. In other words, a country
9See Ching and Devereux (2003).
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that considers joining a currency union, such as the new EU member states, may not
want to wait until business cycles are perfectly synchronised but rather benet from
the insurance mechanism of a nancially-integrated currency union as long as cycles are
asynchronous.
The proponents of Mundell II apply a similar logic to the ex post experience in a
currency union. While Krugman (1993) predicts problems for EMU due to increased
specialisation in a currency union, McKinnon (2002) holds that the case for a com-
mon currency grows even stronger as the union members become more specialised and
concludes that "the productivity gain from greater regional specialisation is one of the
major benets of having and economic cum monetary union in the rst place." (McK-
innon 2002: 217)
Buildung on Mundell II, Ching and Devereux (2003) develop a general-equilibrium
model to examine the cost and benet of currency union. They incorporate both Mundell
arguments by allowing for the costs of a common currency due to losing the adjustment
property of the exchange rate (Mundell I) as well as the benets arising from consumption
risk-sharing in a currency union (Mundell II). By taking both e¤ects into account, the
presence of asymmetric shocks does not automatically make exible exchange rates more
desirable, in contrast to what much of the empirical literature has been suggesting. If
a country can benet from the risk-sharing mechanisms of a currency union to a large
degree, the presence of shock asymmetry may make the common currency more and
not less attractive. Ultimately, the authors nd that net losses from adopting a common
currency are more likely the more dominant are nominal rigidities. However, according to
their model, the welfare di¤erence tends to be small. In consequence, shock asymmetry
can be used as argument both in favour and against currency union, depending on the
relative importance of the exchange rate adjustment and the role of risk-sharing in the
face of nominal rigidities.
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Empirical evidence on Mundell II
Empirical research on the arguments of Mundell II remains fragmentary. Farrant and
Peersman (2005) analyse whether the exchange rate is a shock absorber or a source of
shocks in itself. Althoug they do not consider the context of currency union but focus
on the U.S. dollar exchange rate vis-à-vis a number of other currencies, we may suspect
similar e¤ects between the euro area and potential euro adopters. The authors employ
an SVAR approach using sign restrictions instead of the traditional zero restrictions. In
a subsequent variance-decomposition exercise they nd that nominal shocks exert a con-
siderable permanent e¤ect on variations in the nominal exchange rate. They interprete
their result as a strong indication that the exchange rate does not only act as shock
absorber but also gives rise to shocks. These disturbances, they argue, could be reduced
by joining a currency union.
A number of empirical studies have been conducted on the areas of nancial integra-
tion and risk sharing although rarely linked explicitly to the Mundell II argument. Gene-
really, nancial integration and risk sharing are notoriously di¢ cult to measure. Baele
et al. (2004) provide a survey on price-based and quantity-based indicators of nancial
integration. Price-based indicators rely on the idea of purchasing power parity (PPP)
and imply converging interest rates across countries. Quantity-based measures include
cross-country capital ows although data on bilateral ows tend to be scarce. In a series
of papers, Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2001, 2005) analyse the dynamics of international
nancial integration on the basis of foreign assets and liabilities. Their ndings suggest
an increasing degree of nancial integration among a selection of industrialised coun-
tries. Another quantity-based indicator is captured by the consumption-correlation puz-
zle which is one of the "Six major puzzles in international macroeconomics" as pointed
out by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000). A large degree of nancial integration should be re-
ected, it is argued, by the correlation of private consumption across countries because
consumers can smooth their consumption ows by beneting from the risk-sharing e¤ect
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of international portfolio diversication. Notably, consumption correlation would, from
a theoretical viewpoint, be exptected to exceed output correlation. However, poor em-
pirical evidence on consumption correlation has been puzzling. For instance, Darvas and
Szapáry (2005) nd that consumption correlation among the European Union countries
remains below GDP correlation. Demyanyk and Volosovych (2005) come to similar re-
sults, applying the utility-based risk-sharing model by Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2001). They
interprete their results along the lines of Mundell II, arguing that those countries with
little risk sharing, namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic states, would be
expected to reap the largest potential gain from joining monetary union.
In a next step, we would be interested in the interaction of nancial integration, risk
sharing and business cycle synchronisation in the context of currency union. Although
many studies do not make explicit reference to currency union, they do touch on related
topics. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) argue that nancially integrated regions can a¤ord
to exploit increasing returns to scale by specialisation because capital markets make up
for the insurance function otherwise exerted by geographical diversication. In an em-
pirical excercise, they nd evidence for their hypothesis that regions with well-integrated
nancial markets, such as U.S. states, tend to be more specialised than European coun-
tries. This is interpreted as supporting the Krugman (1993) argument which predicts
increasingly asynchronous business cycles due to integration-induced specialisation. Imbs
(2004, 2006), on the other hand, nds a positive impact of nancial integration on cycle
synchronisation. He employs various nancial integration indicators in a simultaneous
equations model and argues that a direct spill-over channel from nancial integration to
cycle sychronisation prevails over potential indirect e¤ects via specialisation. But none of
these studies considers the benecial impact of risk-sharing via consumption insurance
which may, according to Mundell II, compensate the adverse e¤ects of asynchronous
cycles.
As for other potential endogenous e¤ects of currency union, more time is needed to
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make reliable statements about the impact of the euro on nancial integration. First
indications are, however, encouraging. Cappiello et al. (2005) nd evidence on a positive
e¤ect of the euro on capital markets. On the micro levels, conditional correlations
between euro area equity returns tend to move up at around 1999 and the volatility
of bond markets has been reduced. Concerning macro aspects, the variability of yield
premia has decreased with EMU, related to a reduction in macroeconomic volatility.
Hence, the unfolding impact of currency union on nancial integration seems to lend
support to parts of Mundell II.
Risk sharing, nancial integration and Mundell II in the enlarged European
Union
Chapter 4 of this dissertation takes the Mundell II framework to the European data.
From the codependence analysis of Chapter 2 we know that the degree of business cycle
synchronisation between the CEECs and the euro area is still poor. Following the logic
of Mundell II, this asymmetry may not be a reason against early euro adoption but
rather highlight the potential gain for the prospective entrants, given that countries
with asymmetric shocks typically benet most from risk-sharing in a currency union.
We explore the past degree and future potential of risk sharing and nancial inte-
gration in the context of euro area enlargement. Considering eight new member states
(NMS) vis-à-vis the aggregate euro area, we investigate risk sharing by looking at cor-
relation and codependence measures of private consumption and GDP. For comparison,
we conduct the same analysis for the "old" EU member states. In a second step, we
examine real interest rate comovement measures to proxy the degree of nancial inte-
gration. Again, we pair the NMS with the euro area and compare their development
with the experience of the EU-15 countries in the 1980s and 1990s vis-à-vis Germany in
preparation to EMU. We employ correlation, dispersion and variability measures as well
as the codependence technique. Taken together, we draw a threefold conclusion from
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our analysis.
First, we nd that consumption correlations of the NMS with the euro area tend to
be lower than GDP correlations. This result is conrmed by the codependence analyis
and in line with the consumption correlation puzzle. One reason behind this result may
be the relatively low degree of nancial integration. Both correlation and codependence
measures of real interest rate comovement between the NMS and the euro area indicate
low values over the past decade. According to Mundell II, these countries would enjoy
the largest potential gain from euro adoption. Second, the although GDP correlation still
exceeds consumption correlation for the EU-15 countries, they are both at much higher
levels and with a more narrow gap than those of the NMS. Also, nancial integration
as increased markedly in the run-up to EMU. In the face of the long common history
of economic integration, we may expect a similar pattern for the NMS as they further
integrate with the EU economy. Third, both consumption and GDP correlations tend
to increase over time, for the NMS as well as for the EU-15 countries. We note that
GDP correlations tend to rise even faster than consumption correlations. Also, interest
rate comovement goes up as time proceeds. These observations seem in line with the
hypothesis of Imbs (2006) who nds that nancial integration does not only increase
consumption correlation but also, at an even faster rate, output comovement. He argues
that the consumption correlation puzzle may not originate in too little risk sharing in
the rst place but is rather due to the often neglected e¤ect on output synchronisation.
The question that remains open at present is whether the introduction of the euro
will speed up nancial integration with the CEECs. If that will be the case, and we see
indications for such an e¤ect in the existing euro area, Mundell II would eventually prove
correct. In combination with the OCA endogeneity argument, this would be good news in
a twofold sense for the new EU member states. First, the euro may result in consumption
and income insurance based on a risk-sharing e¤ect if nancial markets integrate quickly
after joining the euro area. This e¤ect would make up for some of the present shock
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asymmetry. Second, business cycles may synchronise endogenously, following further
integration in trade and nancial markets. Given the limited data situation to date,
further research is required to shed more light on the e¤ects of Mundell I and Mundell
II on the enlarged euro area but indications so far seem to imply cautious optimism.
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Chapter 2
Common trends and cycles of
Central and Eastern Europe and
the euro area
Since the enlargement of the European Union by ten countries in May 2004, most new
members have expressed the goal to adopt the euro in due time. Does EU accession
imply the end of the transition phase, or is more real integration required to pave the
way to the euro? Given the compulsory two-year membership in the second generation of
the exchange rate mechanism, the most advanced new members may enter the euro area
soon, among them Slovenia which will introduce the euro in January 2007. In addition,
more countries are expected to join the EU in the near future, implying their adoption
of the euro at a later stage as well. For the former planned economies, preparing for the
nal stage of EMU has been a demanding task. Therefore, euro area enlargement is a
prevailing policy question both for the existing Union and for the entrants, and demands
new answers from empirical economics. In response, this study investigates trend and
cycle comovement of six new EU member states as well as Croatia and Turkey with the
euro area, employing seasonal cointegration and codependence approaches.1
We analyse trend and cycle comovement as follows. The rst part constitutes the
1The new EU members considered are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia. The remaining four new member states Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Malta, as well as
Bulgaria and Romania, were not included due to data constraints.
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trend analysis and estimates alternative measures of convergence between the CEECs
and the euro area. Following Bernard and Durlauf (1996), we distinguish and test two
concepts: catching-up and steady-state convergence. The former is also known as beta
convergence and investigates the catching-up process of countries in transition to a new
steady state. We nd preliminary evidence that since 1994, lower initial income levels led
to signicantly higher economic growth across European countries. In other words, the
catching-up economies seem to have experienced a decade of transition towards a new
steady state. The alternative understanding of convergence applies to those countries
that have reached a steady state already. In this case, convergence is the process of
mean-reversion to the steady state level after a shock to the system. We employ the
seasonal version of cointegration analysis to avoid spurious results that may arise from
using up-front seasonal adjustment. In bivariate seasonal cointegration tests, we examine
output series of six new EU member states plus Croatia and Turkey against the euro
area and nd no cointegration relations at frequencies zero or 1/4. At frequency 1/2, we
nd Croatia and the Czech Republic to be cointegrated with the euro area. Hence, the
CEECs are still largely in transition towards the steady-state equilibrium.
The second part of the paper deals with cyclical comovement. Distinguishing be-
tween synchronised and non-synchronised common cycles, we use the common feature
and codependence approaches. The former concept was developed by Engle and Koz-
icki (1993) and serves to detect contemporaneous comovement among business cycles,
using di¤erence-stationary series. However, given that the common feature analysis is
a measure of simultaneous comovement, it does not capture any delays in response by
the other series. To discover cycles that are common but not synchronised, we use the
codependence approach of Vahid and Engle (1997). In this case, the common response
to a shock may not materialise in the rst period but at some later stage. In other
words, the codependence framework tests for common features in the qth period, allow-
ing for di¤erent initial responses to a given shock. Building on the seasonal cointegration
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framework, the common feature/codependence analysis takes di¤erent seasonal frequen-
cies into account. We nd that only Slovenia reveals a common serial correlation feature
while Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia and, as a borderline case, the Czech Republic exhibit
signs of collinear cycles after one or two periods. For Poland, Croatia and Turkey, we
nd no evidence of codependence of any order.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 divides the trend
analysis into catching-up and steady-state convergence and performs tests of these con-
cepts. Section 2.2 focuses on common cycles and conducts common feature and code-
pendence tests. Section 2.3 concludes.
2.1 Trend analysis
This section deals with the long-run convergence among the CEECs and the euro area.
The understanding of convergence is, however, not clear-cut. Following Bernard and
Durlauf (1996), we distinguish between two, mutually exclusive concepts of convergence:
catching-up and steady-state convergence. Both concepts will be applied to the countries
under consideration, using cross-section regression and seasonal cointegration analysis.
2.1.1 Catching-up convergence
The concept of catching-up convergence stems from the well-known convergence hy-
pothesis of the neoclassical growth literature. A Solow-type production function with
non-increasing returns to scale typically implies that the long-term behaviour of the econ-
omy will be independent of the initial conditions. Due to the concavity of the production
function in the capital stock, capital-poor countries will grow su¢ ciently faster, i.e. catch
up to the capital-rich countries to o¤set the initial di¤erences. Hence, we would expect
to nd catching-up convergence primarily among developing and transition countries
that are converging towards a steady-state which they have not yet reached.
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The data in this sub-section are mostly taken from Eurostat and the World Banks
World Development Indicators. Data on years of schooling are extracted from the Barro
and Lee (2000) database. The individual variables are explained below.
To obtain a preliminary indication of whether catching-up convergence exists in Eu-
rope, we test for beta convergence in a simple cross-section setting. Figure 2.1 plots
the average 1994 to 2004 annual growth rates of real GDP against the logs of the 1994
initial real per-capita GDP levels of 25 European countries, i.e. 14 EU countries (except
Luxembourg) plus eleven CEECs. For catching-up convergence, we expect lower initial
incomes to be associated with higher growth rates. Graphical inspection suggests an
overall negative relationship and divides the countries into two broad categories.
EU-14 countries are characterised by high 1994 income levels and lower growth rates
whereas most of the Central and Eastern European states are located in the high-
growth/low-initial-income area of the graph. Only two countries do not match this
categorisation. First, Slovenia seems to be located closer to the EU-14 group than to
the remaining CEECs. Second, Ireland stands out with its high initial income and high
average growth rate. On the whole, most CEECs seem to be catching up to Western
European income standards.
Our OLS regression analysis is a simplied version of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)
and includes the following control variables.2 First, school measures the years of school-
ing in 1995 to proxy education attainment. Second, edu stands for average public spend-
ing on education, as a percentage of GDP. Naturally, this variable captures the quality
of education beyond the mere years of schooling. Both variables are expected to raise
the average growth rate. Third, the variable invest represents average gross domestic
investment as a percentage of GDP. Since higher investment values increase output per
2There is little consensus in the empirical growth literature with regard to the choice of appropriate
control variables. Here, we do not enter this discussion but simply adopt the approach of Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995), with one modication: While they employ pre-sample values of most variables as
instruments to avoid endogeneity problems, our data for Central and Eastern Europe does not naturally
allow this approach. In particular, pre-1994 values may bias the results since they involve enormous
variation due to the breakdown of the command economy systems.
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e¤ective worker, the growth rate tends to increase as well. Finally, government consump-
tion is controlled for by the variable gov. It is measured as average general government
nal consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Assuming that higher govern-
ment consumption tends to distort private decisions, we expect a negative impact on the
growth rate.
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Figure 2.1: Beta convergence: cross-section regression of the avergage 1994-2004
annual per-capita real GDP growth rate of 25 European countries on the logs of
the initial (1994) per-capita real GDP levels.
The regression equation can be expressed as
gi = c+ xi94 + 1schooli + 2edu1 + 3investi + 4govi + "i: (2.1)
We regress gi, the average annual GDP growth rate between 1994 and 2004 for
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country i = 1; :::; 25, on a constant c, initial per-capita GDP xi94, the control variables
as specied above, and an error term "i. The coe¢ cient  measures the convergence
e¤ect and is expected to be negative.3
Table 2.1: Beta convergence
Estimation (1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP 94 -.0106 -.0105 -.0100 -.0114
(-4.07) (-3.81) (-3.49) (-4.26)
school .0022 .0035
(1.21) (1.98)
edu .4829 .4984
(1.67) (2.28)
invest .0635 .0820 .0415
(.89) (1.11) (.60)
gov -.0673 .0025
(-.84) (.03)
adj. R2 .39 .48 .44 .48
Note: OLS regression of the average 1994 - 2004 growth rate of per-capita GDP on
the log of initial 1994 real per-capita GDP levels, with t-statistics given in parentheses.
Constant terms are included but not reported.
The regression results are summarised in table 2.1. Estimation (1) includes only
initial income as a determinant of the average growth rate. As expected, the relation is
negative and, with a t-statistic of -4.07, clearly signicant. Ceteris paribus, convergence
occurs at the rate of around 1.0 percent per year. Adding the control variables in various
combinations hardly a¤ects the coe¢ cient size or t-statistic of the initial income variable.
In estimation (2), we include all four controls but none turns out to be signicant. This
may be due to multicollinearity. Indeed, edu is strongly correlated with school and with
gov. Hence, estimation (3) excludes edu, while regression (4) is estimated without school
and gov. The results imply a signicantly positive e¤ect of education on the growth rate,
if only one of the two respective variables is involved. The education quality variable edu,
3 In this indicative exercise, we employ a larger country sample than in the following time-series
calculations, for the simple reason that more data are available on an annual basis as compared to the
quarterly case. We doublecheck the beta regressions with an alternative, smaller dataset which matches
the time-series country sample and nd very similar results.
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however, appears to have a far larger e¤ect in size than the mere years of schooling. On
the other hand, government consumption and investment do not seem to play a major
role.
On the whole, we conclude from our simple cross-section framework that catching-
up convergence seems to take place and that, besides initial income levels, educational
attainments have played a major role. The following sections will investigate the other
dimension of convergence more formally.
2.1.2 Steady-state convergence
The second convergence concept we consider is steady-state convergence. This case
typically deals with those countries that have reached a common steady state already
and move together in the long-run. Convergence denotes the process of mean reversion
back to the steady state after the occurrence of a shock to the system. Hence, there
is no permanent deviation from the common long-run equilibrium. In the words of
Bernard and Durlauf (1996: 165), this process means that "the long-run forecasts of
output di¤erences tend to zero as the forecasting horizon increases." Analytically, we
test for steady-state convergence by means of cointegration analysis. To detect long-
run comovement between two or more non-stationary series, we try to nd a linear
combination which is then stationary. The cointegrated series follow a common stochastic
trend and hence are steady-state converging.
Preliminary analysis
Before conducting the seasonal cointegration tests, we examine some descriptive prop-
erties of the series. The data used in this section comprises non-seasonally adjusted
quarterly industrial production (IP) index series as a proxy of real economic activity.4
4Alternatively, we checked quarterly real GDP data which pointed at roughly similar results. However,
the econometric analysis using GDP was complicated by the fact that the data were available for only
few countries from 1994 onwards and that, in many cases, the apparently more volatile GDP series were
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Figure 2.2: Levels of the logs of quarterly, non-seasonally adjusted industrial
production indices, 1994Q1-2004Q3.
Nine economies are included in this analysis: the aggregate euro area as well as
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey.
The series are provided by the OECDs Main Economic Indicators, the International
Financial Statistics of the IMF and by national sources. The sample covers the period
1994Q1 to 2004Q3; the starting point was chosen as to exclude the major downturn after
the breakdown of the centrally-planned systems between 1990 and 1993.
only borderline di¤erence-stationary. In chapter 4, we use an updated GDP dataset starting in 1995 as
measure of comparison for consumption comovement in the framework of risk-sharing analysis.
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Figure 2.3: Seasonal di¤erences of the logs of quarterly, non-seasonally adjusted
industrial production indices, 1995Q1-2004Q3.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate the series in levels, xi;t; and in seasonal di¤erences,
4xit = xi;t   xi;t 4. The line graphs of the levels reveal upward-sloping curves with
clear seasonal patterns. While the IP indices of the euro area and most of the CEECs
exhibit a relatively stable positive trend, only Turkey stands out. Its 2001 nancial crisis
is reected in a downturn in output which reaches its 1997 level again only in 2002.
Graphed in seasonal di¤erences, it becomes clear that many countries su¤ered from
temporary set-backs. The bar graphs of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland
and Slovakia show negative spikes around 1998/1999 when the Russian nancial crisis
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unfolded. Slovenia seems to have been less a¤ected while Hungary apparently follows
the post-2000 recession which is visible in the euro area series.
To analyse the data more systematically, we apply the Box-Jenkins techniques and
test for unit roots. Analysing levels and seasonal di¤erences subsequently, we rst in-
spect the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions. Slowly decaying auto-
correlation in combination with abruptly diminishing partial autocorrelation suggests
an autoregressive pattern in the data. Minimising the Akaike (AIC) and the Schwartz
(SIC) information criteria serves to determine the appropriate lag lengths. However,
two restrictions apply. First, the AIC is known to overstate the correct lag length while
the SIC typically understates it. Second, the relatively small number of observations
may distort the information criteria results. Hence, we examine the autocorrelation
properties of the autoregressionserror terms of various lag choices and the related Q
statistics.
Table 2.2: ADF test results
Country Levels Seasonal di¤erences
ADF statistic Lag ADF statistic Lag
Euro area -1.50 5 -3.21** 3
Croatia -3.66** 1 -3.58** 3
Czech Republic -1.03 5 -3.40** 3
Estonia -3.47** 1 -3.34** 4
Hungary -2.62* 1 -3.04** 3
Poland -2.95* 1 -3.28** 3
Slovakia -1.09 3 -3.43** 3
Slovenia -3.42** 2 -4.60** 3
Turkey -1.78 5 -3.24** 3
Note: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results, IP data in levels and seasonal dif-
ferences. We apply the small-sample, lag-adjusted critical values for the ADF test by
Cheung and Lai (1995). Signicance at the 5 percent level is indicated by "**", at 10
percent by "*". For the levels, we include a deterministic trend.
Having determined the lag lengths this way, we employ the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) test for unit roots with intercept and, in the case of levels, with a deterministic
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trend. Table 2.2 outlines the results of the unit root tests and the corresponding lag
lengths. In the case of levels, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected in
all but three cases on the 5 percent signicance level. For the seasonal di¤erences, we
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root on the 5 percent level for all countries. Hence,
we consider the data stationary in di¤erences.
Seasonal cointegration
In the presence of persistent seasonal behaviour of a time series, one option is to season-
ally adjust the data up-front. However, as Lee (1992) points out, seasonal adjustment
may result in mistaken inference regarding economic relationships, particularly with -
nite samples. Moreover, it comes at the cost of losing valuable information if seasonal
uctuations are an important source of variation in the system. Therefore, working
with non-adjusted data and incorporating seasonality into the statistical model is the
preferable option, implemented by the concepts of seasonal integration and seasonal
cointegration.
Seasonal integration implies that a series can have a unit root not only in the standard
case of zero frequency but at seasonal frequencies as well and exhibits a spectrum with
distinct peaks at these frequencies. Hence, the series exhibits "long memory" in the sense
that shocks last forever and may permanently change seasonal patterns. In the case of
quarterly data, we may identify an annual cycle of the four seasons, i.e. a quarter-cycle
per quarter, and/or a semi-annual pattern with two cycles per year, i.e. a half-cycle
per quarter. The seasonal series exhibits a spectrum with distinct peaks at the seasonal
frequencies s  2j=s; j = 1; :::; s=2:With s = 4 indicating the number of observations
per year, we have ; and =2 as seasonal frequencies, besides zero frequency for the
standard case. Hyllenberg et al. [HEGY] (1990) provide the quarterly-data example
(1 B4)xt = "t; (2.2)
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with B as the backshift operator. This equation can be expressed as
(1 B)(1 +B +B2 +B3)xt = "t (2.3)
(1 B)(1 +B)(1 +B2)xt = "t
(1 B)S(B)xt = "t:
Following Lee (1992), the process xt is denoted xt  I(d); with the frequencies  = 0; ;
and =2 and integration order d. In this exercise, we focus on the standard case of
d = 1. Thus, the process has four roots with modulus one: one root at the zero frequency
(! = 0); one root at two cycles per year which equals half a cycle per quarter (! = 12);
and a pair of complex roots at one cycle per year which equals a quarter cycle per quarter
(! = 14):
Seasonal cointegration designates the case in which two or more series share common
stochastic seasonals. In a generalisation of Engle and Grangers (1987) cointegration
approach, Lee (1992) states that the components of a seasonally integrated vector xt 
I(1) are seasonally cointegrated at frequency , denoted by xt  CI(1; 1) if there
exists a vector  (6= 0) so that zt = 0xt  I(0): Intuitively, seasonal cointegration
has a connotation similar to the standard cointegration approach. It implies that an
innovation has only a temporary e¤ect on the seasonal behaviour of zt = 0xt but a
permanent impact on the seasonals of xt:
We consider an n-dimensional vector autoregressive process of order p, V AR(p), of
the form
xt = 1xt 1 +2xt 2 + :::+pxt p + "t; (2.4)
with t = 1; 2; :::; T and "t  i:i:d:Nn(0;
): The determinant of the matrix polynomial
(z) = I   1z   2z2   :::   pzp has four roots on the unit circle (z = 1;i),
corresponding to the frequency cases ! = 0; 12 ;
1
4 : The related seasonal error correction
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model (SECM) can be expressed as
4xt = +	Dt + t+1y1;t 1 +2y2;t 1 +3y3;t 1 +4y4;t 1
+ 14xt 1 + :::+  p 44xt p+4 + "t; (2.5)
where 4xt = (1   B4)xt is stationary and h = p   4 is the order of the SECM. In
addition, y1;t = S1(B)xt = (1+B +B2 +B3)xt; y2;t = S2(B)xt = (1 B +B2  B3)xt;
y3;t = S3(B)xt = B(1   B2)xt; and y4;t = S4(B)xt = y3;t+1: The seasonal lter Sk(B)
with k = 1; :::; 4 eliminates unit roots at all frequencies other than the one in the ltered
series. ; 	Dt; and t represent deterministics, namely a constant, seasonal dummies,
and a linear time trend, respectively. If the coe¢ cient matrices k that convey the
long-run information are of reduced rank r, with 0 < r < n; then k can be decomposed
as k = k
0
k; where k is an n  r matrix of short-run coe¢ cients and 0kyk;t 1 is an
r  1 vector of stationary cointegration relations. 1 = 101 corresponds to seasonal
cointegration at frequency zero (! = 0), 2 = 2
0
2 refers to biannual frequency (! =
1
2),
while a seasonal cointegration test at annual frequency (! = 14) can be conducted based
on the property of 3, given 4 = 0. Thus, the SECM be transformed into
4xt = +	Dt + t+ 1z1;t 1 + 2z2;t 1 + 3z3;t 1 + 4z4;t 1
+ 14xt 1 + :::+  p 44xt p+4 + "t; (2.6)
with the error correction terms zk;t = 0kyk;t: The likelihood ratio test for the hy-
pothesis of r cointegrating vectors, i.e. H0 : k = k
0
k, with n r matrices k and k
(for k = 1; 2; 3), can be summed up by the expression
TRk =  T
nX
j=r+1
ln(1  k;j): (2.7)
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The smallest (n  r) squared partial canonical correlations between each yk;t 1 and
4xt are represented by k;r+1; :::; k;n; given lagged 4xts f4xt i for i = 1; :::; kg,
other y1;t 1(1 6= k) and deterministic terms. For further details on the test procedure,
see Lee (1992) and Lee and Siklos (1995).
Table 2.3: Seasonal cointegration results
Country h rank Frequency
0 1/2 1/4
Croatia 2 r = 0 6.77 22.12** 26.43
r = 1 1.74 2.64 8.46
Czech Rep. 1 r = 0 6.45 22.75** 19.62
r = 1 1.02 8.94 3.24
Estonia 2 r = 0 6.52 15.85 11.32
r = 1 1.31 3.13 3.38
Hungary 3 r = 0 12.05 14.54 22.29
r = 1 2.31 5.57 1.27
Poland 1 r = 0 10.53 14.97 16.42
r = 1 1.12 6.90 4.58
Slovakia 1 r = 0 3.07 20.53 11.66
r = 1 0.73 5.89 4.88
Slovenia 2 r = 0 13.57 12.22 28.62
r = 1 0.94 2.80 3.93
Turkey 2 r = 0 7.76 7.82 20.81
r = 1 0.42 2.48 7.49
Note: Table 2.3 reports bivariate seasonal cointegration results of quarterly, non-
seasonally adjusted industrial production data of each country vis-à-vis the euro area.
The seasonal error correction model (SECM) order is given by h. In the case of cointe-
gration, rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration (r = 0) at the 5 percent level
is marked with "**" and corresponds to acceptance of one cointegration vector (r = 1),
as in the 1/2 frequency cases of Croatia and the Czech Republic. In all other cases, we
nd no seasonal cointegration as the null hypothesis of no cointegration (r = 0) is widely
accepted. The nite-sample critical values are provided by Lee and Siklos (1995).
In the case of the CEECs, we construct bivariate cointegrated VARs, testing the euro
area vis-à-vis each of the eight countries in the data set. We rst set up the VARs and
determine the optimal lag length p: As in the univariate case, minimising the Akaike
37
information criterion alone may lead to biased results. Therefore, we also consider the
sequential modied LR test statistic which tends to deliver shorter lag lengths than
AIC. To nally decide upon p; we check the VAR residual serial correlation LM test
to ensure that there is no signicant autocorrelation left in the residuals of the VAR.
The order of the corresponding SECM is then h = p   4. Finally, we compute the
seasonal cointegration test statistics for the frequencies zero, 12 , and
1
4 . To allow for
the limited data series, we employ the nite sample critical values as tabulated in Lee
and Siklos (1995). Table 2.3 reports the seasonal cointegration test results including
the corresponding SECM orders. In fact, not a single country reveals a cointegration
relation with the euro area at zero frequency. At frequency 12 , the test rejects the notion
of no cointegration (r = 0) for Croatia and the Czech Republic. In the case of frequency
1
4 , there is again no evidence of cointegration for any series.
The weak cointegration results are in line with the existence of beta convergence.
The CEECs have obviously not yet reached a steady state equilibrium with the euro
area but are still in the process of transition.
2.2 Cycle analysis
After having explored the trends and long-run comovement among the CEECs and the
euro area, we now turn to the cyclical components of the output series to gain in-
sights regarding short-run synchronisation. Again, we use the non-adjusted, quarterly
industrial production series as in the cointegration part of the analysis. To investi-
gate common business cycle behaviour, we rst calculate simple correlations of growth
rates and cyclical components of the data. Next, we move on to the common feature
framework to test for synchronised common cycles and then generalise the approach to
non-synchronised cycles, testing for codependence. Given that persistent stochastic sea-
sonality may inuence the variables, both trends and cycles must be disentangled from
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seasonal components. Employing the approach of Cubadda (1999), that part builds on
the seasonal cointegration results and thus takes seasonality into account.
2.2.1 Cycle correlations
First, we investigate contemporaneous correlations. Table 2.4 presents the correlation
coe¢ cients of each CEEC with the euro area. We correlate the growth rates in form of
the seasonal di¤erences before we extract the cyclical component from the data, applying
the band-pass lter by Baxter and King (1999).5
Table 2.4: Contemporaneous correlation
Country Seasonal BK cycles
di¤erences k = 4 k = 8
Croatia 0.22 0.49 0.40
Czech Republic 0.23 0.74 0.53
Estonia 0.35 0.68 0.72
Hungary 0.79 0.79 0.93
Poland 0.49 0.57 0.68
Slovakia 0.25 0.70 0.58
Slovenia 0.47 0.63 0.75
Turkey 0.24 0.52 0.57
Note: Contemporaneous correlations with the euro area, data in seasonal di¤erences
and as Baxter-King band-pass ltered cyclical components (BK cycles) with alternative
lead-lag lengths k = 4 and k = 8.
We observe that the correlation coe¢ cients tend to be larger in the case of the cycles
as compared to the seasonal di¤erences. Except for Croatia, all countries display cycle
correlation coe¢ cients larger than 0.5. Apparently, the correlation of the short-term
cycles tends to be larger than the comovement of long-run stochastic trends which are
5We use the conventional "Burns-Mitchell" settings for the minimum and maximum oscillation period,
see Burns and Mitchell (1946). For quarterly data, these translate into a minimum of 6 and a maximum
of 32 oscillation periods. The choice of the appropriate lead-lag length, k, however, involves a trade-o¤
because larger ks downsize the already small number of observations. In table 2.3, we present results
with alternative lead-lag lengths k = 4 and k = 8.
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still included in the seasonal di¤erences. Also, this may be due to the fact that the
Baxter-King lter can lead to amplied cycle frequencies and spurious cycles.6
Across countries, we note that Hungary, Slovenia and Poland exhibit large correla-
tion coe¢ cients, followed by the Czech Republic and Estonia. Croatian and Turkey, on
the other hand, assume low values in all set-ups. These simple correlations deliver a pre-
liminary indication of the data properties. In the following, we take an econometrically
more advanced approach by analysing common business cycles within the framework of
common features and codependence.
2.2.2 Synchronised common cycles
The common feature framework is based on Engle and Kozicki (1993) and Vahid and
Engle (1993) and investigates the existence of synchronisation, i.e. contemporaneous
comovement among business cycles. In analogy to the non-stationary cointegration
case, common feature analysis puts series together which exhibit a certain stochastic
component each, e.g. autocorrelation. The series are then said to have a common
feature, or a common serial correlation cycle, if there is a linear combination which does
not have any correlation with the past. It is required, however, that the individual
series have the same autoregressive order for the common feature to cancel out in the
linear combination. The rank of the common feature space provides the number of
common feature vectors. Engle and Kozicki (1993) employ a two-stage least squares
approach in which one variable is regressed on the lagged values of all variables, serving
as instruments. This way, they test whether the dependence of the variables on the past
is only through common channels which would, in turn, hint at the existence of common
cycles.
In Vahid and Engle (1993), the analysis is further developed to incorporate results of
the preceding cointegration tests. In particular, the di¤erences of cointegrated variables
6See Guay and St-Amant (1997).
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are related to the past not only through the lagged di¤erences, 4x0t 1; :::;4x
0
t h+1; but
also through the lags of the estimated error correction terms, bz1;t 1; :::; bz4;t 1: This set of
variables constitutes the "relevant past" and is summed up as wt = (4x0t; :::;4x
0
t h+1;bz1;t; :::; bz4;t)0: Regressing the common feature linear combination on these past variables
delivers the TR2 which serves as a statistical measure of the dependence of the linear
combination on the relevant past. The linear combination which minimises the TR2
points at the potential common feature vector. The minimand will then be the limited
information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator of the regression of one of the ele-
ments of 4xt on the others, employing the relevant past as instruments. The LIML
estimator is also the canonical covariate corresponding to the smallest canonical corre-
lation between the transposed di¤erences and the relevant past information. Testing for
the number of linearly independent common feature vectors is based on the number of
zero canonical correlations and goes back to Tiao and Tsay (1989). They test the signif-
icance of the smallest m canonical correlations which translates into the null hypothesis
of at least m common feature vectors. The understanding is similar to the notation
in cointegration. In fact, m is the dimension of the common feature space and n  m
indicates the number of common cycles. In the bivariate case, the existence of m = 1
common feature vector corresponds to one common cycle. The test statistic is given by
C(h;m) =  (T   h  4)
mX
j=1
ln

1  bj (2.8)
where bj is the jth smallest sample squared canonical correlation between4xt and wt 1.
The statistic C(h;m) is 2-distributed under the null hypothesis, with (m(nh+r+m n))
degrees of freedom. The SECM order is denoted by h and r is the number of cointegrating
vectors in the system.
Table 2.5 reports the results of the common feature tests in its centre column. Slove-
nia is the only one of the eight relationships tested that reveals a common serial correla-
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tion feature. The corresponding test statistic for the hypothesis of one common feature
vector (m = 1) is accepted while the notion of two common feature vectors (m = 2) can
be clearly rejected at the 1 percent level. Hence, Slovenia shares one common business
cycle with the euro area. For all other countries, we cannot nd a common feature vec-
tor, indicated by the rejection of the hypothesis of any common feature vectors at the 1
percent level.
Table 2.5: Common feature/codependenc results
Country rank Common Codependence
features Order 1 Order 2 Order 3
Croatia m = 1 24.46*** 10.52** 9.99** 2.46
m = 2 82.76*** 28.17*** 18.87** 8.60
Czech Rep. m = 1 35.26*** 1.84 4.54 2.08
m = 2 89.03*** 11.89* 10.19 10.03
Estonia m = 1 33.72*** 9.59** 4.11 2.01
m = 2 83.44*** 21.71*** 16.01** 10.49
Hungary m = 1 11.46*** 3.52* 0.29 0.06
m = 2 65.41*** 10.99** 3.76 3.48
Poland m = 1 38.18*** 6.95*** 1.53 0.79
m = 2 85.04*** 16.79*** 8.44* 6.15
Slovakia m = 1 23.25*** 2.52 0.01 0.37
m = 2 75.90*** 14.08*** 8.13* 11.40**
Slovenia m = 1 6.16 2.65 4.68 5.71
m = 2 59.87*** 14.82* 15.69** 10.24
Turkey m = 1 35.98*** 11.71*** 7.91** 3.12
m = 2 94.06*** 23.08*** 16.17** 11.50
Note: Table 2.5 reports bivariate seasonal common feature and codependence results
of quarterly, non-seasonally adjusted industrial production data of each country vis-à-vis
the euro area. Rejection of the null hypothesis of common feature/codependence vectors
at the 1 percent level is indicated by "***", the 5 percent level is marked with "**", the
10 percent level with "*". If we nd the combination of accepting one vector (m = 1)
and rejecting a second vector (m = 2), we conlude the existence of n  m = 2   1 = 1
common cycle.
In the case of Estonia, it is unlikely to nd common serial correlation features ex
ante since Estonia is the only country in the sample which does not have the same
autoregressive order as the euro area when analysed individually. As shown above, the
euro area is modelled by an AR(3) process, as are all other countries except Estonia for
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which an AR(4) model applies. We acknowledge, however, a certain natural uncertainty
in the determination of lag length parameters.
In conclusion, we nd only little overall evidence of contemporaneous short-run co-
movement of the CEECs with the euro area.
2.2.3 Non-synchronised common cycles
The concept of common serial correlation features is very restrictive in that it requires
the variables to react contemporaneously to shocks. Consequently, this allows us only to
detect perfectly synchronised common cycles or no common cycles at all. Those shocks
that require some time to propagate across countries at di¤erent speeds are not captured.
The codependence framework of Vahid and Engle (1997) relaxes this constraint and
formulates the same idea in a more general setting. In particular, it permits the series
to respond to shocks with a certain delay. Even if one country does not immediately
react to a shock in one country, it may fully react at a later stage. This kind of non-
synchronised common cycle can be measured with the codependence test. The system
is then said to be codependent if the impulse responses of the variables are collinear
beyond q periods. For q = 0; the codependence test is equivalent to the common feature
test.
The test statistic for the null hypothesis of at least m codependence vectors after the
qth period is given by
C(h; q;m) =  (T   h  q   4)
mX
j=1
ln
 
1 
bj(q)
dj(q)
!
: (2.9)
Now, bj(q) represents the jth smallest sample squared canonical correlation between
4xt and wt q 1, and dj(q) is dened as dj(q) = 1 + 2
Pq
i=1 bi(b04xt)bi(b0wwt q 1),
where bi() is the lag-i sample autocorrelation of the series in argument, and b and
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bw are the sample canonical variates associated to bj(q): Under the null hypothesis, the
statistic C(h; q;m) is asymptotically distributed as 2(m(nh + r + m   n)): The test
statistic is based on the following intuition. The required linear combinations 04xt
and 0wwt q 1 have non-zero cross correlations up to lag q but zero cross-correlations
from lag q + 1: The (q + 1)th cross correlation between 4xt and wt q 1 is the smallest
canonical correlation. According to the Bartlett formula, the corresponding variance is
dj(q)=(T   h  q   4):
The codependence results for Central and Eastern Europe are presented in the right-
hand panel of table 2.5. We accept the notion of one codependence vector (m = 1) at
order one in the cases of Hungary and Slovakia. In the Czech case, we can reject the
hypothesis of a second codependence vector only at the 10 percent level. For Hungary, we
accept one vector at the 5 percent level although rejection is indicated for the 10 percent
level. For Slovakia, the case is more clear-cut: one vector is denitely accepted while
a second vector is rejected even at the 1 percent level. Overall, we conclude that these
three countries share common but non-synchronised cycles with the euro area and adjust
after q = 1 quarter, with the Czech Republic as a borderline case. For the remaining
countries, both m = 1 and m = 2 are rejected when testing for rst-order codependence.
However, we nd one codependence vector at order 2 for Estonia. Thus, Estonia seems
to respond to a euro area shock after two quarters.
Summing up, the cycle analysis can nd a common feature vector only in the case of
Slovenia. Hence, the case for contemporaneous comovement, i.e. synchronised common
cycles, of most CEECs with the euro area is limited. When delays in the response are
permitted, however, we do nd common cycles. Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and, with
some uncertainty, the Czech Republic, exhibit one codependence vector after one or
two periods. The fact that Croatia and Turkey do not show any common cycles with
the euro area is not unexpected since these two countries are only at the beginning of
their integration process with the EU and started formal accession talks only recently.
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Identifying Poland as the third country without any commonality in its cycles with
the euro area is surprising because a number of studies identify Poland as one of the
leading countries in terms of business cycle synchronisation.7 This divergence may partly
stem from the fact that the Polish economy has a large agricultural sector which is not
captured by our output proxy, industrial production.8 On the other hand, our nding
may be substantiated in that Poland is the largest of the new EU member states. Hence,
it would naturally be less integrated than its smaller neighbours. On the whole, the
CEECs show an intermediate degree of cycle comovement with the euro area but they
do not yet seem to be substantially synchronised.
2.3 Conclusion
Employing a trend/cycle approach, this study investigates the degree of output integra-
tion of eight Central and Eastern European countries with the euro area. According to
the traditional OCA framework, a higher the degree of business cycle synchronisation
impies lower costs of renouncing individual monetary policy when adopting the euro.
The trend analysis is the foundation of the subsequent cycle tests and estimates
catching-up and steady-state convergence. A simple cross-section regression conrms the
beta convergence hypothesis in that it indicates signicantly higher average growth rates
for those countries with lower initial income levels. Apparently, most countries under
investigation are still in the process of transition towards the steady-state equilibrium.
This presumption is conrmed by the cointegration analysis. Using quarterly, non-
seasonally adjusted industrial production data for the aggregate euro area plus the eight
individual countries, we perform bivariate seasonal cointegration tests for each country
vis-à-vis the euro area. We nd no cointegration at zero or 1/4 frequency. Croatia and
7See, for example, Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006).
8We ran alternative tests on GDP data which include the agricultural sector. Although the GDP
dataset is not su¢ ciently rich to be presented in full, it indicates an intermediate degree of synchronisation
for Poland. See chapter 4 for an up-dated GDP dataset including Poland.
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the Czech Republic cointegrate with the euro area when tested at frequency 1/2. This
widely negative cointegration result is consistent with the existence of beta convergence
because the two convergence concepts can be regarded as mutually exclusive.
The tests for common business cycles divide into the categories of synchronised and
non-synchronised common cycles. When testing for contemporaneous common serial
correlation features, we nd only one case of synchronised common cycles, Slovenia.
This indicates that the remaining countries do not share common cycles with the euro
area. To allow for a delay in the response to shocks, we also test for codependence. Due
to ine¢ ciencies in the propagation mechanism of shocks, the CEECs may respond to
shocks but not in the initial period. In fact, we nd evidence of rst-order codependence
for Hungary, Slovakia and, as a borderline case, the Czech Republic. Estonia shows signs
of second-order codependence. These countries can, therefore, be considered as having
an intermediate degree of cyclical comovement with the euro area. For Poland, as well
as for the candidate countries Croatia and Turkey, we do not nd any codependence.
Their cycles do not seem to align to that of the euro area even after a certain delay.
On the whole, our results suggest that real integration of the CEECs with the euro
area is still limited. Only Slovenia appears well-equipped for joining the euro soon.
In fact, the Slovenian government assured its intention to do so by joining ERM II
immediately after EU accession in 2004. In the meantime, the European Commission
has approved of the Slovenian request to introduce the euro in January 2007. For most
of the other CEECs, however, giving up individual monetary policies at too early a stage
may entail the risk of incurring major costs. There is still some way to go to achieve
business cycle synchronisation.
However, a number of questions remain open. First, there is still considerable uncer-
tainty concerning the data situation with regard to the CEECs. The ten years of data
available represents the lower boundary of statistically meaningful time series analysis.
As time proceeds, longer series will allow for more reliable investigation. Second, our
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approach attempts to capture the "meta-property" of the OCA theory. Finding ways to
analyse the individual OCA criteria in a convincing and consistent manner has not yet
been achieved. Third, the OCA framework itself is not devoid of ambiguity. It has been
argued that business cycle synchronisation may not be an ex ante requirement but may
evolve endogenously after the adoption of a single currency. Moreover, the proponents
of the "Mundell II" framework have argued that currency union membership may be
desirable even in the presence of non-synchronised cycles if risk-sharing is facilitated
by integrated nancial markets.9 Although more evidence regarding these hypotheses
remains to be inferred from the ongoing EMU experiment, the following chapters shed
more light on these questions. So far, however, it appears that EU accession has by no
means concluded transition of the CEECs and is only one milestone on road to the euro.
9See McKinnon (2002).
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Chapter 3
Determinants of business cycle
synchronisation across euro area
countries1
Will the euro area countries move together or apart in their business cycle uctuations?
Since the launch of the single currency, researchers and policy makers have sought to
learn more about the driving forces of business cycles and the role of the euro. The e¤ects
of a common currency on business cycle synchronisation is at the heart of the second
major strand of currency union economics, the endogeneity of optimum currency areas. If
a common currency promotes trade and if trade increases business cycle synchronisation,
Frankel and Rose (1998) argue, then an ex ante non-optimum currency area may turn
into an OCA ex post, due to the unfolding impact of the currency union itself. So is the
euro area, arguably not an ex ante OCA, going to be optimal ex post?
This chapter examines the underlying factors of business cycle synchronisation in
the euro area. We do not address the endogeneity question directly because at such an
early stage, it proves di¢ cult to isolate a clear e¤ect of the euro. Instead, we follow
Frankel and Rose (1998) and approach the topic by asking which factors are signcantly
associated with business cycle synchronisation across euro area countries. A positive
1Most of this chapter was produced in cooperation with Catherine Guillemineau at the European
Central Bank.
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association of trade and cycle synchronisation may be interpreted as an indication of
OCA endogeneity.
Various studies have shown that European business cycles have become increasingly
synchronous, see Artis and Zhang (1997, 1999), Massmann and Mitchell (2004). Ap-
plying Markov Switching VAR models, Artis et al. (2004) nd evidence of a distinct
European business cycle. Few academics have, however, explored the underlying factors
behind cycle synchronisation in Europe. Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004) and Imbs (2004)
analysed large samples of both developing and industrialised countries and found trade
ows, specialisation, and nancial integration to be important factors for business cycle
synchronisation. Their results are, however, partly conicting and seem to depend on
the country and time samples chosen.
In the following, we investigate a variety of potential determinants of cycle synchro-
nisation in the context of European monetary integration. The purpose of our analysis
is to nd out why, inside the euro area, the business cycles of di¤erent countries may
be synchronous or asynchronous and why they may converge or diverge. We test some
standard determinants and, in addition, consider a number of EMU-specic policy and
structural indicators which, to our knowledge, have not been tested in this context. We
check robustness by applying the extreme-bounds analysis framework as suggested by
Leamer (1983) and further developed by Levine and Renelt (1992) and by Sala-i-Martin
(1997). Also, we divide our 25-year sample period into sub-samples in order to capture
changing e¤ects throughout the di¤erent stages of European integration.
We nd that bilateral trade has indeed been a robust, positive determinant of business
cycle synchronisation. Hence, we see the endogeneity hypothesis of Frankel and Rose
(1998) conrmed for the euro area: countries with larger trade volumes tend to have
more closely synchronised business cycles. Although we observe this phenomenon over
the whole sample, its explanatory power seems to be driven mainly by the earlier sub-
sample, 1980-1996. During the period of preparation for EMU and actual currency union,
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since 1997, we nd that the di¤erences in trade structure emerge as robust determinants
of cycle synchronisation. In other words, the degree of intra-industry trade plays an
increasingly important role in binding euro area business cycles together. In combination
with our descriptive nding of rising intra-industry trade among euro area countries, this
result gives rise to cautious optimism with regard to ex post optimality of the euro area.
Regarding our policy and structural indicators, scal decit di¤erentials appear to
have driven di¤erences between business cycles until the preparation for EMU. With the
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, scal policy seems to have become less
pro-active and scal decit di¤erentials have lost some of their explanatory power. In
contrast, similarities in monetary policies, measured by interest rate di¤erentials, have
emerged as a robust determinant of business cycle synchronisation. Also, di¤erences
in the size of industrial sectors, stock market comovement and similar competitiveness
situations appear to have good explanatory power. On the other hand, we could not
detect any robust impact of nominal exchange rate variability, bilateral bank capital
ows or di¤erences in labour market exibility on cycle synchronisation. The missing
e¤ect of mere exchange rate stabilisation on the synchronisation of business cycles is
in line with the endogeneity hypothesis of optimum currency areas which predicts that
only irrevocably xed exchange rates, i.e. currency union, would unleash synchronisation
dynamics.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 provides an
overview of the recent literature, introduces the potential determinants of cycle corre-
lation and presents some stylized facts. Section 3.2 outlines the methodology of the
extreme-bounds analysis (EBA) and presents the EBA results. Section 3.3 summarises
and concludes.
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3.1 The potential factors behind business cycle synchroni-
sation in the euro area
This section deals with the potential determinants of business cycle synchronisation.
The rst sub-section reviews traditional factors from the recent literature and suggests
new indicators that seem particularly relevant in the context of EMU. Based on these
considerations, we then specify our variables and present some stylised facts.
3.1.1 Traditional and new factors
The foremost candidate expected to inuence business cycle synchronisation is trade. In
theory, however, it is unclear whether intensied bilateral trade relations result in more
or in less synchronised business cycles. Spill-overs due to common aggregate demand and
productivity shocks would result in a positive e¤ect of trade integration on business cycle
synchronisation.2 On the other hand, intensied trade relations may also lead to a higher
degree of specialisation in di¤erent sectors across countries, due to the exploitation of
comparative advantages. As a result, business cycles may become more asynchronous.3
The underlying question is whether bilateral trade occurs mainly in similar or di¤erent
sectors. If trade ows are predominantly intra-industry, as it is the case for most of the
trade among industrialised countries, then we would expect the rst e¤ect to materialise.
If bilateral trade is, or increasingly becomes, mostly inter-industry, the second prediction
would dominate. Whether an intensication of bilateral trade relations will result in
more or less synchronous business cycles can be assessed by paralleling the evolution of
bilateral trade and of relative trade specialisation. Smaller cross-country di¤erences in
trade specialisation would indicate an intensication of intra-industry trade conducive
of more synchronous business cycles.
Given the unclear theoretical case, the question is fundamentally an empirical one. In
2See Gruben et al. (2002).
3This point was made by Krugman (1993). He postulates that, due to a specialisation e¤ect of trade,
even an ex ante OCA may turn out to be non-optimal ex post.
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their seminal contribution on "the endogeneity of the optimum currency area criteria",
Frankel and Rose (1998) estimated a single-equation model based on a large sample of de-
veloping and industrialised countries and found a strong and robust positive relationship
between bilateral trade and cycle synchronisation. This result is conrmed by Baxter
and Kouparitsas (2004). Imbs (2004) employs a simultaneous-equations approach and
veries the overall positive impact of trade on business cycle synchronisation but points
out that "a sizable portion is found to actually work through intra-industry trade."4
The e¤ects of economic specialisation on cycle synchronisation have also been mea-
sured directly. Stockmann (1988) emphasises the importance of sectoral shocks for the
business cycle since two countries will be hurt similarly by sector-specic shocks if they
have economic sectors of similar nature and size. Hence, we would expect the degree
of di¤erences in sectoral specialisation to be negatively related to cycle synchronisation,
i.e. the more dissimilar the economies, the less correlated their cycles. Empirical studies
however, nd conicting evidence regarding the robustness of this e¤ect.5
Financial integration is the third major eld of determinants. The literature is am-
biguous on the e¤ect of nancial integration on the synchronisation of business cycles.
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) argue along the lines of Krugman (1993) that countries with
a high degree of nancial integration tend to have more specialised industrial patterns
because rms need not spread production risk geographically. Hence, business cycles
will be less synchronised. Evidence from the nancial crises and contagion literature,
however, points out the role of psychological spill-overs and indicates a direct, positive
e¤ect of capital ows to business cycle synchronisation.6 Kose et al. (2003) nd that
nancial integration tends to enhance international spillovers of macroeconomic uctua-
tions leading to more business cycle synchronisation. Imbs (2004, 2006) tests this direct
link and nds a positive e¤ect dominating the indirect link via specialisation dynamics.
4 Imbs (2004: 733).
5While Imbs (2004) asserts that specialisation patterns play an independent role in cycle correlation,
this notion is rejected by Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004).
6See ECB(2004).
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Even if nancial integration leads to intensied specialisation, the latter may occur
in similar and not di¤erent sectors, as argued by Obstfeld (1994). In his model, coun-
tries that gain new access to international nancial markets can now all equally well
a¤ord to specialise on risky high-tech industries. This catching-up process leads, despite
specialisation, to more and not less similar economic structures across countries.
The three major determinants of business cycle synchronisation and the various,
partly opposite transmission channels are illustrated in gure 3.1.
Integration and business cycles
Financial
integration
Specialisation Business cyclesynchronisation
Trade
integration
(+) Inter-industry
trade
(+) Risk sharing
(+) Contagion
(-) Different sectors
(+) Similar sectors
(+) Intra-industry trade
(+) Demand
channel
Figure 3.1: Major determinants of business cycle synchronisation and
channels of inuence; adapted from ECB (2004) and Imbs (2004).
In addition to the above variables used in the literature, we suggest a number of
policy and structural indicators that seem particularly relevant for the euro area. We ask
whether the degree of similarity in various economic variables between two countries has
inuenced the bilateral synchronisation of business cycles. The policy indicators include
bilateral di¤erentials in the real short-run interest rate as a measure of the monetary
policy stance, nominal exchange rate variations, and di¤erentials in scal decits. The
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structural indicators capture competitiveness di¤erentials, stock market comovements,
and labour market exibility. Finally, we add geographical distance between countries
and relative country size in terms of population, in order to control for exogenous factors.
The following sub-section species these variables in detail.
3.1.2 Data and variable specication
As a measure of business cycle synchronisation in the euro area, we compute bilateral
correlation coe¢ cients between the cyclical part of real annual GDP for each pair of
countries, drawing 66 pairs among the twelve euro area countries over the 1980-2004
period.7 The cyclical parts are obtained by applying the Baxter-King band-pass lter,
which Baxter and King (1999) suggested specically in order to measure business cycle
correlations.8
The remainder of this sub-section provides detailed information on the specication
of variables which we selected as potential determinants of business cycle synchronisa-
tion. In general, we take averages of the annual data which cover the period 1980-2004.
Exceptions due to missing years or countries are indicated in the respective sub-sections.
The data apply to the twelve individual euro area countries. We use bilateral country
data where available and construct them from individual country data otherwise. Hence,
the terminology in the following equations corresponds to the country indices i = 1, . . . ,
12 and j = 1, . . . , 12, i 6= j; as well as the time index t = 1, . . . , 25. The rst set
of variables draws largely on the determinants used by Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004)9
7For the pre-euro period, national currencies are converted using the xed euro exchange rate as to
exclude the inuence of exchange rate uctuations. We use annual data for GDP because, for a number
of euro area countries, quarterly data are unavailable prior to 1997.
8For the Baxter-King lter, we employ the standard Burns-Mitchell settings for annual data, i.e.
maximum lead/lag length k = 3, shortest cycle pass p =2 and longest cycle pass q = 8. We are aware
that, due to the one-sided ltering windows at the margins of the sample, the estimates of the cyclical
components may decrease in accuracy at the beginning and the end of the data period.
9Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004) use initial values for the determinants of business cycle correlation.
We prefer full-sample and sub-sample averages based on the consideration that cross-country correla-
tions of business cycles may not be appropriately explained solely by the initial values of the potential
determinants since nearly all variables have undergone major changes since 1980.
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and Imbs (2004). The second set of variables consists in policy and structural indicators
which appear particularly relevant in the context of EMU. Appendix table A.1 gives an
overview of the variables and provides the data sources.
Traditional determinants of business cycle synchronisation
The independent variable bilateral trade is constructed in two alternative ways. First, it
is dened as the average of the sum of bilateral exports and imports, divided over the
sum of total exports and imports, denoted by BTTij .
BTTij =
1
T
TX
t=1
xijt +mijt + xjit +mjit
xit +mit + xjt +mjt
;
where xij denotes the exports of country i to country j at time t, mit stands for the
imports of country i from country j at time t, and xit and mit represent total exports
and imports of country i.
Second, the sum of national GDPs, yi and yj , serves as scaling variable which gives
BTYij =
1
T
TX
t=1
xijt +mijt + xjit +mjit
yit + yjt
:
The variable trade openness is calculated as the sum of total exports and imports of
both countries, divided by the sum of national GDPs:
TTYij =
1
T
TX
t=1
xit +mit + xjt +mjt
yit + yjt
:
We expect the bilateral trade and trade openness indicators to be positively correlated
with business cycle correlation.
Trade specialisation is measured by the cross-country di¤erence between the average
share across time of a particular sector in total exports. To obtain an overall sectoral
distance measure for total exports, we add up the distances calculated for all sectors:
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TRADEPATij =
XN
n=1

1
T
XT
t=1
eint

 

1
T
XT
t=1
ejnt

where eint stands for the share of sector n in total exports of country i, at time t. For
instance, the share of the chemical sector in Belgiums overall exports is rst averaged
over the number of annual observations, then subtracted from the average chemicals
share of, say Greeces total exports. This gives the economic "distance" between the
two countries for the trade in the chemical sector. Total exports of a country are divided
into the ten rst-digit sub-sectors of the United Nations Standard International Trade
Classication (SITC), revision 2. These sub-sectors are (i) food and live animals, (ii)
beverages and tobacco, (iii) crude materials, inedible, except fuels, (iv) mineral fuels,
lubricants and related materials, (v) animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes, (vi)
chemicals and related products, n.e.s., (vii) manufactured goods, (viii) machinery and
transport equipment, (ix) miscellaneous manufactured articles, and (x) commodities and
transactions not classied elsewhere in the SITC.10 Di¤erences in trade specialisation
patterns should be negatively related to business cycle correlation.
Economic specialisation is dened along the same lines as trade specialisation, as the
sum of the di¤erences of sector shares in the national economies:
ECOPATij =
XN
n=1

1
T
XT
t=1
sint

 

1
T
XT
t=1
sjnt

:
sint now represents the share, in terms of total output, of sector n in country i, at
time t. Intuitively, we would expect a larger distance in economic patterns to have a
negative impact on business cycle synchronisation. Hence we expect a negative coe¢ -
cient for this variable, as for di¤erences in trade specialisation. National value added
divides into six sub-sectors, based on the International Standard Industrial Classication
10The data source is the NBER World Trade Flows Database, as documented in Feenstra and Lipsey
(2005). We calculate the average over the years 1980, 1989, and 2000. Luxembourg is not covered by
this dataset.
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(ISIC): (i) agriculture, hunting, forestry, and shing, (ii) industry including energy, (iii)
construction, (iv) wholesale and retail trade, (v) nancial intermediation and real estate,
and (vi) other services.11 Ideally we would have needed to use a more detailed decompo-
sition of value-added in order to construct indices representing product-di¤erentiation.
A comprehensive data for more detailed sectors of the economy was unfortunately not
readily available for all countries over the entire sample.
There is a variety of strategies of how to measure nancial integration. A recent ECB
survey on nancial integration indicators by Baele et al. (2004) identies two major
measurement categories. The rst category comprises price-based measures. According
to the law of one price, a nancial market is completely integrated if all di¤erences in
asset prices and returns are eliminated which stem from the geographic origin of the
assets. Hence, the degree of price-based nancial integration is measured by interest
rate spreads of comparable assets across countries. Other authors resort to the second
major category, quantity-based measures. These include asset quantities and ows across
countries and attempt to measure capital ows and cross-border listings among countries;
hence, they can be regarded as measures of nancial intensity.12 One pitfall of price-
based and of most quantity-based measures is the lack of bilateral, country-to-country
information. Only Papapioannou (2005) explores actual bilateral ows between country
pairs as a quantity-based measure, employing data on bank ows. In addition, Imbs
(2006) uses bilateral asset holdings data which are, however, survey-based and limited
in their country coverage.13 We adopt Papapioannous approach and employ bilateral
bank ows as a quantity-based proxy of country-to-country ows. We are aware that
bank ows are an imperfect measure of nancial integration but we believe that the
11The ISIC dataset includes all twelve euro area countries but the data period is limited to 1980-2003.
12See, for example, the nancial integration studies by Imbs (2004), Kose et al. (2003), Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2005); in addition to price-based and quantity-based measures, Baele et al. (2004) dene
a third, specialised category, news-based measures, which we neglect here.
13The data used by Imbs (2006) stem from the IMFs Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS)
and apply to 2001 only; a number of nancially important countries are not covered, such as Germany
and Luxembourg.
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bilateral characteristic of the bank ows suits particularly well to our econometric set
up of country pairs.
We use as a proxy bilateral bank ows data provided by Papaioannou (2005). The
source of the data is the BIS International Locational Banking Statistics. The aggregate
bank ows are dened as the change in international nancial claims of a bank resident
in a given country vis-à-vis the banking and non-banking sectors in another country. The
asset and liability ows are adjusted for exchange rate movements. Although similar,
these two sets of series are not strictly equivalent. Asset ows from country i to country j
are the assets held by banks in country i on all sectors in country j: They are not exactly
the opposite of liabilities from country j to country i, since that variable represents
the liabilities of banks in country j on all sectors in country i. The pair-wise series
is calculated by taking the log of the average sum of bilateral asset (liability) ows
between two countries.14 The bilateral averages express a measure of nancial intensity,
regardless of whether ows occur in one direction or in the other. Hence, the log-bank
ows of assets (LBFA) and of liabilities (LBFL) is expressed as
LBFAij =
 1T XTt=1 log (aijt + ajit)
 ; LBFLij =  1T XTt=1 log (lijt + ljit)
 ;
with aijt as the change in assets of a country i bank towards all sectors in country
j, at time t and lijt as the change in liabilities of a country i bank towards all sectors
in country j, at time t.15 The more intensive bank ows between two countries, the
stronger we expect the correlation between their business cycles to be.
14Since the dependent variable, business cycle synchronisation, is by denition a ratio and all the other
explanatory variables are either ratios themselves or are expressed as ratios, it is possible to compare
the logarithm of nancial ows to the other variables.
15The bank ows dataset generally covers the years 1980-2002. Some country series are, however,
incomplete. Data for Luxembourg starts only in 1985, Portuguese data are available only from 1997.
Greeces data are missing.
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Policy and structural indicators relevant in the context of EMU
We consider short-term real interest rate di¤erentials, in order to determine whether
di¤erences in the monetary policy stance can be related to business cycle synchronisa-
tion.16 In theory, the direction of the e¤ect is ambiguous. On the one hand, monetary
policy shocks are one source of business cycles, and hence countries with a similar policy
stance may react in a similar way or stand at around the same point of the business
cycle. In this case, we would expect smaller interest rate di¤erentials to be associated
with larger cycle correlations. On the other hand, we can think of a reverse e¤ect: if
the economies were hit by asymmetric external shocks, business cycles may be less cor-
related due to the inability to respond by individual monetary policy in the presence of
policy coordination. Then we would see small interest rate di¤erentials corresponding
to small cycle correlations. The same argument holds true for scal policy which we
specify below. Therefore, the direction of the e¤ect is ultimately an empirical one. To
proxy the monetary policy stance, we use short-term three-month money market rates
deated by consumer prices (private consumption deator), and take the absolute value
of the mean sample of pair-wise di¤erences:
IRSCDIFFij =
 1T XTt=1 (rit   rjt)
 ;
where rit and rjt represent the short-term real interest rates of countries i and j at
time t.17
Nominal exchange rate uctuations played a major role in the convergence process
16We employ the real and not the nominal interest rate for the following reason. Although a central
bank sets the nominal interest rate, it does so taking the actual ination rate into account, in order
to achieve a certain real interest rate level. For household and rm decision-making, the real interest
rate is the decisive number. In fact, in the presence of high ination rates, a large nominal interest
rate contains no information per se whether the central banks monetary policy stance is e¤ectively
contractive or expansionary. Although we are aware that real interest rate di¤erentials can also be seen
as nancial integration indicators, we presently focus on their characteristic as monetary policy measures.
17The interest rates dataset ranges from 1980-2004, except for Portugal where the series starts only
in 1985.
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prior to 1999. Exchange rate volatility should be negatively correlated with business
cycle synchronisation. To capture the e¤ect of variations in nominal exchange rates on
business cycle synchronisation, we use the standard deviations of the bilateral nominal
exchange rates between countries i and j across time t, (Eijt), calculated via the ECU
exchange rates. The standard deviations are scaled by the mean of the bilateral exchange
rates over the sample period and can be written as
SD_NEREij =
(Eijt)
1
T
PT
t=1Eijt
:
Another convergence measure is given by the scal decit di¤erentials. As in the
case of monetary policy, the e¤ect of similar scal policy is unclear from a theoretical
point of view. Two countries with a small di¤erence in their general government balance
may exhibit more or less similar business cycles. To explore this question empirically, we
use net borrowing or net lending as a percentage of GDP at market prices of countries i
and j at time t, dit and djt, as dened by the European Commissions excessive decit
procedure. The variable is constructed as the mean sample of the bilateral di¤erences
of decit ratios, and taken as the absolute value:
DEFDIFFij =
 1T XTt=1 (dit   djt)
 :
As a national competitiveness indicator (NCI), we use real e¤ective exchange rates,
weighted by intra-euro area trade partners and deated by the HICP. Since the intro-
duction of the euro in 1999, real e¤ective exchange rates measure competitiveness based
on relative price levels. As a distance measure, we compute the bilateral di¤erences
between countries i and j at time t and take the absolute value of the sample mean.
NCIDIFFij =
 1T XTt=1 (nciit   ncijt)
 :
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The sectoral stock market indicator is built as the di¤erence between stock market
indices. We use the Datastream Total Market Index (TOTMK) and the Cyclical Services
Index (CYSER).18 To explore this nding in the context of cycle comovement, we expect
a smaller cross-country di¤erence in the stock market indices to be associated with more
synchronised business cycles. We calculate country-pair di¤erences in the values of these
indices, scale them by national nominal GDPs and take the absolute value of the sample
mean. Since the stock market indicators are expressed in terms of di¤erences, we expect
a negative relation with business cycle correlation. The corresponding equations read
TOTMKDIFFij =
 1T XTt=1

totmkit   totmkjt
yit + yjt

and
CY SERDIFFij =
 1T XTt=1

cyserit   cyserjt
yit + yjt
 :
Labour market exibility indicators may play a role in the process of business cycle
synchronisation. The more similar two countries are in terms of labour market exibil-
ity, the more similar we expect their adjustment to shocks, leading to smoother cycles
and less idiosyncracy. We employ two indicators from the OECD Labour Market Statis-
tics. The rst indicator is trade union density, measured as the percentage of organised
workers in percent. We calculate the average over the sample and compute the bilateral
di¤erences in order to obtain a distance measure expressed in absolute value.19 The
second indicator is the OECD index of strictness of employment protection legislation.
This index ranges from 0 (no protection) to 5 (strict protection) and is given for both
permanent and temporary employment. We calculate the average of the permanent and
temporary employment protection indices. Since data is available only for the years
18The CYSER index includes retail rms, hotel chains, media corporations and transports (such as
airlines and railroads). Data are available from 1980-2004 except for Greece (1989-2004), Spain (1988-
2004), Luxembourg (1993-2004), Portugal (1991-2004) and Finland (1989-2004). We also test other
sectoral indices but report only those that deliver meaningful results.
19Trade union density data are available for all countries but only for the years 1980-2001.
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1990, 1998, and 2003, we average these values for each country before we compute the
bilateral di¤erences as our distance measure of employment protection.
Finally, we apply gravity variables that are commonly used in the literature to ac-
count for exogenous aspects. Bilateral trade ows have been well explained by the
"gravity" measures of geographical distance and relative size. Geographical distance
is expressed in terms of distance between national capitals, in 1000 kilometre units.20
Relative size is measured as the average of the bilateral di¤erence in population between
two countries, divided by the sum of their population.21 The greater the distance, the
smaller the expected correlation of business cycles.
3.1.3 Stylised facts of cross-country developments in the euro area
Before estimating the extreme-bounds analysis, we explore some descriptive properties
of the core variables.
First, we inspect the country-specic cycles graphically. Figure 3.2 illustrates the
cyclical parts of the annual real GDP series of the 12 euro area countries, scaled by
overall GDP. All series exhibit the boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by
a downturn. The German series reveals the 1990 unication boom and the successive
period of high interest rates. This pattern seems to have spilled over particularly to
France, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. The Finnish series exhibits the strongest downturn
of about 8 percent in magnitude, amplied by the breakdown of the Soviet Union in
1991. Apart from this exception, all cycles move within a band of 3 percent. The
remainder of this sub-section further investigates the properties of the core bilateral
variables, namely business cycle correlation, trade and specialisation.
20For Germany, the distance refers to Bonn, the capital of former West Germany. This makes sense
economically because Bonn is located closer to Germanys main industrial areas than remote Berlin.
21We use population and not GDP to measure relative country size because GDP is already included
in our left-hand side variable, i.e. business cycle synchronisation.
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Figure 3.2: Business cycles of the 12 euro area countries (Baxter-King-filtered cyclical GDP components, scaled by overall GDP), 1980-2004. 
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Correlation of business cycles
Forming country-by-country pairs delivers 66 bilateral combinations. Figure 3.3 presents
the largest and smallest ten coe¢ cients of bilateral cycle correlation. Surprisingly, the
largest correlation coe¢ cient applies to Belgium-Italy, amounting to 0.85. The remain-
ing top ten coe¢ cients appear more intuitive, including neighbouring countries such as
Spain-Portugal, Belgium-France, Germany-Austria or Germany-Netherlands.
Largest and smallest ten business cycle correlation
coefficients
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Figure 3.3: Largest and smallest business cycle correlation coe¢ cients
among the 66 euro area country pairs, 1980-2004.
The ten combinations with the smallest coe¢ cients are often, although not always,
between countries that are separated by a large geographical distance. This conrms the
importance of geographical distance in the literature explaining di¤erences in business
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cycles, as well as the need to include geographical distance as a control variable in regres-
sions, provided it does not overlap with other explanatory variables. With a negative
value that di¤ers signicantly from that of other country pairs, the Germany-Finland
country pair stands out. The negative correlation is due to a one-o¤ event. The Ger-
man and Finnish economies were a¤ected asymmetrically by the same external shock,
namely the breakdown of the Communist regimes in Europe. Germanys unication
boom peaked when Finlands cycle was already bust due to the collapse of the Soviet
Union, one of its main trading partners.
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Figure 3.4: Average correlation coe¢ cients of euro area business cycles
(euro area 11 excludes Greece), 1980-2004, 8-year rolling windows.
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Turning to time-varying aspects, we present rolling windows and sub-samples of the
cycle correlations. Figure 3.4 illustrates the average correlations of the 66 country com-
binations in rolling windows. We choose 8-year windows corresponding to the maximum
length of the business cycle in the Baxter-King lter which we applied to de-trend the
real GDP series. The average correlation reaches a minimum of 0.18 in the period 1981-
1988 before it increases in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It peaks in the period of
1993-2000 with a coe¢ cient of 0.73 before declining to 0.62 in the most recent period,
from 1997 to 2004. Excluding Greece however, the correlation of business cycles con-
tinued to increase after 1993 up to the most recent period, as illustrated by the euro
area-11 line22.
To analyse the background of the correlation variation over time, we divide the
sample into three sub-samples, namely (i) 1980-1988, (ii) 1989-1996, and (iii) 1997-2004.
Sub-samples of smaller size than eight years would be less likely to capture a full business
cycle. In addition, the three periods broadly capture the successive stages of European
integration. Economic and nancial integration gained momentum in the late 80s and
early 90 with the completion of the Single European Act in 1992 and later with the
Treaty on the European Union of Maastricht. The third sub-sample can be regarded as
the period of EMU, plus a two-year anticipation period. While the single monetary policy
came into force in 1999, the denite timetable for its implementation gained credibility
after the agreement on the Stability and Growth Pact in June 1997. Empirical studies
have conrmed 1997 as the start of the convergence process towards monetary union.23
Figure A.1 in appendix A illustrates the average bilateral cycle correlations for the
entire sample as well as for the three sub-samples. Given the overall average correlation
of 0.57, the sub-sample value increased markedly from 0.42 in (i) to 0.65 in (ii). Period
(iii) is characterised by a slight decrease to a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.62. The latter
22We note that, due to the detrending lter, the cycle data may exhibit a certain degree of instability
at the beginning and end points.
23See Frankel (2005) who considers June 1997 as the breakpoint in perceptions; according to Gold-
man Sachs estimations, the expectations of EMU taking place in 1999 shot up to a probability of 75%.
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result becomes clear when looking at the largest and smallest ten coe¢ cients for the
three sub-samples, presented in gures A.2-4. While the presence of some minor negative
coe¢ cients is not surprising for period (i), we see a di¤erent picture in period (ii). Now,
only the country pair Germany-Finland displays a negative coe¢ cient, for the above-
mentioned reasons. In period (iii), however, a large number of negative coe¢ cients
re-emerges. In fact, all of these negative values involve Greece.
The fall in the average correlation during the period of preparation for EMU and
since Monetary Union is entirely due to specic developments in Greece. Excluding
Greece, cross-country correlation coe¢ cients indicate that EMU has been characterised
by a greater synchronisation of business cycles among the other 11 euro area countries.
The cross-country correlation of business cycles averaged 0.79 from 1997 to 2004, which
was higher both than during the previous 1989-96 period (0.65) and than in the full
sample (0.60).
Trade
Figure 3.5 illustrates bilateral trade ratios, scaled by total trade. The largest ratios cor-
respond to the well-known examples of trade-integrated country pairs Germany-France,
Belgium-Netherlands, and Germany-Netherlands. For instance, trade between Germany
and France amounted to an average of 13.5 percent of their overall total trade over
the period 1980-2004. Among the smallest ratios, we again nd either Greece or Lux-
embourg in most of the pairs, conrming their special position among the euro area
member states. Both countries have strong service sectors which are not captured by
the merchandise trade measures.
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a) Largest ten bilateral trade ratios
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b) Smallest ten bilateral trade ratios
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Figure 3.5: Largest and smallest ratios of bilateral trade ratios, scaled
by total trade, 1980-2004.
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Figure 3.6: Average trade ratios, 1980-2003, scaled to 1980 = 100.
Inspecting the average trade ratios over time in gure 3.6, we note a sharp increase
of bilateral trade, scaled by total trade, during the 1980s.24 This may be partly due
to the decrease of total trade which serves as the denominator in that bilateral trade
ratio. At the same time, bilateral trade between the euro area countries in relation to
GDP increased moderately. We take this as an indication of a trade diversion e¤ect
since trade with non-euro area countries seems to have gone down whereas intra-euro
area trade has increased relatively. It is likely that this developement was spurred by
intensied European economic integration in the late 1980s in the form of the Single
Market programme and exchange rate coordination. During the late 1990s, we observe
a sharp rise in bilateral trade, scaled to GDP, among euro area countries. Total trade
has gone up as well which may have caused the ratio of bilateral trade to total trade
to fall slightly. It seems that during the period of preparation and launch of monetary
union, not only bilateral trade among the participating countries increased substantially
24Total trade refers to trade with the rest of the world, including euro area and non-euro area countries.
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but also trade with the rest of the world. Although we recognise the contribution of
other factors, it seems that the trade diversion e¤ect turned into a trade creation e¤ect
so that trade increase among the euro area countries evolves no longer at the expense of
third-country trade but rather in addition.25
Smallest and largest ten trade specialisation indices
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Figure 3.7: Smallest and largest indices of trade specialisation
di¤erences.
Regarding trade structure, the trade specialisation indicator reects the cross-country
di¤erences in ten export sectors and thus focuses explicitly on tradables. The smallest
and largest ten values are shown in gure 3.7, with small values indicating a low degree
of specialisation di¤erences, whereas large values stand for very di¤erent specialisation
patterns. In other words, a small trade specialisation value indicates a high degree of
25This argument nds empirical support in Micco et al. (2003). For an overview, see Baldwin (2005).
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intra-industry trade between two countries while country pair with a large index trades
mostly inter -industry. The lowest trade specialisation position is taken by Germany-
France which is often quoted as the classical example of intra-industry trade. Hence,
these two countries do not only trade most with each other as indicated by the bilateral
trade ratios, they also trade most in similar sectors. The most di¤erent country pairs
involve Greece in six out of ten values. Greek exports exhibit markedly larger shares of
trade in food and beverages while the exports of Greece are at the same time charac-
terised by smaller shares of machinery and transport equipment than that of most other
euro area countries. Luxembourg does not appear because of data unavailability.
Trade specialisation
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Figure 3.8: Average indices of trade specialisation di¤erences.
Across time, euro area countries have converged in terms of trade specialisation as
shown in gure 3.8. From 1980 through 2000, di¤erences in trade specialisation declined.
The trade specialisation measures indicate that euro area countries have become more
similar in terms of trade structure. Combined with the above evidence that EMU con-
tributed to trade creation, this provides an indication that the intensication of trade
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relations due to the single currency was characterised by the development of intra-
industry trade by opposition to inter -industry trade. Thus, as conjectured by Frankel
and Rose (1998), the introduction of the single currency may have given a substantial
impetus for trade expansion.
Smallest and largest ten economic specialisation indices
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3.9: Smallest and largest indices of economic specialisation
di¤erences.
Economic specialisation
Furthermore, we consider bilateral economic specialisation indices across six sub-sectors
of the economy. Again, a small value indicates a small specialisation di¤erence, i.e.
large similarity in the share of economic sectors in value-added. A large index value, in
turn, stands for highly di¤erent sectoral shares across countries. In general, we expect
small values for specialisation to be associated with large coe¢ cients of cycle correlation.
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Figure 3.9 presents the smallest and largest ten economic specialisation indices. Spain
and Austria share the most similar economic structure as indicated by the small value
of the specialisation index. Although this result may appear surprising at rst sight,
it does not reect an actual product specialisation. The small index means that the
shares of industry, construction, wholesale and retail trade and nancial services are
similar in the Spanish and Austrian economies. While this seems like a lot of similarity,
the product specialisation  in particular in tradable goods and services  may di¤er
considerably. Other country-pairs are less unexpected, such as Belgium-Netherlands, or
Spain-Portugal.
Economic specialisation
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Figure 3.10: Average indices of economic specialisation di¤erences.
Analysing the countries with the most di¤erent structures, it strikes that again either
Greece or Luxembourg are involved in each of the pairs. In this case, Luxembourgs
large nancial service sector gives rise to larger values in overall economic specialisation
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di¤erences. Greece stands out with a fairly large agricultural and rather small industrial
sector.
Over time, cross-country di¤erences in terms of broad economic specialisation have
remained fairly stable during the 1980 and early 1990s, as gure 3.10 illustrates.Since
1997, we observe a modest increase. The ECB (2004) report on sectoral specialisation
comes to a similar result and attributes a slight increase in specialisation for some smaller
euro area countries to developments in business sector services. Furthermore, an analysis
by the European Commission (2004: 149) matches our results in observing that "the
specialisation of production has gradually increased [...] while export specialisation has
decreased." While this nding appears puzzling at rst glance, the Commission argues
that production adjusts more slowly than trade. Also, it supports the notion of increased
intra-industry trade measured by a rising Grubel-Lloyd index between 1980 and 2001.
Given that trade in similar industries is a key channel of spill-overs across countries, we
expect trade specialisation, more than economic specialisation, to play a key role in the
synchronisation of business cycles.
Bank ows
Bilateral bank ows are presented in gure 3.11, again for the largest and smallest ten
values. The country pair Germany-Luxembourg ranks top and reects, on the one hand,
the capital-strong position of Germany, and on the other, the outstanding importance
of Luxembourgs nancial service industry. Among the smallest values, Finland seems
to have had a particularly low integration with the euro area countries over the past
25 years. Figure 3.12 illustrates how average bank ows evolved across the three sub-
periods. It is obvious that the average bank asset ows increased steadily over time
across euro area countries which is in line with increasing capital market liberalisation.
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Figure 3.11: Largest and smallest bilateral bank ow indicators
(assets, in logs).
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Figure 3.12: Average bilateral bank ows (assets, in logs).
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3.2 A "robust" estimation approach: The extreme-bounds
analysis
In this section, we introduce the econometric methodology and present the main results
of the analysis of the determinants of business cycle synchronisation across euro area
countries.
3.2.1 Methodology
To identify the key determinants of business cycle synchronisation in the euro area, we
employ the extreme-bounds analysis (EBA) as proposed by Leamer and Leonard (1981),
Leamer (1983) and further developed by Levine and Renelt (1992), Levine and Zervos
(1993), and Sala-i-Martin (1997) in the context of empirical growth analysis. Baxter and
Kouparitsas (2004) employ an EBA estimation to explain business cycle synchronisation
across a large sample of developing and industrialised countries.
Estimation framework
In empirical studies, the researcher is often faced with the decision which determinants
to include in an analysis. Sometimes, various possible regression set-ups have equal
theoretical status but the resulting coe¢ cients may depend heavily on the set of control
variables employed. Hence, the choice of right-hand side variables is often based on
assumptions and, in the end, left to the researchers discretion.26 This dilemma, which
Brock and Durlauf (2001) refer to as the "open-endedness of theories", may result in
incomplete econometric models su¤ering from specication bias.
The EBA framework is one attempt to respond to this dilemma by considering a large
number of alternative specications and ltering out those determinants that do not turn
insignicant with the alteration of the conditioning set of information. In this sense of
26See Durham (2001) and Levine and Renelt (1992).
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robustness, the signicance of the "robust" determinants cannot be eliminated by any
other variable. Otherwise, the variable is considered "fragile" even if it is signicant in
a bivariate or in some multivariate set-ups.
In practice, the robustness of the potential determinants is investigated by testing
each candidate variable (M-variable) against a varying set of other conditioning variables
(Z-variables). A necessary condition for a variable to be a meaningful determinant of
business cycle correlation is that it should be signicant in a bivariate regression. Its
explanatory power may however vary considerably when other determinants are added
to the baseline regression. The basic equation can be expressed as
Y = iI + mM + zZ + u; (3.1)
where Y denotes a vector of coe¢ cients of bilateral business cycle correlations. The
M-variable is the candidate variable of interest which is tested for robustness. This ro-
bustness test is conducted by including a varying set of conditioning or control variables,
Z, and checking ms sensitivity to alterations in Z. For each M-variable, we rst run
a baseline regression without any Z-variables, then successively include one, two, and
three Z-variables in every possible combination.27 The I-variable, on the other hand,
controls for initial conditions that are exogenous. The "gravity variables", geographical
distance and relative population size, fall into that group. We run alternative set-ups
with and without the I-variables.
For every M-variable under consideration, the EBA identies the "extreme bounds"
by constructing the highest and lowest values of condence intervals of the estimated m
coe¢ cients. In other words, the extreme upper bound (EUB) is equal to the maximum
estimated m, plus two times its standard error,
27This strategy follows Levine and Zervos (1993).
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EUB = maxm + 2(
max
m );
the extreme lower bound (ELB) is the minimum estimated m, minus two times its
standard error,
ELB = minm   2(minm );
The M-variable is then regarded as robust, if the EUB and the ELB exhibit the same
sign and if all estimated m coe¢ cients are signicant.
Leamers standard methodology is based on OLS estimates. Estimates of the pa-
rameters in cross-section regressions are subject to sampling uncertainty and to cor-
relations between sampling errors. Frankel and Rose (1998) and Imbs (2004) use the
White correction for heteroskedasticity to account for possible sampling errors. Clark
and Van Wincoop (2001) argue that this does not allow to correct for dependencies in
the residuals and use GMM methods to calculate the variance-covariance matrix of the
parameters. GMM nevertheless gives imprecise variance estimates in small samples and
would therefore not have been appropriate in our case, given the relatively small size of
our sample consisting in the 66 euro area country pairs. Instead, in order to get robust
estimators for the coe¢ cients of the candidate explanatory variables, we apply to the
OLS regressions a Newey-West correction for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in
the residuals which is less dependent on large sample properties.
The decision rule rst outlined by Levine and Renelt (1992) was derived from the
statistical theory expounded in Leamer and Leonard (1981). It has often been criticised
for being too restrictive. In practice, an explanatory variable might fail to qualify for
robustness because of one statistical outlier in one single equation. Using least absolute
deviation (LAD) estimators to deal with potential outliers is, however, not an option for
our study because LAD is particularly inappropriate in relatively small samples. Also,
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when compared with OLS, LAD is not a robust estimation method in the statistical
sense of the word. It indeed requires extra assumptions for the estimation of conditional
mean parameters that are not necessarily met in the actual population. Nevertheless, we
consider two other criteria in addition to the decision rule dened by Levine and Renelt
(1992).
The rst additional criteria is the percentage of signicant coe¢ cients of the same
sign. Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that running a su¢ ciently large number of regressions
increases the probability of reaching a non-robust result, pointing that "if one nds a
single regression for which the sign of the coe¢ cient m changes or becomes insignicant,
then the variable is not robust."28 He suggests to assign a certain "level of condence"
to each M-variable by investigating the share of signicant m coe¢ cients. An M-
variable with a share of signicant coe¢ cients of 95% may be considered as "signicantly
correlated" with business cycle synchronisation. In the results tables, we therefore not
only state the robust/fragile result but also indicate the share of signicant coe¢ cients.29
The second criteria we consider in the cases where one of the bounds changes sign,
is whether the value of the extreme bound is large compared with the corresponding
coe¢ cients. In some cases, after adding (or subtracting) two standard deviations to the
maximum (or minimum) estimated m coe¢ cient, the extreme upper (or lower) bound
changed sign but remained close to around zero while all m coe¢ cients were signicant
and of the same sign. When the value of the upper (lower) bound was less than 5% the
maximum (minimum) coe¢ cient, we have considered that the variable was signicant in
explaining business cycle correlation.
These two criteria do not a¤ect our fundamental results but allow to qualify the
evidence in one or two limit cases.
28Sala-i-Martin (1997: 178)
29We state the share of signicant coe¢ cients only for the cases in which at least the bivariate esti-
mation coe¢ cient is signicant.
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Information set
The dependent variable is a vector of bilateral pairs containing the 66 correlation coe¢ -
cients between the cyclical part of real GDP for the 12 euro area countries. The candi-
date explanatory variables are drawn from the set of potential determinants presented
above. They include: bilateral trade, trade openness, trade patterns, economic patterns,
bilateral bank ows, real short-term interest rate di¤erentials, nominal exchange rate
uctuations, scal decit di¤erentials, national competitiveness indicators, di¤erences in
stock market indices, labour market exibility indicators and gravity variables.
Among this set of indicators, we select four main categories of M-variables of interest
which we think should be key determinants of the business cycle as indicated by the lit-
erature. These variables are: bilateral trade and openness to trade, trade specialisation,
economic specialisation and bilateral bank ows. Regarding the group of Z-variables,
we agree with the selection process used by Levine and Zervos (1993) and try to avoid
including series that may overlap with the M-variable under review. This amounts to
minimising multicollinearity problems between the explanatory variables which might
be a drawback of the EBA analysis. For instance, a similar trade specialisation pattern
between two countries may be related to strong intra-industry trade, which would result
in an intensication of bilateral trade. The similarity of economic structures may also
be reected in the similarity of trade patterns. Strong trade relations may contribute to
intensify the ow of credits between two countries. In addition, we test successively for
di¤erent alternative measures of these M-variables.
The robustness of the M-variables was tested by estimating multivariate regressions
where all possible combinations of 1 to 3 explanatory variables, drawn from a pool of
six Z-variables and one I-variable, were added successively to the bivariate regression.
The core group of control Z-variables which may be related to the business cycle
includes: bilateral exchange rate volatility (SD_NERE), di¤erences in scal decits
(DEFDIFF), di¤erences in national price competitiveness (NCIDIFF), di¤erences in the
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performance of stock markets (TOTMKDIFF for the overall market index; alternatively
CYSERDIFF for cyclical services), di¤erences in trade union density (TUDDIFF). The
employment protection indicator EPADIFF was not used in the multivariate regressions
due to the lack of data and absence of signicance in the bivariate regression. The
Z-variables may also turn out to be potentially important explanatory variables and
have also been identied, directly or indirectly, as key determinants of business cycle
synchronisation.
To the group of initial Z-variables, we added the gravity variables which we rst
considered as I-variables, and which represent external non-economic factors. However,
systematically including geographical distance (GEODIST) in all equations created par-
tial correlation problems because several explanatory variables are closely related to ge-
ographical distance, bilateral trade in particular. As in Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004),
we treated geographical distance as a "not-always" included variable. Including or not
di¤erences in population size (POPDIFF) as an I-variable did not make any di¤erence
to the EBA analysis. In the tables in appendix B we present the results of the EBA
estimates without population di¤erences because of the complete absence of signicance
of that variable in our estimates.
Robustness tests were conducted also for the variables which we designated ex-ante as
Z-variables and I-variables. In order to ensure the comparability of results, the additional
explanatory variables were always drawn from the same pool of explanatory variables,30
as for the M-variables.
Samples
In the following sub-sections, for each group of possible explanatory variable, we present
the bivariate relations with business cycle and discuss the EBA results. The robustness
of the variables is tested for the full sample from 1980 to 2004. It is of particular interest
30BTT, TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFF, SD_NERE, TUDIFFF and GEODIST.
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to know whether the determinants of business cycle correlation have changed since the
implementation of a common monetary policy. We therefore conducted tests for two
sub-periods. The rst period runs from 1980 to 1996, the second period starts in 1997
and ends in 2004. For the above mentioned reasons, we consider the second period as
the "EMU period".
Since the analysis is a cross-section analysis, across countries and for one point in
time, the sample size for the estimates is always the same whatever the number of
years in the period of estimation, and corresponds to the 66 country pairs. Since the
series entering the regressions are calculated in terms of averages, the cross-country
observations might be more dispersed when calculated over a shorter period of time
than when calculated over a period of several years. This is not however the case: the
standard deviations of the series scaled by their means are not always higher in the two
sub-samples than in the full sample, and in the last sub-sample than the rst one.
Regarding parameter uncertainty, the standard error of the coe¢ cients tend to in-
crease in the 1997-04 sample (see tables of results in appendix B) which could lead to
more frequent rejection of robustness. However, there is no automatic link between the
size of standard errors and the acceptation or rejection of robustness. The "robustness"
of the explanatory variable is accepted also in the cases where the standard error of the
explanatory variables coe¢ cient increases considerably in the third sample (for instance
TRADEPAT in table B.3 or IRSCDIFF in table B.6 in appendix B).
3.2.2 Results for core explanatory variables
Bilateral trade and trade openness
Di¤erent measures of trade The three measures of trade are considered successively.
For these variables we expect a positive coe¢ cient: the more intensive trade between
two countries (or the more open to trade), the higher the trade variable, and the more
synchronous the business cycles. Business cycle correlation increases with the intensi-
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cation of bilateral trade, both relative to total trade and to GDP. Through bilateral
trade, spill-over e¤ects appear to a¤ect simultaneously business cycles in two countries
regardless of their relative openness to trade.
The rst measure, bilateral trade as a ratio to total trade (BTT), is plotted against
business cycle correlation in gure 3.13. The vertical axis represents business cycle cor-
relation and the horizontal axis the explanatory variable, the bilateral trade to total
trade ratio in the present case. The plot shows the equation corresponding to the regres-
sion line and the associated R2. The bivariate regression of business cycle correlation
on bilateral trade reveals a positive-sloping trend. With a t-statistic of 3.9, the point
estimate is signicant at the 5% level. The goodness of t amounts to 0.2 which appears
acceptable for a bivariate regression. It is, however, clearly visible from the chart that
the upward slope is generated by approximately a third of the observations while the
remaining points form a cloud close to the vertical axis. The outlier with the negative
correlation estimate pertains to the German-Finnish country pair as discussed above.
Bilateral trade (scaled by total trade) and business cycle
correlation
y = 2.0652x + 0.5087
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Figure 3.13
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The plot of the second trade measure, bilateral trade to GDP (BTY), is shown in
gure 3.14 and exhibits the same positive-sloping trend. The coe¢ cient on BTY is also
positive, the t-statistics signicant at the 5% level, and the R2 acceptable.
By contrast with BTT and BTY, the third trade measure, overall openness to trade
(TTY), fails to be signicant in a bivariate regression. Figure 3.15 indicates little con-
nection between similarities in openness and cycle correlation. Since the total trade to
GDP ratio is not signicant in the bilateral regression and the rst necessary condition
is not fullled, we do not test that variable for the EBA.
Bilateral trade (scaled by GDP) and business cycle correlation
y = 3.2161x + 0.5177
t = 2.90, R2 = 0.15
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Figure 3.14
EBA results Over the full sample, both BTT and BTY come out clearly as robust,
in the case of BTT including or not geographical distance, and in the case of BTY
without geographical distance. The results are reported for the two variables without
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geographical distance.31 For BTT, without geographical distance, the lower and upper
bounds of all estimates range from 0.1 to 3.1. The m coe¢ cients range between 1.0 and
2.1 and are all signicant at the 5% level. Although the lower bound is close to zero,
the associated equation has a fairly good explanatory power. Indeed, the associated
R2 reaches 0.4 and is twice as big as for the upper bound and as in the bivariate case.
For BTY, also without geographical distance, both the extreme m coe¢ cients and
the extreme bounds tend to be higher than for BTT (from 1.5 to 3.2 for the extreme
coe¢ cients), probably because the BTT ratio tends to be lower than BTY. However,
the explanatory power of BTY is not greater than that of BTT, as indicated by the
similarity in the R2s. Among the three Z-variables for which the lower bound is reached
are the national competitiveness indicator and di¤erences in scal decits, both in the
case of BTT and of BTY.
Trade openness and business cycle correlation
y = 0.0786x + 0.5215
t = 0.81, R2 = 0.01
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
Trade openness
B
us
in
es
s 
cy
cl
e 
co
rr
el
at
io
n
Figure 3.15
31 In that particular case, geographical distance may create multicollinearity problems if included
among the regressors. Geographical distance is indeed a strong determinant of bilateral trade itself.
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Turning to the sub-samples, for the 1980-96 period, both BTT and BTY remain
robust determinants of business cycle correlation. The range for the extreme bounds
tends to be larger than for the full sample, due to larger standard errors. Nevertheless,
the range for the actual m coe¢ cients is smaller, indicating that the power of BTT
and BTY to explain business cycle synchronisation is less conditioned by other variables
than in the full sample. However the explanatory power of bilateral trade ratios for the
1980-1996 period is very low (the R2s are around 0.1), indicating that bilateral trade
explained only a small part of business cycle correlation.
While bilateral trade appears to have been a key element in the synchronisation of
business cycles before monetary union, its importance to explain business cycle corre-
lation has clearly decreased since then. For both BTT and BTY, over the 1997-2004
period, the lower bound turns clearly negative as the minimum m becomes insigni-
cant in particular when the scal decit di¤erential are added as explanatory Z-variable.
However, the upper bounds increase markedly. In the bivariate case and when only di¤er-
ence in trade union membership is added to the equation, the maximum m coe¢ cients
increase to 4.1 for BTT and to 5.9 for BTY .
Trade specialisation
The trade specialisation indicator (TRADEPAT) is presented in gure 3.16 where the
expected negative relation to cycle correlation is conrmed. In other words, the more
similar the trade structures of two countries, the higher is cycle correlation. The t-
statistics amounts to -3.1, respectively and the R2 is fairly large (0.2) for a bivariate
regression.
EBA results
Over the full sample, trade specialisation fails to qualify as robust by only a small margin.
All the coe¢ cients have the expected negative sign and are signicant at the 10% level
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but the upper bound turns positive in the case of the maximum coe¢ cient (-0.2). The
minimum coe¢ cient (-0.4) is reached in the bivariate case and in the case with one Z-
variable, di¤erence in trade union density. Noticeably, bilateral exchange rate volatility
when introduced in the estimate seems to reduce sensibly the explanatory power of trade
specialisation.
As the case for trade specialisation is somewhat undetermined, we conducted tests re-
placing it with selected components: di¤erences in the share in total trade of mineral fuels
(CD_FUEL), machinery and transport equipment (CD_MACH), other manufacturing
products (CD_MANU) and chemicals (CD_CHEM). These products were selected for
their greater sensitivity to uctuations in the business cycle. None of the four compo-
nents comes out as a robust over the full sample but, with all the coe¢ cients signicant
at the 10% level, trade in machinery and equipment comes very close to it. Machinery
and equipment is indeed widely considered as a leading indicator of the business cycle,
and a substantial part of intra-industry trade between euro area countries occurs in that
sector.
Trade specialisation and business cycle correlation
y = -0.4330x + 0.8238
t = -3.10, R2 = 0.19
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Figure 3.16
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Over the 1980-1996 period, trade specialisation fails to qualify as robust. Even in
the bivariate regression, the coe¢ cient on trade specialisation remains insignicant. The
upper bound which was more sensitive to changes in the information set in estimates
for the full sample, becomes even more clearly insignicant when the national compet-
itiveness indicator is included as a control variable. None of the components of trade
specialisation qualies as robust and not even as signicant in the case of two Z-variables.
By contrast, trade specialisation becomes clearly robust in the 1997-2004 sample.
The maximum and minimum m coe¢ cients are all signicant at the 5% level, ranging
from -0.5 to -1.5 with fairly large R2s (0.6 and 0.4, respectively). As for the full sample,
most of the impact of trade specialisation on business cycle synchronisation seems to
be driven by trade specialisation in machinery and transport equipment (CD_MACH).
For that sector, the results are even more signicant than for total trade, Importantly,
the R2s are very large, in particular in the case of the upper bound (0.8), including
three Z-variables: the real interest rate di¤erentials, the competitiveness indicator and
di¤erences in scal decits.
Economic specialisation
The economic specialisation indicator (ECOPAT) is presented in gure 3.17. As for trade
specialisation, the expected negative relation to cycle correlation is conrmed. Although
the t-statistics on the coe¢ cient is signicant at the 5% level, the R2 of the regression
(0.05) is not meaningful. This suggests that an overall similarity in the relative shares of
broad economic sectors provides little information to explain business cycle correlation.
EBA results Indeed, in the EBA analysis, economic specialisation fails to reach the
robustness status with the extreme bounds ranging from 0.3 to -1.0. The upper bound
becomes insignicant and of the wrong sign when the total stock market index, the
scal decit di¤erentials and bilateral exchange rate volatility are included as control
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variables. As for trade specialisation, we also analysed the robustness of some of the
components of economic specialisation: industry (CD_IND), construction (CD_CNT),
wholesale and retail trade (CD_TRA), nancial intermediation (CD_FIN). Out of the
ve sectors, only the di¤erences between the share of industrial sectors (CD_IND) come
out as signicant, regardless of the combination of Z-variables included in the equation.
In the full sample, from 1980 to 2004, all the m coe¢ cients signicant at the 5% level
and negative, ranging from -1.2 to -2.2. The statistics presented in the tables in the
appendix are based on short-term interest rates deated by the GDP deator. On a
yearly basis, interest rate di¤erentials deated by the national GDP deators or by
the national consumption deators di¤er little. Nevertheless in the case of industrial
di¤erences, the upper bound turned to the wrong positive sign by a very small margin
(less than 5% of the absolute value of the extreme coe¢ cients), when using interest rates
deated by consumer prices. When using di¤erentials of interest rates deated by the
GDP deator, they remained clearly negative. By comparison using either deator did
not make any di¤erence to the results in the case of the other variables that were tested
for robustness.
Regarding the 1980-96 sub-sample, economic specialisation fails again to qualify as
robust but both the relative shares of industrial sectors (CD_IND) and the relative
shares of nancial sectors (CD_FIN) come close to robustness.32 The relative impor-
tance of nancial specialisation in explaining business cycle synchronisation over the
rst sub-sample may reect the impact on economic activity of the liberalisation, devel-
opment and internationalisation of nancial services during that period. Even though
all the m coe¢ cients are again signicant at the 5% level and of the right sign, the
relative size of the industrial sector in value-added does not comes out as robust. Due to
a marked increase in the standard errors of the estimated coe¢ cients, the upper bound
turns out very positive.
32Construction also appears as robust but with the wrong expected sign.
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Econom ic specialisation and business cycle correlation
y = -0.4987x + 0.6704
t = -2.61, R2 = 0.05
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Figure 3.17
Over the 1997-2004 period, neither overall economic specialisation nor any of its
components comes out as robust. In addition the m coe¢ cients are insignicant and
often of the wrong sign, even in the case of industrial and nancial specialisations. Also,
as for the full sample and for the previous sample, the explanatory power of economic
specialisation appears limited as indicated by the fairly small R2s.
As supposed in sub-section 2.3, the absence of clear-cut results for economic spe-
cialisation and its components might be due to the fact that the impact of economic
specialisation on the business cycle would be better captured by a narrower breakdown
of value-added, allowing to account for product-specialisation in tradable goods and
services.
Bilateral bank ows
The measure of bank ows, log-bilateral ows of bank assets (LBFA), is plotted against
business cycle correlation in gure 3.18. The slope of the regression line is positive (0.04)
90
and signicant at the 1% level with an R2 of 0.2. This suggests that, on a bivariate
basis, larger amounts of bilateral bank ows are associated with higher correlation of
the business cycles.
Bilateral bank flows (log of assets) and business cycle
correlation
y = 0.0378x + 0.3569
t = 3.39, R2 = 0.18
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Figure 3.18
EBA results Over the full sample, bilateral asset ows fail to qualify as robust, in-
cluding or not geographical distance in the group of Z-variables. Although most m
coe¢ cients are positive and signicant at the 5% or 1% level, the coe¢ cients of the
equations including the national competitiveness indicator or real interest rate di¤eren-
tials as control variables, are insignicant. Turning to the sub-samples, asset ows do
not qualify as robust in either case but are more signicant in the second period. From
1997 to 2004, bilateral asset ows are close to becoming a "robust" determinant of busi-
ness cycle correlation, whereas from 1980 to 1996 none of the coe¢ cients are signicant
and most of them have the wrong sign. The series representing bilateral ows of bank
liabilities broadly follow the series of the asset ows and are not explicitly reported; they
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never appeared as robust.
3.2.3 Results for policy indicators
Real short-term interest rates
The relation between real short-term interest rates di¤erentials (IRSCDIFF) and busi-
ness cycle correlation is illustrated in gure 3.19. The regression line is negatively sloped
which indicates more highly correlated cycles in the presence of more similar monetary
policy. The coe¢ cient is signicant at the 10% level but the R2 (0.03) is far too small
for the bivariate regression to be meaningful at all.
EBA results In the full sample, real short-term interest rate di¤erentials do not ap-
pear as robust. When negative as expected, the m coe¢ cients are far from the signi-
cance level and the R2s of the equations are close to zero. When interest rate di¤erentials
turn out as signicant, they have a positive sign. The same characteristics apply to the
1980-96 period as for the full sample.
Short-term interest rate differentials and business cycle
correlation
y = -0.0490x + 0.6324
t = -1.73, R2 = 0.03
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Figure 3.19
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More interesting is the fact that real interest rate di¤erentials clearly appear robust
when used as a variable of interest in the second period from 1997 to 2004. The result is
also robust to the choice of the pool of Z-variables. The coe¢ cients are very signicant
at the 1% level and the R2 very large, ranging from 0.6 to 0.7 in the multivariate
regressions. The actual coe¢ cients vary between -0.3 and -0.6, which corresponds to
extreme bounds of -0.2 and -0.8.33 Since the preparation for and the implementation of
monetary union, business cycle synchronisation and real interest-rate di¤erentials have
become more closely related. This result indicates that monetary policy shocks may act
as a source of business cycles in themselves. Increasingly coordinated monetary policy
could therefore lead to more closely correlated cycles.
Nominal exchange rate variations
Nominal exchange rate variation and business cycle
correlation
y = -0.301x + 0.6415
t = -2.80, R2 = 0.10
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Figure 3.20
33The pool of Z-variables include: BTT, TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIF, DEFDIFF, TUDIFF AND GEO-
DIST.
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We now turn to the relation of nominal exchange rate uctuations (SD_NERE) and
the correlation of business cycles across the euro area. Figure 3.20 suggests a clearly
negative relationship according to which a lower standard deviation in the bilateral
nominal exchange rates is associated with a higher degree in business cycle comovement.
The t-statistic of -2.80 indicates statistical signicance and the R2 of 0.10 is in the
medium range when compared to the other bivariate regressions.
EBA results In the full sample and over the 1980-96 period, nominal exchange rate
uctuations do not qualify as a robust determinant of business cycle synchronisation.34
Nearly all m coe¢ cients are negative but many are not signicant. It seems that
nominal exchange rate stabilisation alone is not su¢ cient for the synchronisation of
business cycles. According to Rose (2000), it takes irrevocably xed exchange rate in
the form of currency union to achieve that goal.
Fiscal decits
The e¤ects of similar scal policies are estimated by the bilateral di¤erentials in scal
budget decits as shares of GDP (DEFDIFF). More similar scal policies correspond
to increased correlation between business cycles as implied by the negative slope of the
regression line as presented in gure 3.21. With a t-statistic of -5.2 and an R2 of 0.2,
the relation proves signicant. In the case of scal decits, however, we may face a
particularly strong case of reverse causation: not only may similar scal policies lead to
more synchronous cycles but common positions in the business cycle are likely to induce
similar scal policy responses as well.
34 In the case of exchange rates, the full sample comprises 1980-1998. The pool of Z-variables include:
BTT, TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFF, IRSCDIFF, TUDIFF.
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Fiscal deficit differential and business cycle correlation
y = -3.0459x + 0.6787
t = -5.24, R2 = 0.21
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Figure 3.21
EBA results Over the full sample, the scal policy indicator appears robustly related
to business cycle synchronisation, with extreme bounds ranging from -0.8 to -4.2.35 All
the t-statistics are signicant at the 1% level. Over the 1980-1996 period, the case for
the scal policy indicator comes very close to qualify as robust. All the m coe¢ cients
are negative and signicant at or close to the 5% level but the upper bound becomes
positive. The upper bound becomes positive by a small margin. However, a close
investigation of the residuals showed that the Germany-Finland pair acted as an outlier
in the equation corresponding to the upper bound.36 This outlier can be easily explained
by the shock created by the collapse of the Soviet system in Europe. In Western Europe,
Germany and Finland were the countries most a¤ected by that event but the shock had
a diverging impact on the two economies. Over the 1980-1996 period, the dummy for
35The pool of Z-variables include: BTT, TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF, SD_NERE, TUDIFF
AND GEODIST.
36The residual for Germany-Finland was 3.9 times the standard deviation of the residuals of the
equation.
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Germany-Finland is signicant in all the equations. In addition, the extreme bounds of
the scal decit indicator keep the right sign, remaining clearly negative.
As expected, given the timing of the external shock, the Germany-Finland dummy
has no signicant impact on the results for the full sample and for the second sample.
Over the 1997-2004 period, the scal policy indicator fails to qualify as robust, with
or without dummy for the Germany-Finland pair. Nevertheless, more than 95% of the
coe¢ cients remain signicant with the right expected negative sign.
The apparent weakening in the power of scal decit di¤erentials to explain busi-
ness cycle di¤erentials might be related to the Stability and Growth Pact. Since the
implementation of the Pact, scal policy has become less pro-actively used as a policy
instrument to ne tune economic growth. Compared with the 1980-96 period, scal
decits may have become more determined by the business cycle and have become less
a causing variable of the business cycle.
Table 3.1: Test results for business cycle correlation as a robust determinant of scal
decit di¤erentials (1997-2004)
Result Estim. Bound Coef.
Stdd
err.
T-
Stat. R2 adj. Z control variables
No of
Z-var.
Out-
liers
Bivariate -0.017 0.004 -4.56 0.12
High 0.004 -0.008 0.006 -1.36 0.31 BTT, IRSCDIFF, TUDDIFF
Low -0.046 -0.029 0.009 -3.33 0.12 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF
1,2
and 3
High 0.004 -0.008 0.006 -1.36 0.31 BTT, IRSCDIFF, TUDDIFF
Low -0.046 -0.029 0.009 -3.33 0.12 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF
3 5%
High -0.002 -0.011 0.004 -2.52 0.26 BTT, NCIDIFF
Low -0.043 -0.029 0.007 -3.89 0.14 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF
2 0%
High -0.002 -0.011 0.004 -2.50 0.26 BTT
Fragile
Low -0.031 -0.019 0.006 -3.03 0.11 IRSCDIFF
1 0%
In order to test that hypothesis, we conducted tests on the robustness of business
cycle correlation as a determinant of scal decit di¤erentials over the 1997-2004 pe-
riod. Although robustness was rejected, it was so by a very small margin, suggesting
that reverse causation from business cycle correlation to scal decit di¤erential became
stronger in the 1997-2004 period.
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3.2.4 Results for the structural indicators
Competitiveness
Bilateral di¤erences in competitiveness (NCIDIFF) are plotted against cycle correlation
in gure 3.22. As hypothesised, the relationship is clearly negative: the lower the di¤er-
ences in national competitiveness, the larger is the degree of cycle correlation. The more
similar countries are in terms of relative price competitiveness, the more comparable will
be their ability to adjust to international shocks. With a t-statistic of -4.8, the relation
is highly signicant. In addition, the R2 of 0.3 is the highest of all bivariate regressions
in this section.
Competitiveness differentials and business cycle correlation
y = -2.214x + 0.6742
t = -4.80, R2 = 0.26
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Figure 3.22
EBA results In the multi-regression estimates, excluding geographical distance, na-
tional price competitiveness di¤erentials comes out as signicant. All coe¢ cients are
negative and signicant with the extreme bounds ranging from -0.03 to -4.8. When geo-
graphical distance was included, NCIDIFF failed to qualify as robust by a small margin.
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Nevertheless, all the m coe¢ cients were signicant and negative. The upper extreme
bound coe¢ cient turned slightly positive but remained close to zero when the control
Z-variables included geographical distance.
In the sub-samples, including or not geographical distance, the competitiveness indi-
cator clearly fails to qualify as robust. In the rst sample from 1980 to 1996, the reason
why competitiveness di¤erentials fail to qualify as robust is unclear. Including or not
exchange rate volatility in the set of control Z-variables does not a¤ect sensibly the re-
sults. Furthermore, although the upper bound becomes strongly positive when bilateral
trade or the scal decit di¤erentials are included in the equation, none of these two
variables is strongly correlated with the competitiveness indicator which would indicate
some multicollinearity. The reason why NCIDIFF does not qualify as robust in the rst
sub-sample may be plainly due to its weak own explanatory power as indicated by the
fairly low t-statistics in the bivariate regression. In the second sample, competitiveness
di¤erentials are not even signicant in the bivariate regression.37
Stock market indices
Figures 3.23 and 3.24 present cross-country di¤erences between the total market indices
(TOTMKDIFF) and the cyclical service indices (CYSERDIFF), each plotted against the
correlation of business cycles. The two plots display negatively sloped regression lines:
the di¤erence between stock markets performances is negatively related to business cycle
synchronisation. However, only the cyclical service indicator appears to be signicantly
correlated to business cycle correlation, with an R2 of 0.2 and a coe¢ cient signicant at
the 1% level. The total market indicator does not have a signicant coe¢ cient and the
37Since the launch of the single currency, di¤erences in national competitiveness are driven essentially
by trade-weighted ination di¤erentials with other euro area countries. Real short-term interest rate
di¤erentials also capture essentially changes in national ination but on a bilateral basis. Over the
1997-2004 period, the two series tend to reect more the same shocks than in the previous samples,
due to the xed exchange rates. Nevertheless, tests conducted by replacing real short-term interest rate
di¤erentials with nominal short-term interest rate di¤erentials in the group of control Z-variables, also
led to the rejection of robustness for NCIDIFF over the 1997-2004 sample.
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R2 is too small to be meaningful.
Total stock market index difference and business cycle
correlation
y = -0.0183x + 0.5897
t = -1.84, R2 = 0.05
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Figure 3.23
EBA results Although the di¤erence between total stock market indices (TOTMKD-
IFF) did not appear signicant on a bilateral basis over the full sample, we tested it
in multivariate regressions (Table B. 10a). Overall stock market performance is indeed
a key nancial indicator and may have turned robust in the sub-samples. Although
over the 1980-96 period, TOTMKDIFF is signicant at the 1% level in the bivariate
regression, it fails to qualify as robust for that period, as well as in the second sample.38
By contrast, the relative stock market performance in the sector of cyclical services
(CYSERDIFF) is clearly signicant over the 1980-04 and 1997-04 periods. Over the full
sample, CYSERDIFF comes clearly out as robustly related to business cycle correlation
Table B. 10b). All the m coe¢ cients are signicant at the 1% level. The extreme
38When substituting economic specialisation for bilateral trade in the standard pool of explanatory
variables, overall stock market di¤erentials came out as robust in the 1980-1996 sample but the R2s were
all very small at less than 0.1 in most equations.
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bounds range from -0.001 to -0.012, with R2s of 0.4 and 0.2, respectively. However,
di¤erences between national total stock market indices does not appear related at all to
business cycle correlation, either in the full sample or in the sub-samples.
Cyclical services stock market index difference and business
cycle correlation
y = -0.0081x + 0.5995
t = -4.70, R2 = 0.19
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Figure 3.24
In the rst sample period from 1980 to 1996, the cyclical service indicator does not
qualify as robust but in the second sample from 1997 to 2004, it clearly appears robust
with all m coe¢ cients signicant at the 5% level. Although the upper bound is very
small, the R2 is very high at 0.8. In the last sample, the standard errors of the m
coe¢ cients are noticeably larger than in the full sample and than in the rst period,
probably due to the overall increase in stock market volatility.
Labour market exibility
In theory, more exible labour markets should help an economy to adjust to asymmetric
shocks and hence lead to more synchronous cycles even in the presence of idiosyncratic
shocks. However, labour market exibility is di¢ cult to measure. We apply two al-
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ternative indicators, trade union density and an employment protection index and use
the bilateral di¤erences (TUDDIFF and EPADIFF, respectively) to measure the de-
gree of similarity across countries. High values indicate very di¤erent exibility regimes
whereas low values suggest rather similar labour market conditions. Both indices are
plotted against cycle correlation as shown in gures 3.25 and 3.26. Although the co-
e¢ cients exhibit the expected negative sign, neither of them is statistically signicant.
The trade union density di¤erentials t-statistic is -0.7, the corresponding value for the
employment protection index di¤erential is -0.7. The R2s are around zero.
Trade union density differentials and business cycle correlation
y = -0.1216x + 0.5904
t = -0.71, R2 = 0.01
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Figure 3.25
EBA results In the multivariate regressions we focus on the trade union density
di¤erential due to limited data for the EPA indicator which is available for only three
years available from 1990 to 2003. In none of the estimates and sub-samples, the trade
union di¤erential qualies as robust.
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Employment protection index differentials and business cycle
correlation
y = -0.028x + 0.6041
t = -0.73, R2 = 0.01
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Figure 3.26
Gravity variables
Gravity variables have been used extensively in the empirical trade literature to account
for exogenous factors. Traditionally, geographical distance and relative size are the core
gravity measures. Figures 3.27 and 3.28 provide the corresponding scatter plots, relating
the gravity variables to business cycle correlation. In the case of geographical distance,
the case is surprisingly clear. The closer countries are located next to each other, the
more synchronous are their business cycles. With a t-statistic of -5.2 and an R2 of 0.3,
the relation exhibits strong signicance and a fair goodness of t. We would not have
expected such a clear result, given the relatively small distances and low transport costs
in Europe.
The second gravity variable, relative population size, is plotted against cycle corre-
lation in gure 3.28. We would expect a negatively sloped regression line, hypothesising
that countries of similar size may have more synchronised business cycles. The scat-
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terplot falsies this hypothesis. Although the line slope is slightly negative, it is not
signicant; the t-statistic is only -0.4. Neither is the goodness of t satisfactory, with an
R2 around zero.
We did not test for the robustness of the relative population size, because coe¢ cients
on that variable not only failed to be signicant in the bilateral and in the multilateral
regressions, but were also of the wrong expected sign.
Geographical distance and business cycle correlation
y = -0.1162x + 0.7262
t = -5.24, R2 = 0.25
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Figure 3.27
EBA results Surprisingly, geographical distance appears robust in the period from
1997 to 2004 but not in the previous period and not in the full sample.39 The di¤erence
of result between the di¤erent samples may have reected a partial correlation problem
between geographical distance and the ratio of bilateral trade to total trade (BTT).
Indeed, the pool of Z-variables we drew from to test the robustness of geographical
distance also includes the ratio of bilateral trade to total trade which emerged as a robust
39The pool of Z-variables include: BTT, TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFF, IRSCDIFF, SD_NERE
AND TUDIFF.
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determinant of business cycle correlation in the full sample and in the rst sub-sample but
not in the second one. Bilateral trade is also strongly related to geographical distance.
However, tests conducted by replacing bilateral trade with economic specialisation in the
pool of Z-variables, did not support that assumption. Although economic specialisation
is not at all correlated to geographical distance, the latter came out again as nearly
robust in the last sample,40 whereas for the 1980-04 and 1980-96 periods the rejection
of robustness was clear-cut.
Relative size and business cycle correlation
y = -0.0306x + 0.5835
t = -0.44, R2 = 0.01
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Figure 3.28
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter dealt with the determinants of business cycle synchronsiation among euro
area countries. In the context of the endogeneity hypothesis of optimum currency areas,
we investigated whether business cycles are likely to become more or less synchronised
40The coe¢ cients are all negative and signicant at the 5% level but the upper bound is around zero.
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under the inucen of EMU. Since it is still too early to isolate a direct "euro e¤ect"
reliably, we followed Frankel and Rose (1998) in their approach to estimate the e¤ect of
trade on business cycle synchronisation. In theory, it is unclear whether increased trade
leads to more synchronised cycles or, as Krugman (1993) suggests, to more specialisation
and hence less cycle synchronisation. In addition to trade, we tested a large number of
other potential determinants and apply the extreme-bounds analysis (EBA) by Leamer
(1983). We split our 25-year period in sub-samples to learn more about time-variant
e¤ects.
The main results of the EBA analysis are presented in Table 3.2. The table shows
the variables that qualify as "robust" in the strict sense and those for which robust-
ness is rejected by a very small margin ("quasi-robust"); cases when more than 95% of
coe¢ cients are signicant but robustness is rejected are also reported.
We need to take into account that, as emphasised by Levine and Renelt (1992), the
EBA is not a causality analysis. For that reason, the choice of variables as potential de-
terminants of business cycle synchronisation relies on economic theory. The upper panel
presents the variables which were selected as potential determinants of business cycle
synchronisation, the so-called "M-variables of interest". For these variables, economic
literature indicates that they should inuence business cycle synchronisation. The lower
panel presents variables which were used as "control Z-variables". Economic theory tells
us that several of these variables should have something to do with economic growth
and with the business cycle. However the direction of the causality is far less clear than
in the case of the M-variables. This is particularly obvious in the case of scal decits
and of the exchange rate where the relation works both ways, especially in the short
run. This does not mean that the Z-variables are not determinant of the business cycle
but indicates that the relationship is more likely to be two-way than in the case of the
M-variables.
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1. As they failed to be significant in the bivariate baseline regression, we do not report the EBA results for the following variables: Trade openness (TTY), log-bilateral bank liability flows (LBFL),
employment protection differential (EPADIFF), and relative population (POPDIFF).
2. Qualifies as robust but the coefficient has the wrong (positive) expected sign.
3. Including a dummy for the Germany-Finland country pair.
RobustFragileFragileGeographical distance (GEODIST)
FragileFragileFragileTrade union membership differential (TUDDIFF)
RobustFragileRobustStock market differential, cyclical services (CYSERDIFF)
FragileFragileRobustPrice competitiveness differential (NCIDIFF)
Fragile
(significant)Robust3RobustFiscal deficit differential (DEFDIFF)
--FragileFragileNominal exchange rate volatility (SD_NERE)
RobustFragileFragileReal short-term interest rate differential (IRSCDIFF)
Z-variables: policy and structural indicators
FragileFragileFragileBilateral flows of bank assets (LBFA)
Fragile
Quasi-robust
(significant)FragileFinancial intermediation
FragileFragileFragileWholesale and retail trade
FragileRobust2FragileConstruction
Fragile
Quasi-robust
(significant)RobustIndustry
FragileFragileFragileEconomic specialisation (ECOPAT)
FragileFragileFragileChemicals
FragileFragileFragileOther manufacturing
RobustFragile
Fragile
(significant)Machinery and transport equipment
FragileFragileFragileFuels
RobustFragile
Fragile
(significant)Trade specialisation (TRADEPAT)
FragileRobustRobustRatio of bilateral trade to GDP (BTY)
FragileRobustRobustRatio of bilateral trade to total trade (BTT)
M-variables: traditional determinants of business cycle synchronisation
1997-20041980-19961980-2004Variable1
Table 3.2: Summary of EBA results
In the full sample, among the potential determinants of the business cycle, the ratios
of bilateral trade to total trade and to GDP as well as the scal decit di¤erentials, the
stock market di¤erentials for cyclical services and the di¤erentials in national competi-
tiveness come out as robust. While overall economic specialisation does not qualify as a
robust determinant of business cycle synchronisation, di¤erences between the shares of
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industrial sectors in total value-added meet the criteria. Similarities in overall trade spe-
cialisation and in the relative specialisation particular in machine and equipment have a
signicant coe¢ cient in all equations but do not qualify as a robust determinant in the
strict sense because of the relatively large standard errors on the estimated coe¢ cients.
When considering the results for the sub-periods, the variables robustly related to
business cycle synchronisation from 1980 to 1996 are the ratios of bilateral trade and
the scal decit di¤erentials. The relative shares of the industrial and nancial sectors
and the scal decit di¤erentials do not fully qualify for robustness but are very close to
it. Over the period from 1997 to 2004, trade specialisation in particular in machinery
and transport equipment, the real short-term interest rate di¤erentials and the stock
market di¤erentials for cyclical services all appear robustly related to business cycle
synchronisation.
The EBA results conrm external trade as a key determinant of business cycle syn-
chronisation in the context of the euro area. Given the theoretically unclear case of
the trade e¤ect on cycle correlation, our results support the OCA endogeneity view of
Frankel and Rose (1998). They nd a strongly positive e¤ect for a wide array of coun-
tries and on these grounds postulate the "endogeneity of the optimum currency area
criteria": if trade promotes the comovement of business cycles, then a common currency
that fosters trade would endogenously lead to more synchronised cycles in the monetary
union. Also in keeping with the results of Rose (2000) and its "Rose e¤ect"41 we fail to
identify a direct "robust" relation between exchange rate volatility and business cycle
correlation.
The e¤ect of monetary union is closely related to our second major nding on the
impact of trade specialisation and the degree of intra-industry trade. The positive trade
e¤ect on cycle correlation hinges on the degree of intra-industry trade, i.e. the similar-
ity of trade specialisation patterns. The more intra-industry trade, the more likely is
41Entering a currency union delivers an e¤ect that is over an order of magnitude larger than the
impact of reducing exchange rate volatility from one standard deviation to zero, Rose (2000: 17).
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the positive trade e¤ect to materialise. Empirical evidence indicates an increased de-
gree of intra-industry trade over time across euro area countries, even though the very
broad economic structures do not seem to have not converged. The EBA analysis shows
that similar trade specialisation emerges as a robust determinant of cycle correlation
in the 1997-2004 period. Taken together, these ndings support the Frankel and Rose
(1998) prediction that EMU would lead to trade expansion and to the development of
intra-industry trade, rather than to greater trade specialisation, which in turn would
result in more highly correlated business cycles. The transmission of industry-shocks via
intra-trade seems to be concentrated in the sector of machinery and equipment: trade
specialisation in machinery and equipment alone explains 61% of cycle correlation in
1997-2004.
The positive impact of stock market comovements in the cyclical service sector on
cycle correlation can be interpreted either as an indication that nancial integration
has been conducive of greater cycle symmetry or that cyclical services themselves have
become a channel of transmission of business cycle uctuations across countries. The
second hypothesis of a direct link seems more appropriate since the relative performance
of overall stock market indices does not appear clearly as a major determinant of business
correlation.
Further research would be required on nancial integration. Although the bivariate
correlation between bank ows and cycle synchronisation is quite strong the EBA results
remain weak, partly due to incomplete data sets. Another area of research is competi-
tiveness di¤erentials which would require more in-depth investigation of the interactions
with the synchronisation of business cycles.
We acknowledge that more time is needed to make denite statements on the e¤ects
of the euro on business cycle synchronisation. As of today, however, we believe that our
results indicate a cautiously optimistic view on ex post optimality of the euro area.
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Chapter 4
Risk sharing, nancial integration
and Mundell II in the enlarged
European Union
This chapter deals with the the latest advancement in OCA theory, known as Mundell
II. In contrast to the initial OCA literature (Mundell I) and in interaction with the
endogeneity hypothesis of optimum currency areas, Mundell II draws attention to risk
sharing and the role of nancial markets in a currency union. In the presence of nancial
market integration, it is argued, those countries with little business cycle synchronisation
may benet even more from adopting a common currency. This benet arises from new
consumption risk sharing opportunities because, in a nancially integrated currency
union without exchange rate uctuations and risk premia, national consumption patterns
should be diversied across the union and less contingent on home income. Even if the
degree of nancial integration is limited in the rst place, the common nancial market
created by the currency union would unfold benecial risk-sharing e¤ects and make the
adoption of the common currency more and not less attractive if cross-country business
cycles lack synchronisation.
We investigate some measures of risk sharing and nancial integration for the en-
larged European Union. Given that the degree of business cycle comovement of the
new member states (NMS) with the euro area is still limited, it is interesting to learn
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more about the past degree and future potential of risk sharing in the context of euro
adoption. The prevailing policy question is whether it makes sense for the NMS to wait
until their cycles are su¢ ciently synchronised with the euro area or whether they should
join early and benet from the euro areas risk-sharing property, even and especially in
the presence of non-synchronised cycles.
In the following, we examine the eight Central and Eastern European NMS1 in re-
lation to the euro area as an aggregate. For comparison, we apply similar tests to the
"old" EU members. We use correlation and codependence measures of cross-country con-
sumption and output comovement to proxy the degree of risk sharing before we analyse
nancial market integration by employing a number of interest rate comovement indica-
tors. We nd that the degree of risk sharing between the new member states and the euro
area is limited, hence the potential gain from euro adoption may be substantial. Fur-
thermore, we note that both consumption and output comovement have been increasing
over time, for the NMS as well as for the EU-15. The reasons for little risk sharing may
be attributed to a relatively low degree of nancial integration between the NMS and
the euro area which is revealed by the analysis of real interest rate comovement. The
introduction of the euro may, however, unfold endogenous e¤ects particularly on nan-
cial markets which may change the picture. Results from the EU-15 countries indicate
a rising degree of nancial integration during the preparation for monetary union.
4.1 Risk sharing
This section portrays the conceptual framework of the risk-sharing analysis and presents
the empirical results of consumption and output comovement in the enlarged EU. We
investigate the degree of risk sharing between the NMS and the euro area during the
last decade and compare their experience to that of the "old" EU countries. The the-
1The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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oretical foundation of analysing consumption correlations in the context of risk sharing
is based on models of markets for contingent claims. In a world of complete markets,
consumers can diversify risk by investing in Arrow-Debreu securities. These nancial
assets constitute contingent claims and deliver a state-contingent pay-o¤. By purchas-
ing and selling Arrow-Debreu securities, households can consume the same amount of
resources in varying states of the world. In other words, they can e¤ectively insure
against domestic risks and decouple their consumption patterns from domestic income
ows. In equilibrium, cross-country consumption should be highly correlated because
national consumption is internationally diversied and thus invariant to domestic output
shocks. On these grounds, Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) construct a calibrated
international real business cycle model which predicts consumption to be more highly
correlated than output across countries.
Empirical analysis, however, has not substantiated this prediction. In fact, cross-
country consumption tends to be less highly correlated than output. The resulting
consumption correlation puzzle is one of the "six major puzzles in international macro-
economics" as pointed out by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000). Various reasons may be
responsible for this puzzle. Low degrees of nancial integration may prevent consumers
from diversifying their portfolios internationally to the Arrow-Debreu degree. Also, trade
costs and other barriers to international trade may inhibit risk sharing across countries.
Moreover, a large degree of non-traded goods may contribute to the puzzle since risk
sharing is possible only for risk to tradable output. Hence, measuring cross-country
correlation in consumption of tradables only may alleviate the puzzle. Another mea-
surement issue pertains to the output side. Given that only output remaining after
investment and government consumption can be shared by private consumers, consump-
tion correlations should rather be compared to correlations in GDP net of investment and
government consumption, see Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000). In practice, however, limited
data availability often restricts this type of analysis. Furthermore, the model proposed
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by Stockman and Tesar (1995) emphasises the role of inuences from the demand side,
particularly taste shocks, which may be responsible for low cross-country consumption
correlation. Finally, Imbs (2006) investigates potential interactions between nancial
integration, output and consumption correlation. He nds that increased nancial inte-
gration does not only raise consumption correlations across countries but that it boosts
output correlation to an even larger degree. As a result, he argues, "the bulk of the
quantity puzzle originates in the tendency for GDP correlations to increase with nan-
cial links, not in low risk sharing" (Imbs 2006: 315).
The following empirical investigation of risk sharing in the EU proceeds in two steps.
We explore consumption and GDP comovement rst by looking at cross-country corre-
lations and then move on to the codependence analysis.
4.1.1 Consumption correlation
In a rst step, we compare cross-country correlations of consumption and GDP. We
use quarterly data of real private consumption and real GDP for the euro area and the
eight NMS over the time period 1995Q1-2005Q4.2 For comparison, we also investigate
14 "old" EU countries.3 Data mostly stem from Eurostat, supplemented by national
sources. Given that we are interested in the new member countriesprospective adoption
of the euro, we correlate each country with the aggregate euro area.
Table 4.1 presents consumption correlation coe¢ cients of growth rates and various
cycle specications. We derive the latter by detrending real GDP applying the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) lter and the Baxter-King (BK) band-pass lter.4
2Private consumption includes consumption of households and non-prot institutions serving house-
holds (NPISH). All data are in euro, scaled to 1995 prices and exchange rates, indexed and taken in
logs. At this stage, we use seasonally-adjusted data. In the following section, we apply the codepen-
dence framework which incorporates seasonal adjustment within the statistical model and hence employs
non-adjusted data.
3These include the EU-15 without Luxembourg, due to data constraints.
4See Hodrick and Prescott (1997) and Baxter and King (1999).
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Table 4.1: Consumption correlation
Country Growth HP cycles BK cycles BK cycles
rates (k = 4) (k = 8)
Czech Rep. -0.06 -0.51 -0.20 -0.21
Estonia -0.06 -0.62 -0.24 -0.52
Hungary -0.16 0.23 0.07 0.06
Latvia -0.31 -0.44 -0.32 -0.33
Lithuania -0.28 -0.34 -0.04 0.03
Poland 0.20 -0.28 -0.23 -0.26
Slovakia -0.02 -0.39 -0.26 -0.37
Slovenia 0.15 0.12 0.05 0.22
Austria 0.34 0.76 0.50 0.60
Belgium 0.17 0.72 0.54 0.65
Denmark 0.26 -0.26 0.00 -0.30
Finland 0.38 -0.12 0.07 0.03
France 0.63 0.82 0.59 0.79
Germany 0.76 0.83 0.60 0.79
Greece -0.25 -0.20 -0.04 -0.03
Ireland 0.49 0.83 0.42 0.75
Italy 0.41 0.64 0.48 0.61
Netherlands 0.33 0.73 0.49 0.79
Portugal 0.38 0.70 0.33 0.67
Spain 0.31 0.79 0.61 0.80
Sweden 0.45 0.78 0.52 0.68
UK 0.39 0.57 0.21 0.45
Note: Correlation coe¢ cients of real private consumption vis-à-vis the aggregate euro
area in growth rates and cycles, applying the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter and the Baxter-
King (BK) lter, the latter with alternative lead/lag parameters k = 4 and k = 8.
Both lters have been used extensively in business cycle analysis. The BK lter iden-
ties the cyclical component by removing very high and very low frequency uctuations
from the data but the choice of the lead/lag parameter k involves a trade-o¤ particu-
larly in small samples like ours. The larger k; the more periods need to be cut o¤ at the
beginning and at the end of the sample. A smaller k; however, reduces the reliability of
the results. The HP lter involves minimising the variance of the cyclical component but
has been critised for the arbitrariness of the smoothing parameter employed. Although
113
the HP lter does not reduce the sample size like the BP lter, the HP marginal values
tend to be biased due to the required estimation of values for di¤erencing.
According to table 4.1, the correlation of consumption with the euro area is very
low for all NMS. In fact, the majority of coe¢ cients is even negative, regardless of the
specication of the indicator. Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia exhibit the lowest correlation
whereas only Slovenias consumption is positively correlated with euro area consumption
throughout specications, with coe¢ cients ranging from 0.05 to 0.22. Not surprisingly,
consumption correlation is much higher for EU-14 countries. France and Germany are
characterised by top values between 0.59 and 0.83 while this is, of course, partly due to
their large weight in euro area aggregate consumption. Depending on the specication,
large correlation coe¢ cients also pertain to Ireland, Spain and Sweden. We note that
the correlation coe¢ cients of the non-euro area members Sweden and the UK are not
considerably lower than than those of euro area countries. Low and partly negative
coe¢ cients can be observed, however, in the cases of Denmark, Finland and Greece.
Table 4.2 presents the same growth rate and cycle specications for GDP correla-
tions. For the NMS, most coe¢ cients take positive values although the sizes vary across
specications. Hungary stands out with the largest correlation coe¢ cients of up to 0.88.
Also, Slovenia and, in part, Poland show a relatively large degree of output correlation
with the euro area. Lithuania, Slovakia and, partly, the Czech Republic have rather
low, if not negative coe¢ cients. For the EU-14 countries, France and Germany again
exhibit the largest correlation values, between 0.72 and 0.97. Other countries with large
coe¢ cients include Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. Greece has again by far
the lowest correlation coe¢ cients.
Regarding the consumption correlation puzzle, we turn to the di¤erences between
consumption and GDP correlations across countries. Figure 4.1 illustrates this gap at
the example of the HP-ltered series.5
5We acknowledge that both the HP and the BP lters deliver imperfect results in the presence of
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Table 4.2: GDP correlation
Country Growth HP cycles BK cycles BK cycles
rates (k = 4) (k = 8)
Czech Rep. -0.13 0.05 0.04 0.54
Estonia 0.20 -0.06 0.59 0.33
Hungary 0.43 0.78 0.76 0.88
Latvia 0.06 0.03 0.40 0.27
Lithuania -0.18 -0.51 -0.04 -0.19
Poland 0.32 0.18 0.68 0.62
Slovakia 0.05 -0.42 0.18 -0.06
Slovenia 0.08 0.41 0.35 0.58
Austria 0.43 0.72 0.69 0.80
Belgium 0.63 0.83 0.83 0.85
Denmark 0.34 0.53 0.39 0.77
Finland 0.17 0.51 0.36 0.61
France 0.72 0.93 0.93 0.94
Germany 0.78 0.92 0.93 0.97
Greece 0.05 0.06 -0.13 0.00
Ireland 0.45 0.67 0.65 0.82
Italy 0.65 0.87 0.89 0.94
Netherlands 0.68 0.79 0.84 0.82
Portugal 0.30 0.64 0.21 0.41
Spain 0.46 0.83 0.61 0.75
Sweden 0.53 0.80 0.70 0.75
UK 0.37 0.71 0.71 0.85
Note: Correlation coe¢ cients of real GDP vis-à-vis the aggregate euro area in growth
rates and cycles, applying the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter and the Baxter-King (BK)
lter, the latter with alternative lead/lag parameters k = 4 and k = 8.
It is very obvious that the consumption-GDP gap is negative and with down to -0.56
very large for most NMS, i.e. the consumption correlations are considerably lower than
the GDP correlations. This is a rst indication that the consumption correlation puzzle
applies for the NMS. The only two positive gaps in the cases of Slovakia and Lithuania
stem from the fact that both consumption and GDP correlations are very negative, with
GDP even exceeding consumption correlation in absolute value.
small samples. To avoid further reduction of our sample, we employ the HP lter for the following
exercise.
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Consumption-GDP correlation gap
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Figure 4.1: Di¤erences in the correlation coe¢ cients of real consumption
(households and NPISH) and real GDP vis-à-vis the euro area,
1995-2005 (HP-ltered series).
For the EU-14 countries, we identify large negative gaps for Denmark (-0.79) and
Finland (-0.69) whereas the remaining countries are characterised by much smaller or
even positive gaps. Except for Greece and Italy, all remaining countries have values
above -0.20. Austria, Portugal and Ireland have positive gaps, i.e. for these countries,
consumption correlation exceeds output correlation - an indication of functioning risk
sharing with the euro area. Taken together, the consumption-GDP correlations seem to
indicate that those countries which have shared years of economic integration already
(EU-14) tend to have much smaller consumption-GDP gaps than those still in economic
116
transition. Hence, the consumption correlation puzzle may decline as integration pro-
ceeds.
To nd out more about the dynamics of risk sharing, we investigate rolling correlation
windows. Figures 4.2-4.4 depict 5-year rolling windows ranging from 1995Q1-1999Q4 to
2001Q1-2005Q4. Due to the large number of countries, we form country groups composed
of weighted averages of correlation coe¢ cients.6
Figure 4.2 includes the eight NMS and shows that the average degree of GDP cor-
relation with the euro area has increased markedly from -0.01 up to 0.58 during the
1999Q4-2004Q3 window before it declined to 0.27 in the most recent period. The very
last windows may, however, be subject to some endpoint instability of the detrending
lters and hence not be overestimated. The average consumption correlation of the
NMS-8 with the euro area is clearly below GDP correlation. It has, however, risen from
a starting value of -0.27 to a maximum of 0.00 in 1998Q4-2003Q3 and then moved down
to -0.21. The distance between consumption and GDP correlation is illustrated by the
bottom line in the graph. On the whole, the gap has widened over time.
Figure 4.3 averages nine euro area countries (EA-9) which seem to behave roughly
similar. The euro area countries Finland and Greece, in contrast, appear idiosyncratic
and hence grahped together with the non-euro area countries in gure 4.4 (EU-5). Al-
though GDP correlation exceeds consumption correlation for the EA-9 countries, both
lines are at far higher levels and have a more narrow gap than the NMS-8. GDP corre-
lation of the EA-9 increased from 0.77 to 0.93 in 2000Q2-2005Q1 before it fell slightly to
0.90. Consumption correlation also rose on average from 0.70 to 0.85 in the same peak
window as GDP, then decreasing somewhat to 0.79. As in the case of the NMS-8, we
observe increasing rates of both GDP and consumption correlations, though at a lower
rate for consumption. This nding is summarised by the negative and decreasing gap
6We use relative GDP as weighting factor for averaging the respective correlation coe¢ cients. Ap-
plying unweighted averages instead did not have a major impact on the results. The presented gures
are based on HP-ltered data.
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Consumption-GDP correlation gap, NMS-8
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Consumption-GDP correlation gap, euro area-9
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Consumption-GDP correlation gap, EU-5
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Figures 4.2-4: 5-year rolling correlation windows of quarterly HP-filtered consumption, GDP 
and their difference, against the euro area. See the text for exact country coverage. 
line. However, the EA-9 gap never touches the -0.20 shreshold.
The experience of the remaining EU-5 countries is less uniform. Figure 4.4 graphs
only the consumption-GDP gaps but for each country individually. While the gap lines
of Sweden and the UK declined moderately, we observe a massive decline in the case of
Finland and a very volatile behaviour for Denmark and Greece.
On the whole, our correlation results conrm the consumption correlation puzzle for
the NMS and the EU-14 countries as GDP correlations frequently exceed consumption
correlations. However, the correlation levels of the EA-9 countries are much higher than
for the NMS. Also, the gaps are more narrow. This may lead us to the conclusion that,
as integration between the NMS and the euro area makes progress, the consumption-
GDP gap may go down. Another interesting overall observation is that both GDP and
consumption correlations increased on average over time. This may, without having per-
formed any causal analysis, be interpreted as supportive evidence of the hypothesis by
Imbs (2006). He suggests that the consumption-GDP gap widens not because of lacking
risk sharing. Instead, he argues, it is nancial integration with promotes both GDP
and consumption correlation. According to his estimates, the e¤ect of nancial integra-
tion on GDP, or business cycle correlation is much stronger than that on consumption
correlation. As a result, a widening consumption-GDP gap may be a more ambiguous
phenomenon than previously assumed.
4.1.2 Consumption codependence
In addition to the correlation analysis above, we explore the data using the codepen-
dence framework. This method is a more sophisticated time-series technique which takes
both long-run and short-run comovement into account. Also, the codependence analy-
sis explicitly incorporates the seasonal adjustment into the statistical model. Hence we
use non-adjusted data in this section. For more detailed information on the methodol-
ogy of codependence, we refer to Chapter 2. In this section, we consider quarterly real
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household consumption and real GDP the eight new EU member states (NMS-8) and 13
"old" EU countries, again covering 1995Q1-2005Q4.7 Since we are mostly interested in
short-term comovement of consumption and output, we omit the cointegration results
at this stage and turn directly to the short-term analysis of common cycles.8
Since codependence operates with di¤erence-stationary data, we conduct unit root
tests for all data in levels and seasonal di¤erences, employing the Dickey-Fuller General
Least Squares (DF-GLS) unit root test by Elliot et al (1996). This test is a modied
version of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and involves transforming the time
series via a generalised least squares regression. It has been shown that the DF-GLS
test, as compared to the standard ADF test, tends to be substantially more powerful,
i.e. it is more likely to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root when the alternative
hypothesis of stationarity is true.9
The series of the NMS, presented in the upper panel of table C.1 in appendix C,
reveal a considerable amount of unstability in the data. For consumption, ve out
of eight countries cannot be considered di¤erence-stationary. Among the EU countries,
Irish and Dutch consumption show non-stationary behaviour in di¤erences. In the case of
GDP, we cannot reject the unit root hypothesis for three NMS and three EU-13 countries.
These countries basically disqualify for the codependence analysis. However, given the
uncertainties of unit root testing with a relatively short time sample, all countries are
tested for codependence with borderline cases receiving special attention.
Starting with consumption codependence, the results show again that comovement
of consumption is weaker than that of GDP. Also, the relative comovement levels of
EU-13 countries tends to be higher than that of the NMS.
7Greece and Portugal are not included due to data unavailability. For Ireland, the data span begins
in 1997Q1.
8For the series under investigation, hardly any cointegration relations can be detected. Only France
shows some indication of common stochastic trends with the euro area at the standard frequency. We
do, however, nd seasonal cointegration for a number of countries which hints at seasonal unit roots in
the data and supports the idea of using non-adjusted gures.
9See Obstfeld and Taylor (2002), Stock and Watson (2003).
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Table 4.3: Consumption codependenc results, NMS-8
Country rank Common Codependence
features Order 1 Order 2 Order 3
Czech Rep. m = 1 34.17*** 13.71*** 17.90*** 1.34
m = 2 108.68*** 24.44*** 24.33*** 5.91
Estonia m = 1 21.77*** 1.57 4.09 2.85
m = 2 67.15*** 11.81* 9.03 4.83
Hungary m = 1 34.07*** 10.70*** 4.18 1.90
m = 2 91.42*** 21.75*** 12.92** 4.77
Latvia m = 1 24.90*** 9.04 16.24*** 6.34
m = 2 110.43*** 21.85** 23.92** 11.22
Lithuania m = 1 11.95** 1.77 8.64 2.35
m = 2 64.52*** 12.89 16.69 4.86
Poland m = 1 40.32*** 9.60** 12.13** 5.20
m = 2 105.60*** 23.97*** 21.28** 11.79
Slovakia m = 1 22.63*** 3.87** 0.57 0.00
m = 2 60.11*** 13.51*** 5.34 2.37
Slovenia m = 1 24.16*** 1.88 15.27*** 2.48
m = 2 68.47*** 12.28 23.01** 11.28
Note: Codependence results of real private consumption of each country vis-à-vis the
euro area. Rejection of the null hypothesis of common feature/codependence vectors at
the 1 percent level is indicated by "***", the 5 percent level is marked with "**", the
10 percent level with "*". If we nd the combination of accepting one vector (m = 1)
and rejecting a second vector (m = 2), we conlude the existence of n  m = 2   1 = 1
common cycle.
Table 4.3 reports the consumption codependence results of the NMS. We nd no
clear-cut case of common features or, in other words, codependence of zero order CD(0).
Hence, no NMS seems to have synchronised common consumption cycles with the euro
area. Considering borderline cases, we note that for Lithuania the hypothesis of one
common feature vector is rejected with a p-value of 0.02. Applying the 5 percent signif-
icance criterion, Lithuania does not qualify for a common feature - applying 1 percent,
however, it does. Another borderline case is Slovakia which exibits codependence of rst
order, CD(1); with a p-value of 0.049.
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Table 4.4: Consumption codependenc results, EU-13
Country rank Common Codependence
features Order 1 Order 2 Order 3
Austria m = 1 5.65 1.40 9.74** 1.86
m = 2 56.02*** 14.42* 18.42** 9.77
Belgium m = 1 3.38 0.96 10.11** 2.29
m = 2 61.04*** 14.45** 18.22** 8.74
Denmark m = 1 3.21 0.91 2.55 0.03
m = 2 64.55*** 11.25* 9.20 4.09
Finland m = 1 19.69*** 4.31 4.67* 1.62
m = 2 68.51*** 13.91** 10.48 6.78
France m = 1 18.17*** 3.47* 0.46 0.02
m = 2 60.06*** 13.56*** 5.01 2.68
Germany m = 1 23.60*** 8.22** 6.41* 2.31
m = 2 81.14*** 21.78*** 14.79* 16.18**
Ireland m = 1 18.92*** 3.53 0.60 0.58
m = 2 91.40*** 16.79** 7.84 6.41
Italy m = 1 20.04*** 4.23** 0.85 0.07
m = 2 64.11*** 13.99*** 6.08 3.76
Luxembourg m = 1 19.68*** 5.84* 1.13 0.88
m = 2 71.13*** 15.18** 5.57 2.87
Netherlands m = 1 6.91*** 3.93** 4.51** 0.01
m = 2 59.05*** 16.77*** 11.04** 3.79
Spain m = 1 5.51** 0.43 0.00 0.46
m = 2 43.35*** 9.92** 4.78 1.94
Sweden m = 1 32.48*** 9.31 5.68 8.56
m = 2 108.22*** 24.78 17.99 19.73
UK m = 1 20.33*** 9.80 4.43 3.24
m = 2 80.16*** 24.61** 19.79 14.84
Note: Codependence results of real private consumption of each country vis-à-vis the
euro area. Rejection of the null hypothesis of common feature/codependence vectors at
the 1 percent level is indicated by "***", the 5 percent level is marked with "**", the
10 percent level with "*". If we nd the combination of accepting one vector (m = 1)
and rejecting a second vector (m = 2), we conlude the existence of n  m = 2   1 = 1
common cycle.
However, Slovakias unit root test concluded an optimal autocorrelation lag length
of 1 which would exclude any codependence of order higher than zero. Since the choice
of the unit root lag length tends to be ambiguous, we consider Slovakia a candidate for
CD(1), i.e. common but non-synchronised consumption cycles with the euro area. In
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other words, the Slovak consumption cycles may not be perfectly synchronised with the
one of the euro area but it may adjust after one lag period. On the whole, however,
consumption codependence results for the NMS with the euro area are largely negative
and the only indications of comovement are burdened with uncertainty.
Turning to consumption codependence of the EU-13 countries, the evidence is only
slightly more favourable. Austria, Belgium and Denmark are the only clear cases of
synchronised common consumption cycles with the euro area as table 4.4 makes clear.
In all of these cases, the notion of one common feature vector cannot be rejected with
p-values above the 0.10 threshold whereas second vectors are rejected at the 1 percent
levels throughout. For Austria and Belgium, this is in line with the correlation results
that indicated a large degree of consumption comovement for these countries with the
euro area. Interestingly, Denmark shows signs of zero-order codependence whereas the
consumption correlation results were rather poor. Other countries which were ascribed
a high consumption correlation coe¢ cient in the analysis above do not qualify for con-
sumption codependence.
Neither France nor Germany exhibit synchronised common correlation cycles with
the euro area. In the cases of France and Luxembourg, we nd nd evidence of non-
synchronised common cycles, i.e. CD(1). These results, however, depend on the true
autoregressive order which may be 1 or 2. The Netherlands, on the other hand, would
qualify for CD(1) if they did not fail to be di¤erence-stationary. Spain is another bor-
derline case which hinges on the level of signicance applied. In the standard case of
the 5 percent level, it fails but it qualies if we use the 1 percent criterion - the corre-
sponding p-value for the rejectance of one common feature vector is 0.02. In sum, the
consumption codependence results for both the NMS and the EU-13 countries with the
euro area turn out to be weak, with the EU-13 slightly more positive than the NMS.
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Table 4.5: GDP codependenc results, NMS-8 plus Turkey
Country rank Common Codependence
features Order 1 Order 2 Order 3
Czech Rep. m = 1 27.01*** 7.03 3.85 1.18
m = 2 149.03*** 22.30** 11.91 7.68
Estonia m = 1 31.93*** 11.78** 9.73** 2.99
m = 2 96.98*** 24.03*** 16.09* 11.28
Hungary m = 1 9.54* 0.96 5.96 4.23
m = 2 44.78*** 9.71 12.77 10.04
Latvia m = 1 19.77*** 1.66 0.05 1.65
m = 2 75.83*** 13.37*** 5.54 5.90
Lithuania m = 1 4.32 2.07 8.90** 1.69
m = 2 58.35*** 12.49 13.02 9.19
Poland m = 1 11.61*** 3.33* 1.73 0.47
m = 2 48.14*** 11.21** 12.42** 7.40
Slovakia m = 1 13.70*** 4.27 7.99** 3.76
m = 2 58.40*** 14.40* 13.34 8.16
Slovenia m = 1 3.65* 7.31*** 2.84* 0.49
m = 2 41.74*** 17.01*** 9.29** 9.07*
Turkey m = 1 22.37*** 9.09** 3.88 06.69
m = 2 60.28*** 17.40** 15.61** 10.59
Note: Codependence results of real GDP of each country vis-à-vis the euro area.
Rejection of the null hypothesis of common feature/codependence vectors at the 1 percent
level is indicated by "***", the 5 percent level is marked with "**", the 10 percent level
with "*". If we nd the combination of accepting one vector (m = 1) and rejecting a
second vector (m = 2), we conlude the existence of n m = 2  1 = 1 common cycle.
Not unexpectedly, the common GDP cycles are more pronounced. Table 4.5 provides
the results for the NMS. Lithuania and Slovenia exhibit one common feature vector which
indicates synchronised common cycles with the euro area. Hungary also qualies accord-
ing to the codependence test but the non-stationarity result for Hungarys GDP growth
rates calls that result in question. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Poland
show signs of rst-order codependence, i.e. common but non-synchronised common cy-
cles. Slovakia, on the contrary, clearly fails both in terms of di¤erence-stationarity and
codependence. In addition to the above countries, we consider the EU candidate country
Turkey but nd no evidence of any codependence. In brief, the results on common GDP
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cycles of the NMS with the euro area are clearly better than in the case of consumption
which tends to lend support to the consumption correlation puzzle.
Table 4.6: GDP codependenc results, EU-13
Country rank Common Codependence
features Order 1 Order 2 Order 3
Austria m = 1 7.49* 0.58 3.73 3.92
m = 2 45.75*** 8.30 7.67 12.83
Belgium m = 1 5.51** 1.89 0.01 0.28
m = 2 45.92*** 10.78** 8.22* 11.04**
Denmark m = 1 35.01*** 8.29** 3.32 7.99**
m = 2 77.65*** 15.78** 15.90** 11.87
Finland m = 1 22.76*** 6.21 2.71 1.93
m = 2 55.44*** 14.25* 7.85 7.67
France m = 1 4.11** 1.17 1.74 0.03
m = 2 35.16*** 7.87* 7.83* 2.09
Germany m = 1 0.07 0.00 1.99 0.09
m = 2 37.37*** 7.60 4.01 6.28
Ireland m = 1 0.20 1.90 0.12 1.26
m = 2 32.77*** 8.76* 2.24 4.80
Italy m = 1 11.55*** 1.52 0.01 0.00
m = 2 44.41*** 10.21** 6.54 9.93**
Luxembourg m = 1 7.29** 0.97 21.91*** 1.47
m = 2 59.10*** 12.63** 32.40*** 15.03**
Netherlands m = 1 15.78*** 3.26** 0.94 0.06
m = 2 72.20*** 15.31*** 8.44 6.30
Spain m = 1 2.21 0.37 0.00 0.58
m = 2 38.12*** 7.01 4.09 4.56
Sweden m = 1 12.35*** 2.57 0.58 0.03
m = 2 46.91*** 9.67** 3.29 0.59
UK m = 1 0.01 0.04 0.47 0.05
m = 2 32.48*** 7.42 4.62 9.19*
Note: Codependence results of real GDP of each country vis-à-vis the euro area.
Rejection of the null hypothesis of common feature/codependence vectors at the 1 percent
level is indicated by "***", the 5 percent level is marked with "**", the 10 percent level
with "*". If we nd the combination of accepting one vector (m = 1) and rejecting a
second vector (m = 2), we conlude the existence of n m = 2  1 = 1 common cycle.
Next we turn to GDP codependence of the EU-13 countries vis-à-vis the euro area,
see table 4.6. Again, we generally nd a larger degree of GDP than consumption co-
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movement. Austria, Germany and the UK qualify for synchronised common GDP cycles
with the euro area. Borderline cases for CD(0) are Belgium, France and Luxembourg
for which the p-value of rejecting one common feature vector is below 0.05 but above
0.01. Ireland and Spain seem to qualify for common features but both su¤er from non-
stationarity results in the unit root test. Italy and Sweden seem to have common but
non-synchronised cycles with the euro area, i.e. they exhibit one codependence vector
of order one. This CD(1) result holds also true for Belgium and Luxembourg who were
considered borderline for CD(0). These results largely correspond with the correlation
evidence concerning Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the UK. For other coun-
tries, the codependence results tend to be weaker than the correlation evidence. However,
simple correlations do not provide a clear benchmark threshold and are a more simplistic
concept per se.
Summing up, we make two general observations. First, the degree of consumption
comovement tends to be weaker than that of GDP comovement which, at rst glance,
hints at a low degree of risk sharing. However, the rolling correlations seem to indicate
that both consumption and GDP comovement vis-à-vis the euro area have been increas-
ing over the recent years, for both the NMS and the "old" EU countries. Considering the
argumentation of Imbs (2006) who sees increased nancial integration behind the rise
of both consumption and GDP comovement, we may not draw unequivocal conclusions
from our evidence on the consumption correlation puzzle on the underlying degree of
risk sharing.
The second observation pertains to the fact that the overall levels of consumption and
GDP comovement to the euro area tend to be larger among the EU-13 countries than
among the NMS. This is not surprising given the longer integration history among the
"old" EU and the fact that most EU-15 are actually included in the euro area aggregate.
It may indicate, however, that with ongoing economic integration, the obstacles to risk
sharing may continue to shrink and hence the improve the future perspective of risk
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sharing among the member states of the enlarged EU. To shed more light on the degree
and dynamics of nancial integration, we now turn to the analysis of real interest rate
comovement.
4.2 Financial integration
The argument of Mundell II postulates that, in the presence of nancial integration,
countries with asymmetric business cycles benet most from joining a currency union
because consumers can diversify their portfolios across the region and decouple their
consumption patterns from potentially idiosyncratic output cycles at home. The previous
section presented evidence that the degree of risk sharing, measured by consumption
comovement, is to date limited in the NMS. The "old" EU members, however, enjoy
a larger degree of risk sharing which is a likely result from their common integration
history.
This section investigates nancial integration for both the NMS and the EU-15 coun-
tries. It nds that the degree of nancial integration as measured by real interest rate
comovement is limited for the NMS. The EU-15 countries have, however, made consider-
able progress in nancial integration from the 1980s to the 1990s. This development can
be expected to have contributed to higher levels of risk sharing and may be anticipated
for the NMS as they continue to integrate with the EU-15.
One way to measure nancial integration is to compare cross-country interest rates.
If nancial markets are integrated, identical nancial assets should have the same price
whether they are traded at home or abroad. As a result, we would expect to see equalised
real interest rates between countries that share a perfect nancial market. Various con-
cepts capture the di¤erent dimensions of interest parity. Uncovered interest parity states
that di¤erences in nominal returns across countries should equal expected exchange rate
changes. Covered interest rate parity uses the forward rate instead of spot rates. Ac-
127
cording to real interest parity, the expected di¤erence between domestic and foreign real
interest rates is zero. We follow Kugler and Neusser (1993) who investigate long-run
and short-run comovement of real interest rates across countries using the codependence
technique. While they foucs on pairwise codependence among ve G7 countries and
Switzerland, we consider the 23 countries of the enlarged EU vis-à-vis the euro area
aggregate. Before conducting the correlation and codependence analyses, we discuss the
ambiguous issue of stationarity in the context of interest rates.
4.2.1 Interest rates and stationarity
It has been an issue of debate whether interest rates should be regarded as stationary
or non-stationary. A stationary time series is characterised by constant expected mean
and variance and is hence considered mean-reverting. For consumption and GDP, the
case seems clear: Most countries exhibit long-run positive trends which turn the series
non-stationary. Growth rates or cyclical components, however, tend to be stationary,
i.e. they uctuate around a constant mean and have a nite variance.
The case of interest rates is less clear. In theory, the life cycle model of consumption
predicts consumption growth rates to have similar time-series properties as real interest
rates.10 Hence, interest rates would be expected to be stationary, similar to consumption
growth rates. But empirical evidence on interest rate stationarity is mixed. Kugler and
Neusser (1993) conrm the theoretical proposition for their 1980s sample of industrialised
countries and nd that the unit root hypothesis can be easily rejected. Rose (1988), in
contrast, suggests that interest rates in the U.S. and elsewhere tend to be non-stationary.
Also, Obstfeld et al. (2005) nd that, at least during the post-Bretton Woods era,
interest rates are overwhelmingly non-stationary. However, they admit that interest
rates are unlikely to follow a literal unit root process - otherwise we would see interest
rates rise unboundedly. This is hardly the case. Dri¤ell and Snell (2003) propose that
10See Kugler and Neusser (1993).
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the unit root result my stem from the high persistency of interest rates and not from
a truely non-stationary process. Moreover, they argue that what seems like a unit root
process may often be a result of regime shifts in otherwise stationary data. Also, Garcia
and Perron (1996) make this point and treat interest rates as stationary.
In our dataset of the enlarged EU, evidence on stationarity is mixed and thus reects
the ambiguity of the literature. The following sections present the unit root test results
in the context of the correlation and codependence analyses. The corresponding tables
can be found in appendix C.
4.2.2 Interest rate correlation
We consider quarterly short-term interest rates for the eight NMS and the EU-15 coun-
tries. We employ three-months money market rates from the IMFs International Fi-
nancial Statistics, supplemented by Eurostat data. All data are deated by CPI.11 In
the case of the NMS, our time frame is 1995Q1-2005Q4 and we pair each country with
the euro area aggregate. For the EU-15 countries, we apply the pre-EMU time frame
1980Q1-1998Q4 which we divide into two subsamples at 1990Q1.12 We use Germany as
the reference country for the EU-15 countries because it served as benchmark and role
model in the run-up to EMU.
Given the ambiguous stationarity situation for interest rates, we rst conduct unit
root tests for all real interest rate series. Tables C.2 and C.3 summarise the results for
the NMS and the EU-15 for their respective time frames in levels and rst di¤erences.13
11Although the Harmonised Index of Cosumer Ination (HICP), compiled by Eurostat, would be
preferable for the comparison of European countries, it is not available for all countries in all periods.
Hence, we resort to the commonly used consumer price index (CPI), provided by IFS. Quarterly ination
rates are calculated on a year-on-year basis and then subtracted from the quarterly nominal interest rate.
Following Obstfeld and Taylor (2002), we make the standard assumption that the observed ex post real
interest rates are equal to the ex ante real rate plus a white-noise stationary forcast error.
12We analyse only pre-EMU data because with the start of the single monetary policy, nominal short-
term interest rates are equalised across the euro area. Hence, real interest di¤erentials would only be
due to ination di¤erentials which are, in itself, not a prime measure of nancial integration.
13We calculate the rst di¤erences from the interest rate levels, not logs. The reason is that logs cannot
be computed for negative real interest rates which tend to prevail for quite a number of observations.
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The evidence is irregular. Some of the NMS seem stationary in levels whereas for others,
the test cannot reject the hypothesis of a unit root. In di¤erences, all countries but
Lithuania seem stationary at least on the 10 percent level of signicance. In case of the
EU-15 countries, only ve countries show stationary behaviour in levels but in nearly
all cases, the di¤erences are stationary. For France and Ireland, we cannot reject a unit
root either in levels or in di¤erences. Given the ambiguity of interest rate stationarity,
we present correlation results for both levels and di¤erences in the following.
Table 4.7: Real interest rate correlation, NMS-8
Country Levels First di¤erences
95-05 95-99 00-05 95-05 95-99 00-05
Czech Rep. 0.55 -0.20 0.32 0.20 0.26 0.16
Estonia -0.43 -0.53 0.42 0.33 0.45 0.31
Hungary -0.44 -0.53 -0.61 0.29 0.15 0.40
Latvia 0.02 -0.38 0.75 0.21 0.13 0.39
Lithuania -0.34 -0.80 0.53 -0.02 -0.15 0.20
Poland 0.18 -0.29 0.87 0.28 0.31 0.29
Slovakia 0.50 -0.08 0.07 0.26 0.27 0.33
Slovenia -0.05 -0.02 -0.77 -0.15 -0.36 0.25
Note: Correlation coe¢ cients of real interest rates vis-à-vis the euro area.
Table 4.7 presents the correlation coe¢ cients of NMS real interest rates vis-à-vis those
of the euro area aggregate. We calculate correlation coe¢ cients of levels and di¤erences
for the entire 1995Q1-2005Q4 period as well as for two sub-periods, 1995Q1-1999Q4
and 2000Q1-2005Q4. In the levels case, we observe correlation coe¢ cients of up to 0.55
for the Czech Republic and 0.50 for Slovakia. Three out of the eight countries show
negative coe¢ cients: Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania. Comparing the two sub-samples,
it becomes clear that, except for Hungary and Slovenia, all countries exhibit increasing
correlation which may hint at improved nancial integration with the euro area. The
correlation coe¢ cients of the rst di¤erences are less dispersed. Generally, all coe¢ cients
Using instead the logs of the interest rate factors, log(1+R), as suggested by Obstfeld et al. (2005),
would yield factor growth rates when di¤erenced. Their correlation coe¢ cients, however, are almost
equal to those of the simple rst di¤erences of non-log levels since d[log(1+R)]  d[R] for small Rs.
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remain below 0.50 but we nd only two negative correlations. Now, Estonia and Hungary
are among the countries with the highest correlation.14 Poland and Slovakia still exhibit
a relatively large degree of interest rate correlation. Surprisingly, Slovenias coe¢ cient
is now negative. Still, most coe¢ cients tend to rise or remain relatively stable from the
rst to the second sub-period. They shrink in only two cass, the Czech Republic and
Estonia.
To nd out more about variations over time, we calculate moving correlation windows
of ve years length. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 present those in line graphs for both levels and
di¤erences. The levels tend to increase strongly over the considered period, ranging
across almost the entire spectrum of -1 to 1. Only Hungary and Slovenia stand out
with negatively sloped lines. The di¤erences, graphed in gure 4.6, tend to move closer
together and range between -0.5 and 0.6. Although most countries experience rising
coe¢ cients on the whole, the increase appears less dramatic.
Another way of analysing real interest rate comovement is looking at bilateral dif-
ferentials. Figure 4.7 presents bilateral di¤erentials of the eight NMS, each paired with
the euro area. While most di¤erentials experience enormous uctuation over time, it
seems that some countries achieved more stability since approximately 1999/2000. In
particular, the currency boards of Estonia and Latvia seemed to have contributed to
this development.
14 In the case of Estonia, the lack of stationarity in levels may render the corresponding correlation
result invalid.
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Figures 4.5-4.6: 5-year rolling correlation windows of short-term real interest rates against the 
euro area, based on quarterly data in levels and first differences, respectively. 
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Figure 4.7: Bilateral short-term real interest rate di¤erentials, each country minus the euro
area, 1995Q1-2005Q4.
To analyse the variability of real interest di¤erentials further, we calculate the stan-
dard deviations for the whole period and for the two sub-periods, 1995-1999 and 2000-
2005. The results are displayed in gure 4.8. All NMS are characterised by decreasing
variation in their interest rate di¤erentials with the euro area. While standard devia-
tions vary considerably during the rst sub-period, they seem to converge to a simliar low
level during the second. We regard this as additional indication for increased nancial
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integration.
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Figure 4.8: Standard deviations of real interest rate di¤erentials vis-à-vis the euro area.
For comparison, we investigate real interest rate correlation and variation of di¤er-
entials for the EU-15 countries. Now we focus on the pre-EMU period where countries
converged towards the benchmark country of those years, Germany. We again split our
series into two sub-samples, now ranging from 1981Q1-1989Q4 and 1990Q1-1998Q4.
Table 4.8 provides the correlation coe¢ cients for both levels and di¤erences, each
country paired with Germany. Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
seem to form a core group and experience by far the largest correlation coe¢ cients. This
applies for both levels and di¤erences, although the values for the di¤erences tend to be
lower on the whole. The smallest coe¢ cients pertain to Greece and Portugal, followed by
Ireland and Spain. Almost every countrys correlation with Germany increases markedly
from the rst to the second sub-period, although again the e¤ect is stronger in case
of levels. Interestingly, the correlation coe¢ cients for the UK tend to be increasing
towards Germany while they go down vis-à-vis the United States which we explore as
an additional benchmark.
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Table 4.8: Real interest rate correlation, EU-15
Country Levels First di¤erences
81-98 81-89 90-98 81-98 81-89 90-98
Austria 0.78 0.60 0.94 0.44 0.50 0.31
Belgium 0.85 0.79 0.92 0.47 0.48 0.46
Denmark 0.50 -0.20 0.83 0.12 0.11 0.13
Finland 0.42 -0.38 0.91 0.13 -0.15 0.53
France 0.49 -0.13 0.87 0.26 0.28 0.24
Greece -0.34 -0.31 -0.38 0.02 -0.16 0.18
Ireland 0.17 -0.27 0.70 0.19 0.25 0.10
Italy 0.21 -0.24 0.63 0.28 0.11 0.54
Luxembourg 0.80 0.72 0.94 0.48 0.50 0.41
Netherlands 0.83 0.58 0.97 0.59 0.59 0.62
Portugal 0.00 -0.01 0.33 -0.12 -0.13 -0.11
Spain 0.20 -0.35 0.85 -0.13 -0.25 0.30
Sweden 0.16 0.03 0.24 0.29 0.08 0.50
UK 0.22 -0.28 0.74 0.15 0.12 0.22
UK-US 0.20 0.25 -0.30 0.14 0.19 -0.05
Note: Correlation coe¢ cients of real interest rates vis-à-vis Germany.
Turning to rolling interest rate correlation windows, we split the country sample into
three groups to facilitate graphical inspection. For many countries, correlation of interest
rates with Germany seems to move in cycles. Figure 4.9 includes those countries with
the largest overall correlation coe¢ cients, the euro area core. These are relatively small
countries which have maintained close ties to German monetary policy for many years.
They tend to experience "correlation booms" during the late 1980s and the mid-1990s,
interrupted by downturns around 1990 and in the most recent periods.
The 1990 trough is likely to be due to German reunication which was associated
with exceptionally high interest rates in Germany compared to the rest of Europe. On
the whole, the core group uctuates within a relatively narrow band of 0.40-0.90. Figure
4.10 shows the remaining euro area economies. These "periphery" countries show a
larger degree of convergence as they all start at negative correlation values and increase
drastically from there, some appraoching 0.95 in the mid-1990s. Again, we observe a
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Figures 4.9-11: 5-year rolling correlation windows of short-term real interest rates against 
Germany, based on quarterly data in levels. 
certain cyclical behaviour and a downturn of correlation values towards the end of the
sample. Figure 4.11 consists of the three non-euro area countries among EU-15, plus
the UK-US relation for comparison. While Denmark and Sweden increased markedly in
their interest rate correlations with Germany, the UK pattern against the US seems to
mirror that vis-à-vis Germany. During the mid-1990s, UK-German interest rates tend
to comove on a high level but turn negative in the most recent period whereas UK-US
correlation remains negative during most of the 1990s and picks up towards the end of
the sample. Apparently, the UK takes a changing position in terms of nancial market
integration with Germany and the US. We note, however, that neither for Germany, nor
for the UK and the US we can formally reject the unit root hypothesis in levels.
The line graphs of the di¤erence correlations, illustrated in gures 4.12-4.14, tend to
follow a roughly similar pattern. Again, the core group uctuates on a relatively high
level against Germany while the periphery countries exhibit a clearer upward trend.
Regarding the non-euro area countries, it stands out that the UK-German correlations
remain above the UK-US relation at all times since the end of the 1990s. Taken together,
the EU-15 countries seem to have followed German real interest rates to an increasing
extent during the pre-EMU period which hints at improved nancial market integration
and policy coordiation in preparation for the euro.
To study the variability of bilateral interest rate di¤erentials between the EU-15
countries and Germany, we rst inspect the di¤erentials graphically, see gure 4.15. Al-
though all series seem to include considerable variation, some appear to narrow down in
the second half of the sample. Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands basi-
cally even out at a plus/minus one percentage level since around 1993. Other countries,
such as France or the UK, tend to remain within a virtual plus/minus two percentage
band towards the end of the sample.
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Rolling interest rate correlations, euro area core (differences)
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Figures 4.12-14: 5-year rolling correlation windows of short-term real interest rates against 
Germany, based on quarterly data in first differences. 
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Figure 4.15: Bilateral short-term real interest rate di¤erentials, each country minus Germany,
1980Q1-1998Q4.
Figure 4.16 ranks countries according to the standard deviation of their bilateral
interest rate di¤erentials against Germany. The aforementioned euro area core group
plus France and the UK lead the list of smallest variations over the whole sample. How-
ever, other countries which experienced a high level managed to reduce their variation
considerably. As a result, except for Greece all EU-15 countries brought their variation
level down to around two standard deviations - which is a similar level as for the NMS
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versus the euro area since 2000.
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Figure 4.16: Standard deviations of real interest rate di¤erentials vis-à-vis Germany.
Finally, we study the degree of dispersion across EU-15 countries. For this purpose,
we calculate the standard deviation across all EU-15 countries at one point in time and
repeat this exercise for all periods. Analysing the cross-country dispersion over time
has also been known as sigma convergence in the empirical growth literature. Figure
4.17 shows that despite some peaks, the overall dispersion level has clearly decreased
between 1981 and 2005. One major spike stands out in 1994 which is due to idiosyncratic
developments in Greece. Leaving out Greece (EU-14) delivers an even smoother path of
decreasing dispersion.
In summary, our correlation, variability and dispersion evidence suggests that real
interest rates have become more similar during the 1980s and 1990s in the EU-15. Al-
though correlations for the NMS tend to be ambiguous, the reduced variability of bi-
lateral interest rate di¤erentials hints at more similar rates as well. We acknowledge
that the stationarity analysis of interest rate is subject to limitations and has delivered
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mixed results. This is, however, in line with the conicting propostions on stationarity
of interest rates in the literature.
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Figure 4.17: Standard deviation of real interest rates across the EU-15 countries
(EU-14: excluding Greece), at every point in time.
4.2.3 Interest rate codependence
In the following, we analyse real interest rates across countries employing the codepen-
dence technique. Again, as our focus is on the short run, we concentrate on the cyclical
part of comovement. We employ the same time and country sample as in the correlation
analysis of interest rates, i.e. eight NMS vis-à-vis the euro area during 1995Q1-2005Q4
as well as the EU-15 countries related to Germany during 1980Q1-1998Q4. For com-
parison, we again consider the relation of the UK to the US. Since the codependence
framework incorporates a seasonal adjustment tool, we use annualised month-on-month
CPI ination to calculate "non-adjusted" real interest rates.
First, we look at unit root test results for the non-adjusted data, see tables C.4 and
C.5, which are largeley similar to the adjusted data. We note that nearly all countries
are stationary in di¤erences while a few seem stationary in levels as well. For some
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countries, however, we cannot reject the unit root hypothesis either in the levels or in
the di¤erence cases.
On the whole, the unit-root results are again subject to debate, as discussed in the
previous section, since interest rates are hard to imagine non-sationary in the classical
sense. The codependence approach works with di¤erences and almost all countries are
stationary at least in di¤erences.
Table 4.9: Interest rate codependenc results, NMS-8
Country rank Common Codependence
features Order 1 Order 2 Order 3
Czech Rep. m = 1 16.38*** 2.17 4.10 5.73
m = 2 48.36*** 19.89** 28.13*** 20.64***
Estonia m = 1 23.61*** 10.66* 16.68*** 11.85**
m = 2 89.00*** 30.75*** 57.15*** 30.72***
Hungary m = 1 1.05 2.57 1.64 2.97
m = 2 36.22*** 21.15*** 27.23*** 21.57***
Latvia m = 1 17.30*** 0.99 17.41*** 2.00
m = 2 56.89*** 31.80*** 47.45*** 12.99
Lithuania m = 1 14.38*** 4.02 20.19*** 7.38
m = 2 72.44*** 25.48*** 53.44*** 22.90**
Poland m = 1 3.30* 1.22 0.08 1.37
m = 2 20.17*** 4.22 7.79* 16.05**
Slovakia m = 1 5.05 4.03 4.92 5.50
m = 2 30.93*** 14.22 20.78** 18.91**
Slovenia m = 1 28.52*** 7.97 19.20 12.56*
m = 2 67.49*** 35.71*** 50.48*** 34.60***
Note: Codependence results of real interest rates of each country vis-à-vis the euro
area. Rejection of the null hypothesis of common feature/codependence vectors at the 1
percent level is indicated by "***", the 5 percent level is marked with "**", the 10 percent
level with "*". If we nd the combination of accepting one vector (m = 1) and rejecting
a second vector (m = 2), we conlude the existence of n m = 2 1 = 1 common cycle.
Table 4.9 provides the codependence results for the NMS. Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia seem to exhibit common features, or codependence of order zero, with the
euro area. This would mean that their real interest rates have synchronised common
cycles which hints at a high degree of nancial integration. This evidence matches
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with the correlation of di¤erences from the previous section where these three countries
were among those with the largest correlation coe¢ cients. Some uncertainty, however,
remains concerning the autoregressive orders. Intuitively, two countries can only have
a common feature if the individual features, i.e. serial correlations, are of equal length.
Otherwise, the feature would not cancel out in the linear combination. For the euro area,
we found an autoregressive order of p = 4 when testing for Q statistics of autocorrelation
in the residuals of the autoregressive equations. For Hungary, this criterion yields p = 1
although according to the modied Akaike information criterion, lag length 4 would be
the optimal choice. The fact that Hungary displays one codependence vector from order
zero to three throughout supports the notion that Hungary acutally does qualify for
CD(0): For Poland and Slovakia, the cases are less clear. The unit root tests would also
allow p = 4 but the fact that the codependence tests suggest two codependence vectors
for CD(1) renders the case of synchronised common cycles rather unlikely.
The remaining countries have no common feature vectors but all have one CD(1)
vector. This indicates common but non-synchronised interest rate cycles which means
that the countries would respond to euro area interest rates with a time lag of one
quarter. However, the autoregressive orders for the unit root tests are again unclear.
Hence, we conclude that the degree of nancial integration between the NMS and the
euro area is at best intermediate.
Codependence results for the EU-15 countries are provided by tables 4.10 and 4.11.
We divide the sample into two the sub-groups 1980Q1-1989Q4 as well as 1990Q1-1998Q4
hoping to learn more about changes in nancial integration among the EU-15 over time.
During the 1980s, the real interest rates of Austria, France and the Netherlands seem to
be synchronised with those of Germany. For France and the Netherlands, however, the
autoregressive lag di¤ers from that of the Germany. This does not exclude the possiblity
of common features, given the ambiguity of the lag length choice, but it adds uncertainty
to the results.
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Table 4.10: Interest rate codependenc results, EU-15, 1980-1989
Country rank Common Codependence
features Order 1 Order 2 Order 3
Austria m = 1 1.48 1.84 0.04 2.60
m = 2 17.23*** 8.47 13.95** 12.30*
Belgium m = 1 1.47 2.18 4.10 3.65
m = 4 33.45*** 6.32 30.22*** 16.58
Denmark m = 1 18.63*** 4.93 11.28** 0.93
m = 2 51.11*** 15.38 32.60*** 18.44**
Finland m = 1 15.06*** 3.24 10.11** 4.34
m = 2 59.68*** 19.14** 33.79*** 16.49*
France m = 1 12.88* 9.61 10.25 11.09
m = 2 56.29*** 37.37*** 42.54*** 40.21***
Greece m = 1 13.37*** 0.38 8.36** 2.15
m = 2 34.52*** 11.26 27.79*** 14.60*
Ireland m = 1 12.40*** 5.94 2.19 4.37
m = 2 71.74*** 24.13*** 18.14** 24.44***
Italy m = 1 19.26*** 3.86 15.56*** 5.56
m = 2 64.92*** 16.41* 32.23*** 32.52***
Luxembourg m = 1 13.08*** 1.07 11.06** 3.57
m = 2 35.54*** 6.77 26.94*** 10.23
Netherlands m = 1 4.44 4.89 6.82 3.78
m = 2 19.35* 19.66* 23.27** 14.91
Portugal m = 1 16.43*** 1.42 10.70** 5.60
m = 2 37.15*** 7.38 28.15*** 21.71***
Spain m = 1 15.91*** 1.95 5.35 5.90
m = 2 51.67*** 12.72 25.46 24.66***
Sweden m = 1 19.52*** 2.62 8.10 2.86
m = 2 46.87*** 12.04 27.53*** 21.02*
UK m = 1 9.52** 2.57 1.02 6.38*
m = 2 40.21*** 13.31 19.08** 21.35***
UK vs. US m = 1 37.28*** 16.45*** 27.91*** 13.86**
m = 2 83.78*** 38.07*** 46.65*** 25.92**
Note: Codependence results of real interest rates of each country vis-à-vis Germany.
Rejection of the null hypothesis of common feature/codependence vectors at the 1 percent
level is indicated by "***", the 5 percent level is marked with "**", the 10 percent level
with "*". If we nd the combination of accepting one vector (m = 1) and rejecting a
second vector (m = 2), we conlude the existence of n m = 2  1 = 1 common cycle.
The UK is a borderline case in which the hypothesis of one common feature vector
is rejected with a p-value of 0.02. In addition, results indicate one common feature
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vector for Belgium. We can rule this out, however, since we were not able to detect
stationarity for Belgiums interest rate di¤erences. Codependence of rst order is in-
dicated for Finland and Ireland while the latter is disqualied by its unsatisfactory
di¤erence-stationarity result. All other countries reveal no signs of codependence vis-à-
vis Germany. This holds also true for the UK-US relation.
Turing to the 1990s, we nd more favourable results. Austria, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK have one common feature vector and thus
synchronised common interest cycles with Germany. Out of these, only Luxembourg does
not fulll the di¤erence-stationarity criterion. The UK-US relation has one codependence
vector for CD(1) and thus shares a common but non-synchronised cycle. Denmark seems
to be CD(1) but fails to be di¤erence-stationary. All remaining countries do not exhibit
clear results.
On the whole, the nancial integration evidence for the EU-15 is not overwhelm-
ing but appears to be increasing over time. During the 1990s, more countries seem to
share a common interest rate cycle with Germany than in the 1980s, for some even syn-
chronised. This supports the correlation evidence of increasing comovement. However,
several aspects remain unclear - for instance, France seems to deteriorate in its nancial
integration with Germany although these two countries are commonly seen as very in-
tegrated. The idiosyncratic impact of German unication in the early 1990s may come
into play here but our analysis is not able to isolate such e¤ects. It is remarkable to
what a large degree the UK seems to be nancially integrated with Germany. Based
on this result, the UK may reap a large gain from joing the euro even in the presence
of non-synchronised business cycles. For the NMS, it seems that nancial integration
is still under development but prospects appear good that further economic integration
would stimulate nancial interactions, suggested by the more favourable results for the
EU-15.
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Table 4.11: Interest rate codependenc results, EU-15, 1990-1998
Country rank Common Codependence
features Order 1 Order 2 Order 3
Austria m = 1 1.87 8.42 14.03** 9.97*
m = 2 21.38** 33.56*** 37.59*** 35.88***
Belgium m = 1 20.43*** 0.94 3.49 5.08
m = 4 47.89*** 10.16 23.39*** 27.80***
Denmark m = 1 17.40*** 3.68 4.99 2.58
m = 2 60.60*** 22.76*** 15.16* 11.03
Finland m = 1 12.27*** 2.08 3.82 4.57
m = 2 32.76*** 7.19 14.39* 15.42*
France m = 1 13.48*** 3.21 0.51 5.22
m = 2 47.13*** 14.83* 7.40 13.93
Greece m = 1 0.56 3.26 11.26** 1.64
m = 2 26.48*** 9.144 29.36*** 9.10
Ireland m = 1 1.76 0.02 0.01 3.62*
m = 2 29.72*** 5.77 8.22* 7.23
Italy m = 1 1.94 0.41 0.02 0.28
m = 2 23.52*** 4.72 1.24 4.45
Luxembourg m = 1 4.52 3.02 18.61*** 3.86
m = 2 42.25*** 17.95* 39.07*** 21.02**
Netherlands m = 1 7.76* 2.61 4.78 5.89
m = 2 38.03*** 11.94 18.39** 14.82*
Portugal m = 1 0.13 0.01 2.53 2.99*
m = 2 6.62 0.93 8.37* 8.32*
Spain m = 1 1.27 4.32** 0.15 3.76*
m = 2 7.38 15.05*** 5.65 10.26**
Sweden m = 1 25.17*** 5.84 21.62*** 5.64
m = 2 53.33*** 19.09* 45.27*** 21.53**
UK m = 1 4.73 9.14 14.23** 8.79
m = 2 33.95*** 26.91** 30.61*** 17.64
UK vs. US m = 1 26.60*** 3.33 8.63** 7.88**
m = 2 59.66*** 16.22** 26.08*** 16.23**
Note: Codependence results of real interest rates of each country vis-à-vis Germany.
Rejection of the null hypothesis of common feature/codependence vectors at the 1 percent
level is indicated by "***", the 5 percent level is marked with "**", the 10 percent level
with "*". If we nd the combination of accepting one vector (m = 1) and rejecting a
second vector (m = 2), we conlude the existence of n m = 2  1 = 1 common cycle.
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4.3 Summary and conclusion
This chapter analysed the role of risk sharing and nancial integration in the context
of the OCA theory and the Mundell II framework. According to Mundell II, countries
with less sychronised business cycles benet most from the risk-sharing properties in a
nancially integrated currency union. Since a common currency removes exchange rate
uctuations and cross-country risk premia, portfolio diversication is expected to deepen
across the currency union and serves as a consumption insurance mechanism because
it decouples consumption from national production patterns. This benet of common
currencies has often been overlooked while the cost of currency union membership due
to the loss of individual monetary policy has been highlighted alone.
In the present chapter, we investigated the degrees of risk sharing and nancial inte-
gration in the enlarged EU to explore the case for Mundell II mechanisms for euro area
enlargement. In particular, we analysed consumption and real interest rate comovement
of the eight Central and Eastern European new member states, each in relation to the
aggregate euro area which they are supposed to join in due course. For comparison, we
investigated the member countries of the "old" EU-15 in relation to the euro area or,
in the case of nancial integration, relative to the pre-EMU benchmark Germany. Our
main ndings are as follows.
Regarding risk sharing, we compare cross-country comovement of consumption with
that of GDP. Methodologically, we rst look at simple correlation coe¢ cients before
we move on to the more sophisticated time-series technique of codependence. From a
theoretical point of view, risk sharing would be manifested in internationally diversied
consumption patterns so that consumption across countries should be relatively inde-
pendent of income and hence more highly correlated than GDP. Our results indicate
that consumption correlations with the euro area are lower than GDP correlations for
most countries under investigation. While this result is, at rst glance, in line with the
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consumption correlation puzzle, we nd a number of insightful details. For the NMS,
correlations are at far lower levels than for the EU-15 countries while Slovenia stands
out with relatively high levels of consumption and GDP correlation. Also, Lithuania
and Slovenia display synchronised common GDP cycles as identied by the codepen-
dence analysis. Furthermore, rolling correlation windows indicate increasing correlation
coe¢ cients for most countries over time. We note that GDP correlations exhibit steeper
increases than consumption correlations.
Turning to nancial integration, we investigate real interest rate comovement. In
addition to the correlation measures, we analyse the variability of bilateral di¤erentials
and the dispersion of interest rates across countries over time. We also resort to the
codependence framework. While we again look at the eight NMS vis-à-vis the euro
area from 1995 through 2005, we consider the EU-15 countries against the pre-EMU
benchmark Germany and consider the 1980-1998 period.
We acknowledge a somewhat unclear stationarity situation with interest rates. The-
oretically, we would expect interest rates to be associated with consumption growth and
hence stationary. However, the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected in many cases
although it is hard to imagine interest rates to be literally non-stationary. High persis-
tence or structural breaks may account for the unit root results. Given this ambiguity,
we analyse interest rates both in levels and in di¤erences.
NMS evidence proves mixed. While the correlation analysis delivers partly conicting
results, the codependence exercise suggests common features for Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia. In other words, real interest rates of these countries seem to exhibit synchro-
nised common cycles with the euro area. When looking at rolling correlation windows,
nearly all NMS seem to increase in their interest rate comovement with the euro area
over time. Also, the variability of bilateral interest rate di¤erentials decreases markedly
from the mid-1990s until 2005.
For the EU-15 countries, we nd more unambiguous evidence of nancial integration.
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From the 1980s to the 1990s, interest rate correlations with Germany shot up to high
levels. Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands seem to form a core group
whose interest rate correlation with Germany uctuated on high levels whereas the cor-
relation coe¢ cients of most remaining countries started at low levels in the 1980s and
experienced stark increases until the late 1990s. The core group of nancially integrated
countries is conrmed by the variability analysis of bilateral interest rate di¤erentials.
Furthermore, the dispersion measure, also known as sigma convergence, indicates a clear
downward trend which is even more pronounced when excluding idiosyncratic Greece.
Finally, we conducted separate codependence tests for the 1980s and 1990s and found
increasing degrees of interest rate comovement between the EU-15 countries and Ger-
many. While only a few countries qualied for synchronised common interest rate cylces
during the 1980s, we nd common feature evidence during the 1990s for Austria, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. A number of borderline cases add to this
evidence. It is interesting to note that the UK displays high levels of nancial integration
throughout our analysed indicators.
Taken together, we draw a threefold conclusion from our results. First, we conrm
the consumption correlation puzzle established by most empirical literature. Consump-
tion correlations remain below output correlation for most considered countries which
contradicts the theoretical proposition. One major reason behind this may be the rel-
atively low degree of nancial integration. We conrm this idea at least in the case of
the NMS which, to date, seem to be characterised by both little risk sharing and limited
nancial integration with the euro area.
Second, even though GDP correlation still exceeds consumption correlation for the
EU-15 countries, they are both on much higher levels and with a smaller di¤erential than
for the NMS. Also, nancial integration has improved markedly for the EU-15 countries
in the run-up to EMU. Given that these countries have shared a long history of economic
integration, we may suspect a similar development for the NMS as integration with the
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euro area proceeds.
Third, we nd that both consumption and GDP correlations increase over time, with
the latter more strongly than the former. Also, interest rate correlations tend to rise
for most countries over time. Although we did not conduct any causal analysis within
the scope of this chapter, these observations may support the hypothesis of Imbs (2006).
He analyses a large set of countries and nds that nancial integration does not only
improve risk-sharing opportunities in the form of cross-country consumption correlation
but also boosts, to an even larger extent, business cycles synchronisation across countries.
Hence, he argues, the consumption correlation puzzle may not stem from too little risk
sharing. Accordingly, we see a widening gap between consumption and GDP correlation
not because of low degrees of risk sharing but simply because GDP correlations increase
even faster than those of consumption. From our results, we can at least conrm that
GDP correlations do indeed increase faster than consumption correlations, and the rising
levels of nancial integration are not unlikely to play a central part in that.
These propositions hint at further need for research. To shed more light on the
dynamics of risk sharing, nancial integration and business cycle synchronisation, a
comprehensive econometric framework would be desirable. Also, to respond to the pre-
vailing policy question of euro area enlargement and its e¤ects on the new member states
and on the euro area, we would welcome more research on these countries. If, as Mundell
II argues, countries with relatively asynchronous business cycles benet most from the
risk-sharing opportunities in a nancially integrated currency union, the NMS may have
far more to gain from euro adoption than previously assumed. This logic applies even
more if the euro delivers the enhanced degree of nancial integration that some studies
suggest.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The introduction of the single European currency in 1999 was undoubtedly one of the
most remarkable innovations in international nance during the last decades. With the
enlargement of the European Union by ten states in 2004, and more accession countries
in negotiation, the enlargement of the euro area to the formerly communist new EU
member states is the next major challenge ahead.
This dissertation addressed a number of fundamental policy questions related to
monetary integration in the enlarged EU. Our arguments unfolded along the lines of
optimum currency area theory and its three major strands: the classical OCA criteria
(Mundell I), the endogeneity of OCAs and the role of risk sharing (Mundell II). We
focused our empirical strategy on business cycle synchronisation which has been regarded
as a "meta-property" in operationalising the OCA framework. In the following, we give
a short overview over the main steps of the analysis and their results before we highlight
some policy inplications and the need for future research.
In Chapter 2, we tested for common trends and cycles of a number of NMS and
accession countries vis-à-vis the euro area. According to the traditional OCA framework,
Mundell I, the best-suited candidates for currency union are characterised by a large
degree of business cycle synchronisation so that renouncing individual monetary and
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exchange rate policy would not give rise to major economic costs. Hence, the NMS
should condition their adoption of the euro to their business cycles being su¢ ciently
synchronised with that of the euro area.
We investigated this question by applying the integrated cointegration/codependence
approach by Engle and Kozicki (1993) and Vahid and Engle (1997) to a decade of Eu-
ropean output data. We found that, regarding long-run convergence, the NMS are still
in a catching-up process and have not yet reached a steady-state equilibrium with the
euro area. Turning to short-run cycle comovement, our results indicate that only Slove-
nia has a synchronised common business cylce with the euro area. Hungary, Slovakia,
Estonia and, as a borderline case, the Czech Republic, show signs of common but not
synchronised cycles which points at an intermediate degree of comovement. Thus, our
analysis supports the Slovenian euro adoption which is scheduled for 2007 but suggests
caution regarding the remaining countries. According to the Mundell I framework, they
may incur major costs by renouncing individual monetary and exchange rate policies
before having reached a su¢ cient degree of business cycle synchronisation.
In Chapter 3, we added the endogeneity dimension of OCAs. According to Frankel
and Rose (1998) and Engel and Rose (2002), the adoption of a common currency per se
may unfold synchronisation dynamics which lead to endogenous trade increase and cycle
synchronisation. Hence, even an ex ante non-optimal currency area like the EU may turn
out to be optimal ex post. However, it is still too early to empirically identify a reliable
endogenous e¤ect of the euro on the EU economies. Therefore, we followed the approach
of Frankel and Rose (1998) by asking which factors are signicantly associated with busi-
ness cycle synchronisation across euro area countries. A positive relation between trade
and cycle comovement would then be interpreted as an indication of OCA endogeneity.
To test the robustness of the potential determinants, we applied the extreme-bounds
analysis by Leamer (1983).
We found that, indeed, bilateral trade has been a robust, positive determinant of
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business cycle synchronisation across euro area countries over the past 25 years. As we
split up our sample to learn more about time-varying e¤ects, our results show that the
explanatory power of the trade e¤ect seems to be driven mainly by the earlier sub-period,
1980-1996. Since 1997, the di¤erences in trade structure emerge as a robust determinant
of cycle synchronisation. In other words, the degree of intra-industry trade plays an
increasing role in business cycle comovement. Given our descriptive nding of a rising
degree of intra-industry trade, we interpret our results as a positive indication for both
the existing euro area and the prospective entrants.
In addition to the trade-related determinants, we included several policy and struc-
tural indicators into our analysis. We found that scal policy similarity has had a positive
e¤ect on cycle synchronisation up to the EMU preparation phase. Since 1997, we found
monetary policy similarity as proxied by real interest rate di¤erentials to emerge as a
robust determinant. Furthermore, similar industrial sector size, stock market comove-
ment and similar competitiveness seem to have good explanatory power. In contrast,
nominal exchange rate variation, bilateral bank capital ows and di¤erences in labour
market exibility did not turn out as robust.
Chapter 4 addressed a strand of OCA theory which has attracted a lot of attention
recently: the role of risk sharing and nancial integration in currency unions, known
as Mundell II. In a nancially-integrated currency union, it is argued, countries with
little business cycle synchronisation may benet even more from adopting the common
currency. This benet is due to new consumption risk sharing opportunities because
national consumption patterns can be diversied across the union and are thus less
contingent on home output. For the new EU member states, this idea implies that for
the countries with asynchronous cycles, the euro would be more, and not less attractive.
To explore the past degree and future potential of risk sharing and nancial integra-
tion in the enlarged EU, we investigated consumption and real interest rate comovement
between the NMS and the euro area. For comparison, we applied the same measures to
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the "old" EU member states. Methodologically, we resorted to cross-country correlations
and the common features/codependence technique. In addition, we employed various
variability and dispersion measures. We found that consumption comovement between
the NMS and the euro area tends to be below comparable measures of output synchro-
nisation. This result, which is in line with the consumption correlation puzzle, may be
due to relatively low degrees of nancial integration. For the EU-15 countries, however,
consumption and output correlation levels are much higher and the di¤erence, though
still often negative, tends to be more narrow. Also, nancial integration has increased
markedly as the EU-15 countries prepared for EMU. In view of the long common history
of economic integration among the EU-15, we may expect similar e¤ects to materialise
as the integration of the NMS into the enlarged EU proceeds. Finally, we observed
that both consumption and output correlations tend to increase over time, alongside
increasing nancial integration. Notably, output comovement increased at a faster rate
than that of consumption. This experience seems consistent with the hypothesis of Imbs
(2006) who suggests that nancial integration does not only facilitate risk sharing but
also, and even more, boosts business cycle synchronisation. Hence, the consumption
correlation puzzle may not stem from too little risk sharing but originates in the often
neglected, strong e¤ect on output comovement. In consequence, the benet that the
NMS may derive from early euro adoption, may so far have been underestimated.
In the light of these results, we see a number of interesting policy implications and
the need for further research. First, it becomes clear that transition is not yet over
in the NMS. Although remarkable progress has been made, business cycles as well as
consumption and interest rates are far from being in line with the euro area. Hence,
further reform and integration e¤orts are required that go beyond the scope of the
analysis in this dissertation. More research would improve our understanding of how, for
example, structural reforms in the banking sector and on the labour markets may improve
the functioning of adjustment channels to foster convergence and cycle sychronisation.
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The euro itself may, however, turn out to be one means of aligning business cycles.
Instead of postponing euro area accession until full synchronisation is achieved, the NMS
may want to exploit the endogenous e¤ects of currency union. EU accession pushed
trade integration with the EU-15 and monetary union is likely to increase bilateral trade
further. Given our results on OCA endogeneity, we may expect increased trade to
translate into more closely associated business cycles as the NMS adopt the euro.
One question is, however, whether increased trade will materialise in similar or di¤er-
ent sectors. Our evidence for the euro area suggests that the trade structure has become
increasingly important in determining business cycle synchronisation.1 Several studies
suggest that trade between the NMS and the EU-15 is increasingly intra-industry2 which
would hint at good prospects for endogenous cycle synchronsiation. However, this trade
seems to occur mostly as vertical intra-industry trade. i.e. trade in similar sectors but in
di¤erent qualities, and driven by wage di¤erentials and foreign direct investment ows.
More research is needed to assess whether this kind of specialisation on low-wage produc-
tion in the same sector leads to more asymmetric cycles, whether the observed foreign
ownership patterns tend to bind cycles together, and which e¤ect would dominate.
The role of risk-sharing bents adds an interesting perspective on euro area enlarge-
ment. According to this logic, the NMS with least cycle synchronisation have most to
benet from joining the euro area quickly. Our results conrm that, should the mech-
anism work reasonably well, most NMS would have substantial gains to reap. Given
that this view has not yet received much attention in empirical research and is appears
still somewhat vague, we would welcome in-depth studies to substantiate and quantify
the potential gains for the NMS. It would be of particular interest to learn more about
domestic nancial markets and the degree of private stock and equity ownership in the
NMS that would facilitate cross-country risk sharing. In addition, the Mundell II view
on risk sharing benets refers mostly to prospective currency union entrants and their
1Fidrmuc (2003) reaches a simliar conclusion for the CEECs.
2See Caetano and Galego (2006), Gabrisch and Segnana (2003).
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gains from joining a common currency. We do not yet know much about the e¤ect on
an exisiting currency union, for instance the euro area. How would an acceding country
with asynchronous business cycles a¤ect a relatively homogeneous existing monetary
union? If it was predominantly the new country that benets, would the existing union
therefore prefer only small countries of relatively little weight to join, as opposed to
larger asynchronous economies which may cause more concern for the union as a whole?
These questions have remained largely open and are the object of future research.
Although euro area enlargement is ultimately a political question, policy decision
makers are in continuous need of answers from empirical economics. With the contri-
bution of this dissertation on business cycle synchronisation, we hope to substantiate
economic policy decision making in the enlarged European Union.
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1: Variables and data sources 
Variable Name Description Data source 
COR Correlation coefficient of business cycles European Commission, Ameco Database; 
own calculations 
BTT Bilateral trade, scaled by total trade IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics; Ameco; 
own calculations 
BTY Bilateral trade, scaled by GDP IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics; Ameco; 
own calculations 
TTY Total trade of both countries, scaled by 
GDP 
IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics; Ameco; 
own calculations 
ECOPAT 
 
Sum of relative sector shares in total value 
added 
OECD National Accounts Database; own 
calculations 
CD_IND Relative shares of industry   
CD_CNT Relative shares of construction   
CD_FIN Relative shares of financial intermediation  
CD_TRA Relative shares of wholesale & retail trade  
TRADEPAT Sum of relative sector shares in bilateral 
exports 
NBER World Trade Flows Database, see 
Feenstra and Lipsey (2005) ; own 
calculations 
CD_FUEL Relative shares of mineral fuels  
CD_MACH Relative shares of machinery and 
transport equipment 
 
CD_MANU Relative shares of other manufacturing 
products 
 
CD_CHEM Relative shares of chemicals  
BFA, BFL Bilateral bank flows (assets, liabilities) BIS, International Locational Banking 
Statistics, see Papaioannou (2005); own 
calculations 
TOTMKDIFF Bilateral difference between overall  stock 
market indices 
Thomson Datastream ; own calculations 
CYSERDIFF Bilateral difference between stock market 
indices for cyclical services  
Thomson Datastream ; own calculations 
IRSCDIFF Bilateral short-run interest rate 
differential minus inflation measured by 
the private consumption deflator 
European Commission, Ameco Database ; 
own calculations 
NCIDIFF Bilateral differences between real effective 
exchange rates (HICP-deflated) 
Calculation 
SD_NERE Bilateral exchange rate variation, defined 
as the standard deviation of the nominal 
exchange rates 
Bank for International Settlements; own 
calculations 
DEFDIFF Bilateral difference in fiscal budget deficits European Commission, Ameco Database; 
own calculations 
TUDDIFF Bilateral difference in trade union density, 
defined as the share of organised workers 
OECD Olisnet Labour Market Statistics; 
own calculations 
EPADIFF Bilateral difference in the averaged OECD 
employment protection indices 
OECD Olisnet Labour Market Statistics; 
own calculations 
GEODIST Geographical distance between national 
capitals (Bonn for Germany) 
International Trade Database, Macalester 
University; own calculations 
POPDIFF Bilateral difference in national population, 
scaled by population 
European Commission, Ameco Database; 
own calculations 
Note: The fully-detailed description of variables can be found in the text of the paper. 
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Figure A.1: Business cycle correlation over time 
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Figure A.2: Business cycle correlation coefficients, 1980 – 1988 
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Figure A.3: Business cycle correlation coefficients, 1989 – 1996 
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Figure A.4: Business cycle correlation coefficients, 1997 – 2004 
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Appendix B: EBA estimates 
 
• The results of the extreme-bounds analysis are reported in tables B. 1 to B. 12. For 
a sample size of 60 (the actual sample has 66 observations), the significance levels for 
the t-statistics are:  1.671 for the 10% level ;  2.000 for the 5% level ;  2.660 for the 1% 
level.  
 
• The t-statistics reported in the tables include a Newey-West correction for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals. 
 
• We consider as “quasi-robust” the variables whose coefficients for all equations were 
significant and of the expected sign, but for which one of the bounds took the wrong 
sign while remaining around 0, with an absolute value of less than 5% of the relevant 
coefficient.  
 
Table B.1: Ratio of bilateral trade to total trade (BTT) W/O geographical distance before 1997 
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate   2.065 0.524 3.94 0.18
High  3.112  2.055 0.528 3.89 0.17 TUDDIFFRobust 
Low  0.123  0.956 0.416 2.30 0.40 TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFF 100% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate    1.872 0.582 3.22 0.12
High  3.349  2.082 0.634 3.29 0.11 SD NERE, TUDDIFFRobust 
Low  0.301  1.369 0.534 2.56 0.13 TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIFF, TUDDIFF 100% 
1997-2004  
Bivariate    4.092 1.456 2.81 0.10
High  7.269  4.121 1.574 2.62 0.09 TUDDIFFFragile 
Low -2.660 -0.830 0.915 -0.91 0.32 TOTMKDIFF, DEFDIFF, GEODIST
46.3% 
 
Table B.2: Ratio of bilateral trade to GDP  (BTY) W/O geographical distance before 1997 
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Significant 
coefficients (%) 
1980-2004  
Bivariate    3.216 1.108 2.90 0.15  
High  5.393  3.204 1.095 2.93 0.15 TUDDIFFRobust 
Low  0.123  1.524 0.700 2.18 0.42 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFF 100% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate    3.111 0.896 3.47 0.11  
High  5.480  3.405 1.037 3.28 0.10 SD NERERobust 
Low  0.682  2.268 0.793 2.86 0.16 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, 100% 
1997-2004  
Bivariate    5.893 2.845 2.07 0.09  
High  11.714  5.895 2.909 2.03 0.07 TUDDIFFFragile 
Low -5.080 -2.534 1.273 -1.99 0.35 DEFDIFF, TUDDIFF, GEODIST
26.8% 
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Table B.3: Trade specialisation patterns (TRADEPAT)  
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate  -0.433 0.140 -3.10 0.19
High  0.032 -0.169 0.101 -1.68 0.38 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF, SD NEREFragile 
Low -0.715 -0.437 0.139 -3.14 0.20 TUDDIFF 100% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate  -0.237 0.157 -1.50 0.04
High  0.219 -0.074 0.146 -0.51 0.10 NCIDIFF, GEODISTFragile 
Low -0.586 -0.246 0.170 -1.45 0.02 SD NERE n.a. 
1997-2004  
Bivariate  -1.233 0.293 -4.21 0.35
High -0.022 -0.469 0.224 -2.10 0.58 IRSCDIFF, DEFDIFF, GEODISTRobust 
Low -2.055 -1.491 0.282 -5.28 0.40 NCIDIFF, TUDDIFF
100% 
 
Table B.3a: Trade specialisation in fuels (CD_FUELS)  
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate  -0.348 0.629 -0.55 -0.01
High  0.813 -0.084 0.449 -0.19 0.07 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, Fragile 
Low -1.555 -0.655 0.450 -1.46 0.35 DEFDIFF, TUDDIFF, GEODIST n.a. 
1980-1996  
Bivariate   0.197 0.628 0.31 -0.02
High  1.503  0.245 0.629 0.39 -0.03 SD NEREFragile 
Low -1.556 -0.240 0.658 -0.36 0.11 NCIDIFF, SD NERE, GEODIST n.a. 
1997-2004  
Bivariate  -4.943 1.928 -2.56 0.22
High  0.936 -0.692 0.814 -0.85 0.76 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, Fragile 
Low -8.993 -5.197 1.898 -2.74 0.20 NCIDIFF, TUDDIFF
92.7% 
 
 170
Table B.3b: Trade specialisation in machinery and transport equipment (CD_MACH)  
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate  -0.720 0.289 -2.50 0.11
High  0.061 -0.446 0.253 -1.76 0.40 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF, SD NEREFragile 
Low -1.516 -0.956 0.280 -3.42 0.25 TOTMKDIFF, TUDDIFF 100% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate  -0.276 0.337 -0.82 -0.00
High  0.457 -0.119 0.288 -0.41 0.09 NCIDIFFFragile 
Low -1.383 -0.514 0.434 -1.18 0.09 TOTMKDIFF, SD NERE, n.a. 
1997-2004  
Bivariate  -3.590 0.536 -6.70 0.60
High -0.566 -1.427 0.431 -3.31 0.78 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFFRobust 
Low -4.680 -3.680 0.500 -7.36 0.61 TUDDIFF
100% 
 
Table B.3c: Trade specialisation in other manufacturing (CD_MANU)  
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate  -0.560  0.266 -2.10  0.03  
High  0.707 -0.062  0.385 -0.16  0.35 
TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, 
NCIDIFF Fragile 
Low -1.376 -0.808  0.284 -2.84  0.16 IRSCDIFF, SD_NERE 
23.8% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate  -0.558 0.319 -1.75 0.03
High  0.493 -0.232 0.362 -0.64 0.12 NCIDIFF, SD NERE, GEODISTFragile 
Low -1.364 -0.645 0.360 -1.79 0.03 SD NERE 1.6% 
1997-2004  
Bivariate   0.427 0.725 0.59 -0.01
High  4.145  2.098 1.023 2.05 0.26 TOTMKDIFF, DEFDIFFFragile 
Low -2.708 -1.803 0.453 -3.98 0.74 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF
n.a. 
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Table B.3d: Trade specialisation in chemicals (CD_CHEM)  
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate  -0.285 0.481 -0.59 -0.01
High  1.321  0.230 0.546 0.42 0.35 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, Fragile 
Low -1.278 -0.510 0.384 -1.33 0.22 DEFDIFF, TUDDIFF n.a. 
1980-1996  
Bivariate   0.265 0.731 0.36 -0.02
High  2.235  0.757 0.739 1.02 0.09 TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIFF, Fragile 
Low -1.498  0.099 0.799 0.12 -0.01 DEFDIFF, TUDDIFF n.a. 
1997-2004  
Bivariate   0.333 0.511 0.65 -0.01
High  4.002  2.161 0.921 2.35 0.29 TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFFFragile 
Low -2.336 -1.616 0.360 -4.49 0.75 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF
n.a. 
 
Table B.4: Economic specialisation patterns (ECOPAT)  
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate  -0.499 0.191 -2.61 0.05
High  0.274 -0.145 0.209 -0.69 0.26 TOTMKDIFF, DEFDIFF, Fragile 
Low -0.980 -0.604 0.188 -3.22 0.07 TUDDIFF 81.0% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate   -0.612 0.305 -2.01 0.05
High  0.194 -0.412 0.303 -1.36 0.13 TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFFFragile 
Low -1.429 -0.902 0.264 -3.42 0.16 NCIDIFF, SD NERE, GEODIST 77.8% 
1997-2004  
Bivariate   -0.473 0.419 -1.13 0.00
High  1.058  0.370 0.344 1.07 0.53 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, Fragile 
Low -1.284 -0.497 0.393 -1.27 -0.01 TUDDIFF
n.a. 
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Table B.4a: Economic specialisation in industry (CD_IND)  
IRSDIFF:  differential between short-term interest rates deflated by the GDP deflators 
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate  -1.979 0.601 -3.29 0.11
High -0.265 -1.156 0.445 -2.60 0.44 IRSDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFFRobust 
Low -3.242 -2.148 0.547 -3.93 0.13 TUDDIFF 100% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate  -2.048 0.903 -2.27 0.06
High  0.126 -1.482 0.804 -1.84 0.11 TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIFF
Quasi-
robust Low -4.462 -2.692 0.885 -3.04 0.11 IRSDIFF, SD NERE, GEODIST 100% 
1997-2004  
Bivariate  -1.717 1.088 -1.58 0.03
High  2.725  0.519 1.103 0.47 0.17 TOTMKDIFF, IRSDIFF, DEFDIFFFragile 
Low -6.016 -3.279 1.369 -2.40 0.22 IRSDIFF, NCIDIFF, TUDDIFF
n.a. 
 
Table B.4b: Economic specialisation in construction (CD_CNT)  
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate   5.426 2.530 2.14 0.03
High  10.862  6.728 2.067 3.25 0.29 IRSCDIFF, SD NERE, GEODISTFragile 
Low -1.522  2.636 2.079 1.27 0.36 TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFF 77.8% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate   11.680 3.584 3.26 0.08
High  20.136  12.476 3.830 3.26 0.10 SD NERE, TUDDIFF, GEODISTRobust 
Low  1.108  8.986 3.939 2.28 0.15 TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFF 100% 
1997-2004  
Bivariate  -0.953 4.160 -0.23 -0.01
High  9.161  4.474 2.344 1.91 0.71 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF, GEODISTFragile 
Low -10.915 -2.919 3.998 -0.73 0.12 TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFF
n.a. 
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Table B.4c: Economic specialisation in wholesale and retail trade (CD_TRA)  
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate  -0.342 0.887 -0.39 -0.01
High  2.954  1.180 0.887 1.33 0.24 IRSCDIFF, SD NERE, GEODISTFragile 
Low -2.267 -0.621 0.823 -0.75 0.20 DEFDIFF, TUDDIFF n.a. 
1980-1996  
Bivariate   0.543 0.748 0.73 -0.01
High  2.676  1.015 0.831 1.22 -0.00 TUDDIFF, GEODISTFragile 
Low -1.543  0.103 0.823 0.12 0.10 NCIDIFF, DEFDIFF, SD NERE n.a. 
1997-2004  
Bivariate  -5.573 2.060 -2.70 0.12
High  1.324 -1.069 1.196 -0.89 0.57 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, Fragile 
Low -9.594 -5.742 1.926 -2.98 0.10 NCIDIFF, TUDDIFF
70.7% 
 
Table B.4d: Economic specialisation in financial intermediation (CD_FIN)  
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate  -0.450 0.396 -1.13 0.00
High  0.982  0.047 0.468 0.10 0.20 TOTMKDIFF, DEFDIFFFragile 
Low -1.429 -0.901 0.264 -3.41 0.41 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF, GEODIST n.a. 
1980-1996  
Bivariate  -1.464 0.482 -3.03 0.10
High  0.021 -1.129 0.575 -1.96 0.15 TOTMKDIFF, DEFDIFFQuasi-Robust Low -2.631 -1.732 0.449 -3.85 0.14 TUDDIFF, GEODIST 100% 
1997-2004  
Bivariate   1.045 0.593 1.76 0.01
High  3.858  2.062 0.898 2.30 0.22 TOTMKDIFF, DEFDIFF, Fragile 
Low -0.439  0.235 0.337 0.70 0.57 IRSCDIFF, TUDDIFF, GEODIST
51.2% 
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Table B.5: Log of bilateral flows of bank assets trade (LBFA) 
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate    0.038 0.011 3.39 0.16
High  0.060  0.039 0.010 3.87 0.13 IRSCDIFF, SD NEREFragile 
Low -0.023  0.005 0.014 0.36 0.34 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFF 69.8% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate    0.025 0.019 1.33 0.02
High  0.088  0.031 0.028 1.10 -0.03 SD NERE, TUDDIFF, GEODISTFragile 
Low -0.101 -0.042 0.030 -1.40 0.21 TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIFF, n.a. 
1997-2004  
Bivariate   0.025 0.010 2.50 0.12
High  0.050  0.028 0.011 2.52 0.12 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFFFragile 
Low -0.020  0.000 0.010 0.01 0.31 IRSCDIFF, DEFDIFF, GEODIST
22.0% 
 
Table B.6: Real short-term interest rate differential (IRSCDIFF) 
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate   -0.049 0.028 -1.73 0.03
High  0.175  0.109 0.033 3.27 0.34 TOTMKDIFF, NCIDIFF, Fragile 
Low -0.107 -0.050 0.028 -1.77 0.03 TUDDIFF 7.3% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate   -0.008 0.018 -0.45 -0.01
High  0.115  0.058 0.028 2.05 0.06 NCIDIFF, TUDDIFFFragile 
Low -0.077 -0.022 0.027 -0.80 0.05 DEFDIFF, SD NERE n.a. 
1997-2004  
Bivariate   -0.417 0.079 -5.28 0.50
High -0.177 -0.328 0.076 -4.33 0.58 TOTMKDIFF, DEFDIFF, Robust 
Low -0.753 -0.596 0.079 -7.59 0.69 NCIDIFF, TUDDIFF
100% 
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Table B.7: Nominal exchange rate volatility  (SD_NERE) 
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate   -0.301 0.107 -2.80 0.10
High  0.289  0.048 0.120 0.40 0.28 NCIDIFF, TUDDIFF, GEODISTFragile 
Low -0.668 -0.404 0.132 -3.07 0.16 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, 36.5% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate    0.006 0.091 0.07 -0.02
High  0.115  0.058 0.028 2.05 0.06 NCIDIFF, TUDDIFFFragile 
Low -0.077 -0.022 0.027 -0.80 0.05 TOTMKDIFF, TUDDIFF
n.a. 
 
 
 
Table B.8a: Fiscal deficit differentials  (DEFDIFF)  
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate   -3.046 0.581 -5.24 0.21  
High -0.794 -1.859 0.532 -3.49 0.43 BTT, IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFFRobust 
Low -4.166 -3.020 0.573 -5.27 0.20 TUDDIFF 100% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate   -1.784 0.573 -3.11 0.07  
High  0.049 -1.186 0.618 -1.92 0.13 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, Quasi-robust
Low -2.940 -1.807 0.567 -3.19 0.03 IRSCDIFF, SD NERE, TUDDIFF 100% 
1997-2004  
Bivariate   -7.801 2.056 -3.80 0.12  
High  0.776 -2.490 1.633 -1.52 0.54 BTT, IRSCDIFF, TUDDIFFFragile 
Low -14.672 -8.610 3.031 -2.84 0.11 NCIDIFF, TUDDIFF
97.6% 
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Table B.8b: Fiscal deficit differentials  (DEFDIFF) with a dummy for the Germany-Finland pair 
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate   -3.003 0.576 -5.22 0.39  
High -0.900 -1.930 0.515 -3.75 0.57 BTT, IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFFRobust 
Low -4.192 -3.006 0.593 -5.07 0.38 TUDDIFF 100% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate   -1.934 0.571 -3.39 0.27  
High -0.169 -1.381 0.606 -2.28 0.33 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, Robust 
Low -3.082 -1.940 0.571 -3.40 0.24 IRSCDIFF, SD NERE, TUDDIFF 100% 
1997-2004  
Bivariate   -8.043 2.205 -3.65 0.11  
High  0.715 -2.601 1.658 -1.57 0.53 BTT, IRSCDIFF, TUDDIFFFragile 
Low -14.842 -8.710 3.066 -2.84 0.09 NCIDIFF, TUDDIFF
97.6% 
 
 
Table B.9: Price competitiveness differentials  (NCIDIFF) W/O geographical distance before 1997 
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate   -2.214 0.461 -4.80 0.26  
High -0.031 -1.410 0.690 -2.04 0.38 BTT, SD NERE, GEODISTRobust 
Low -4.777 -3.435 0.671 -5.12 0.30 IRSCDIFF, TUDDIFF 100% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate   -0.736 0.409 -1.80 0.04  
High  0.532 -0.241 0.387 -0.62 0.14 BTT, DEFDIFF, TUDDIFFFragile 
Low -3.159 -1.781 0.68 -2.58 0.60 IRSCDIFF, SD NERE, TUDDIF 53.7% 
1997-2004  
Bivariate   -1.139 3.038 -0.37 -0.01  
High  17.885  13.791 2.047 6.74 0.70 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFFFragile 
Low -6.979 -1.190 2.894 -0.41 -0.03 TUDDIFF
n.a. 
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Table B.10a: Total stock market differential (TOTMKDIFF) 
 
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate   -0.018 0.011 -1.69 0.0.04  
High  0.010 -0.003 0.007 -0.47 0.29 BTT, IRSCDIFF, DEFDIFFFragile 
Low -0.037 -0.021 0.008 -2.56 0.16 IRSCDIFF, SD NERE, TUDDIFF n.a. 
1980-1996  
Bivariate   -0.031 0.011 -2.88 0.05  
High  0.010 -0.015 0.012 -1.20 0.17 BTT, DEFDIFF, SD NEREFragile 
Low -0.057 -0.034 0.011 -2.97 0.03 SD NERE, TUDDIFF 69.8% 
1997-2004  
Bivariate   -0.036 0.034 -1.09 0.03  
High  0.035  0.002 0.017 0.10 0.51 BTT, IRSCDIFF, SD NEREFragile 
Low -0.108 -0.038 0.035 -1.10 0.00 NCIDIFF, TUDDIFF
n.a. 
 
 
Table B.10b: Stock market differential for cyclical services  (CYSERDIFF)  
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate   -0.008 0.002 -4.70 0.19  
High -0.001 -0.004 0.001 -2.78 0.40 BTT, DEFDIFF, GEODISTRobust 
Low -0.012 -0.008 0.002 -4.97 0.21 TUDDIFF 100% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate   -0.006 0.004 -1.45 0.00  
High  0.007  0.001 0.003 0.38 0.14 BTT, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFFFragile 
Low -0.015 -0.007 0.004 -2.02 0.08 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF, SD NERE n.a. 
1997-2004  
Bivariate   -0.023 0.004 -5.57 0.53  
High -0.000 -0.009 0.005 -2.03 0.76 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFFRobust 
Low -0.032 -0.023 0.004 -5.72 0.54  NCIDIFF, TUDDIFF
100% 
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Table B.11: Differential in trade union membership  (TUDDIFF)  
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate   -0.122 0.171 -0.71 -0.01  
High  0.372  0.077 0.148 0.52 0.34 IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFF, GEODISTFragile 
Low -0.646 -0.323 0.162 -2.00 0.16 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF, n.a. 
1980-1996  
Bivariate   -0.037 0.192 -0.19 -0.01  
High  0.583  0.168 0.207 0.81 0.05 NCIDIFF, SD NERE, GEODISTFragile 
Low -0.499 -0.128 0.186 -0.69 0.03 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF n.a. 
1997-2004  
Bivariate   -0.008 0.334 -0.02 -0.02  
High  1.282  0.500 0.391 1.28 0.34 NCIDIFF, DEFDIFF, GEODISTFragile 
Low -0.783 -0.434 0.175 -2.48 0.52 TOTMKDIFF, IRSCDIFF
n.a. 
 
Table B.12: Geographical distance  (GEODIST) 
Result Estimation Bounds Coefficient
Stdd 
error 
T 
Statistics R2 adj. Z control variables 
Percentage of 
significant 
coefficients 
1980-2004  
Bivariate   -0.116 0.022 -5.24 0.25  
High  0.026 -0.040 0.033 -1.21 0.40 BTT, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFFFragile 
Low -0.162 -0.119 0.021 -5.61 0.23 IRSCDIFF 88.9% 
1980-1996  
Bivariate   -0.045 0.022 -2.05 0.02  
High  0.106  0.039 0.034 1.16 0.15 BTT, NCIDIFF, DEFDIFFFragile 
Low -0.125 -0.072 0.026 -2.76 0.00 SD NERE, TUDDIFF 20.6% 
1997-2004  
Bivariate   -0.305 0.083 -3.68 0.30  
High -0.005 -0.081 0.038 -2.13 0.71 BTT, IRSCDIFF, NCIDIFFRobust 
Low -0.496 -0.321 0.088 -3.67 0.30 TUDDIFF
100% 
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Appendix C
Table C.1: Unit root test results, consumption and GDP, 1995-2005
Country Consumption GDP
Levels Lag Di¤ Lag Levels Lag Di¤ Lag
Euro Area -1.41 4 -1.72* 1 -1.50 4 -1.94* 1
Czech Rep. -1.83 4 -1.12 1 -3.27** 4 -2.62*** 4
Estonia -2.93* 4 -2.54** 1 -2.77 4 -3.43*** 2
Hungary -1.68 4 -0.95 1 -3.17** 4 -1.55 1
Latvia -1.08 4 -1.51 1 -1.20 4 -1.49 1
Lithuania -2.24 4 -1.85* 1 -1.51 4 -2.02** 1
Poland -0.35 4 -0.31 1 -0.96 4 -1.65** 1
Slovakia -1.92 4 -2.06* 1 -1.44 4 -1.23 2
Slovenia -1.76 4 -0.73 4 -0.75 4 -2.36*** 1
Austria -1.65 4 -2.65*** 1 -1.24 4 -2.32** 1
Belgium -1.35 4 -2.60*** 1 -2.13 4 -2.90*** 2
Denmark -1.39 4 -1.88* 1 -1.44 4 -2.27** 1
Finland -1.43 4 -1.96** 1 -1.35 4 -1.87* 1
France -2.21 4 -3.51*** 1 -1.63 4 -1.91* 1
Germany -0.76 4 -1.76* 1 -1.04 4 -2.05** 1
Ireland -1.30 4 -0.72 2 -0.53 4 -0.16 4
Italy -1.95 4 -1.88* 1 -1.36 4 -2.68*** 1
Luxembourg -1.14 4 -2.18** 1 -1.58 4 -1.99*** 3
Netherlands -1.71 4 -0.67 2 -1.83 4 -1.34 1
Spain -2.08 4 -3.39*** 1 -1.61 4 -1.15 4
Sweden -2.14 4 -1.95* 1 -1.71 4 -2.51*** 1
UK -0.01 4 -1.95* 1 -0.39 4 -2.59*** 1
Note: Results of the DF-GLS unit root test by Elliot et al (1996), in the case of
levels including a deterministic trend. The signicance levels are indicated as follows:
*** = 1%, ** = 5%, *=10%. The consumption and GDP data used in this test are not
seasonally adjusted.
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Table C.2: Unit root test, interest rates, NMS
Country Levels Lag Di¤erences Lag
Euro Area 0.35 1 -2.47*** 1
Czech Rep. -1.65* 1 -2.85*** 1
Estonia -0.85 3 -2.07** 2
Hungary -2.33*** 2 -2.25*** 1
Latvia -1.13 1 -2.71*** 1
Lithuania -0.54 1 -1.54 1
Poland -0.80 1 -1.75* 1
Slovakia -1.65* 1 -2.48*** 3
Slovenia -3.13*** 1 -2.13** 1
Note: Results of the DF-GLS unit root test by Elliot et al (1996). The signicance
levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, *=10%. The data used in this test
were calculated using year-on-year CPI ination rates.
Table C3: Unit root test, interest rates, EU-15, 1980-1998
Country Levels Lag Di¤erences Lag
Austria -2.12** 3 -1.42 2
Belgium -1.54 1 -2.32*** 1
Denmark -2.09** 3 -4.77*** 3
Finland -1.03 2 -3.80*** 1
France -0.92 1 -0.67 3
Germany -1.08 1 -2.83*** 1
Greece -0.53 2 -8.95*** 1
Ireland -0.72 2 -1.59 2
Italy -0.91 2 -3.71*** 1
Luxembourg -1.48 1 -2.63*** 1
Netherlands -1.35 1 -2.05** 1
Portugal -2.71*** 1 -2.62*** 2
Spain -2.58*** 1 -6.04*** 1
Sweden -2.90*** 1 -5.59*** 3
UK -1.04 1 -5.44*** 1
US -1.622 2 -1.90* 1
Note: Results of the DF-GLS unit root test by Elliot et al (1996). The signicance
levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, *=10%. The data used in this test
were calculated using year-on-year CPI ination rates.
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Table C.4: Unit root test results, interest rates, NMS-8
Country Levels Lag Di¤ Lag
Euro Area -0.76 3 -3.68*** 4
Czech Rep. -3.03*** 1 -3.39*** 4
Estonia -1.79* 1 -4.78*** 1
Hungary -0.17 4 -3.26*** 1
Latvia -0.80 4 -2.61*** 1
Lithuania -0.70 2 -2.03** 1
Poland -0.58 3 -2.53*** 1
Slovakia -1.58 4 -2.08** 4
Slovenia -1.22 4 -3.20*** 1
Note: Results of the DF-GLS unit root test by Elliot et al (1996). The signicance
levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, *=10%. The data used in this test
were calculated using annualised month-on-month CPI ination rates.
Table C.5: Unit root test results, interest rates, EU-15
Country 1980-1989 1990-1998
Levels Lag Di¤ Lag Levels Lag Di¤ Lag
Austria -2.02** 4 -2.49*** 1 -1.53 4 -2.41*** 3
Belgium -2.78*** 1 -1.50 4 -0.81 2 -2.23** 1
Denmark -4.77*** 1 -2.19** 4 -0.59 3 -1.08 4
Finland -1.40 4 -2.91*** 1 -1.03 4 -1.75* 1
France -1.76* 1 -2.80*** 4 -1.09 2 -2.00** 4
Germany -1.40 2 -2.35*** 1 -1.39 4 -2.20** 1
Greece -1.18 4 -3.79*** 4 -2.32* 1 -2.77*** 1
Ireland -2.41*** 3 -0.83 4 -2.25* 1 -2.98*** 2
Italy -1.80 1 -2.41*** 4 -1.08 3 -3.19*** 2
Luxembourg -2.79*** 1 -3.35*** 1 -0.98 3 -0.84 4
Netherlands -1.49 1 -1.99** 4 -0.78 4 -4.24*** 4
Portugal -1.81 4 -3.28*** 4 -0.74 4 -2.32** 1
Spain -3.08*** 3 -1.73 4 -2.27* 2 -2.76*** 4
Sweden -3.11*** 1 -1.71 1 -1.89 1 -2.23** 4
UK -1.37 4 -3.23*** 1 -1.33 4 -2.77*** 1
US -1.61 1 -2.23** 1 -1.25 2 -1.36 4
Note: Results of the DF-GLS unit root test by Elliot et al (1996). The signicance
levels are indicated as follows: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, *=10%. The data used in this test
were calculated using annualised month-on-month CPI ination rates.
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